Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub

see § 118,) we have the new idea of power. The idea of invariable antecedence, therefore, which of course supposes some sequence, when it is combined with that of Power, constitutes the full notion of CAUSE. When the sequence is found invariably to follow, and its existence cannot be ascribed to anything else, it is called the EF FECT. Accordingly, men usually give the name of events, of occurrences, or facts, to those things which from time to time fall under their notice, when they are considered in themselves. They are the mere facts, the mere events, and nothing more. But when, in the course of their further experience, such events are found to have certain invariable forerunners, they cease to apply these terms, and call them, in reference to their antecedents, EFFECTS. And, in like manner, the antecedents are called Causes, not in themselves considered, but in reference to what invariably comes after.

Cause and effect, therefore, have certainly a relation to each other; it is thus that they exist in the view of the mind and in the nature of things, however true it may be that men are unable to trace any physical connexion between them. We cannot conceive of a cause, if we exclude from the list of our ideas the correlative notion of effect, nor, on the other hand, do we call anything an effect without a reference to some antecedent. These two notions, therefore, involve or imply the existence of each other; that is, are relative.

137. Of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect.

The suggestion of the relation of Cause and Effect exists on occasions almost innumerable; and in all languages gives a character to a multitude of words. This relation is imbodied, for instance, in a multitude of names which are expressive of complex objects, such as printer, farmer, sculptor, warrior, writer, poet, manufacJure, painter.

This may be thus illustrated. When we look at any interesting piece of statuary, the sight of it naturally suggests its author. But when our mind is thus directed from the statue to the sculptor, it is evident we do not think of him as we do of a thousand others, but we com

bine with the conception of the individual a reference to what he has done. We unite with the mere complex notion of man that of a cause, and this combination evidently alters its character, making it relative instead of absolute.—In like manner, when we look at a fine portrait or historical painting, we are naturally reminded of the artist, whose ingenuity has been displayed in its proportions and colouring. But the word painter, which we apply to him, expresses not merely the man, but comprises the additional notion of the relation of cause, which he holds to the interesting picture before us.

138. Connexion of relative suggestion with reasoning.

It may be profitable to notice here the connexion whicn relative suggestion has with reasoning in general. The suggestions of relation (or elementary judgments, as they may perhaps properly be called) are, in some respects, to a train of reasoning, what parts are to the whole. But they evidently do not of themselves include all the parts in a train of reasoning, and are distinguished by this peculiarity, that their office in a great measure is to connect together other subordinate parts in the train. In the combination of numbers, and in the various applications of demonstrative reasoning, the relations of PROPORTION and the relations of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, (otherwise called of AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT,) find a conspicuous place. Moral reasoning embraces all kinds of relations, those of degree, time, place, possession, and cause and effect, as well as of agreement and disagreement, and of proportion. Relative feelings, sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another, continually unfold themselves as the mind advances in argument. So that, although there are elements in reasoning besides perceptions of relation, it is evident that it cannot advance independently of their did. Facts may be accumulated, having close and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but those facts can never be so bound together as to result in any decisive conc usion, without a perception and knowledge of the relat.ons.

CHAPTER V.

ASSOCIATION. (1.) PRIMARY LAWS

139. Reasons for considering this subject here.

IN giving an account of the internal origin of knowi edge, we might be expected to proceed directly from Relative Suggestion to a consideration of the Reasoning power, which is one of the most effective and fruitful sources of intellectual perception. By means of this power, we are enabled to combine and compare the ample materials furnished by ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, and RELATIVE SUGGESTION, and thus to develope in the mind new elements of thought, and to cast light on the darkened places in the field of truth. But there are powers of the mind, subordinate to the reasoning power, and essential to its action, which may with propriety be first considered; particularly Association and Memory. Other persons, perhaps, in examining the various parts of the mind, would propose for the consideration of these powers some other place; but we see no valid objection to considering them here. On the contrary, they have comparatively so little to do with what has gone before, and so much to do with what comes after, and, in particular, are so essential to every process of ratiocination, that this seems to be their appropriate position. As association is presupposed and involved in memory as well as in reasoning, we naturally begin with that principle first.

140. Meaning of association and illustrations.

Our thoughts and feelings follow each other in a regular train. Of this statement no one needs any other proof than his individual experience. We all know, not only that our minds are susceptible of new states, but, what is more, that this capability of new states is not fortuitous, but has its laws. Therefore we not only say that our thoughts and feelings succeed each other, but that this antecedence and sequence is in a regular train

The net

To this regular and established consecution of the states of the mind, we give the name of MENTAL ASSOCIATION.

Illustrations of this important principle, which exerts an influence over the emotions and desires as well as over the thoughts, are without number. Mr. Hobbes relates, ir his political treatise of the Leviathan, that he was once in company where the conversation turned on the English Civil War. A person abruptly asked, in the course of the conversation, What was the value of a Roman denarius? Such a question, so remote from the general direction of the conversation, had the appearance not only of great abruptness, but of impertinence. Hobbes says, that, on a little reflection, he was able to trace the train of thought which suggested the question. The original subject of discourse naturally introduced the history of King Charles; the king naturally suggested the treachery of those who surrendered him up to his enemies; the treachery of these persons readily introduced to the mind the treachery of Judas Iscariot; the cor duct of Judas was associated with the thirty pieces of silver, and, as the Romans occupied Judea at the time of the crucifixion of the Saviour, the pieces of silver were associated with the Roman denarii.

"When I was travelling through the wilds of America," says the eloquent Chateaubriand, "I was not a little surprised to hear that I had a countryman established as a resident at some distance in the woods. I visited him with eagerness, and found him employed in pointing some stakes at the door of his hut. He cast a look towards me, which was cold enough, and continued his work; but, the moment I addressed him in French, he started at the recollection of his country, and the big tear stood in his eye. These well-known accents suddenly roused, in the heart of the old man, all the sensations of his infancy."* --Such illustrations, which appeal to every one's consciousness in confirmation of their truth, show what asso› ciation is.

141. Of the general laws of association.

In regard to Association, all that we know is the fact * Chateaubriand's Recollections of Italy, England, and America

that our thoughts and feelings, under certain circumstances, appear together and keep each other company. We do not undertake to explain why it is that association, in the circumstances appropriate to its manifestation, has an existence. We know the simple fact; and if it be an ultimate principle in our mental constitution, as we have no reason to doubt that it is, we can know nothing more. Association, as thus understood, has its laws. By the Laws of association we mean no other than the general designation of those circumstances under which the regular consecution of mental states which has been mentioned occurs. The following may be named as among the Primary or more important of those laws, although it is not necessary to take upon us to assert either that the enumeration is complete, or that some better arrangement of them might not be proposed, viz., RESEMBLANCE, CONTRAST, CONTIGUITY in time and place, and CAUSE and

EFFECT.

§ 142. Resemblance the first general law of association

A

New trains of ideas and new emotions are occasioned by Resemblance; but when we say that they are occasioned in this way, all that is meant is, that there is a new state of mind immediately subsequent to the perception of the resembling object. Of the efficient cause of this new state of mind under these circumstances, we can only say, the Creator of the soul has seen fit to appoint this connexion in its operations, without our being able, or deeming it necessary, to give any further explanation. traveller, wandering in a foreign land, finds himself, in the course of his sojournings, in the midst of aspects of nature not unlike those where he has formerly resided, and the fact of this resemblance becomes the antecedent to new states of mind. There is distinctly brought before him the scenery which he has left, his own woods, his waters, and his home. The enterprising Lander, in giving an account of one of his excursions in Africa, expresses himself thus. "The foliage exhibited every variety and tint of green, from the sombre shade of the melancholy yew to the lively verdure of the poplar and young oak. For myself, I was delighted with the agreeable ramble; and

« PredošláPokračovať »