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The Affections are distinguished from the other forms of the desirous or propensive nature, besides other subordinate marks or characteristics which will naturally present themselves to our notice as they come separately under examination, in being, in the first place, more complex, and also by the circumstance of their sustaining higher place in the graduation of our esteem and hon our. It may be difficult to explain how it happens, but it is unquestionably the fact, that there is a difference in the sentiments of esteem with which we contemplate different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less honour. In the graduation of our regard, it appears to be the fact, that we generally estimate the appetites as, in some degree, higher than the instincts, and the propensities as higher than either. To the Affections, especially the Benevolent affections, which occupy, in our estimation, a still more elevated position, we look with increased feelings of interest. They obviously stand at the head of the list; and when we shall have completed their examination, nothing more will remain to be said on the regular or ordinary action of the Natural Sensibilities.-We shall then be at liberty to proceed to another and still more important class of subjects

§ 343. Of the complex nature of the affections.

The Affections, unlike the Appetites and Propensities as they exist in their primitive or original developement, are not simple states of mind, but complex. Accordingly, the term AFFECTION denotes a state of mind, of which it is indeed true that some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion in being combined with some form of that state of the mind called DESIRE. "As to every sort of passion," says Kaimes, we find no more in the composition but an emotion, pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire.”

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The affections are susceptible of being divided, although may not be, in all respects, easy to carry the arrange ment into effect in its detail, into the two classes of Benevolent and Malevolent. The malevolent affections, as a general thing, include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire of evil to the unpleasant object The be

nevoient affections, on the contrary, include, for the most part, a pleasant emotion, accompanied with the desire of good to the pleasing object. But what distinguishes and characterizes the two classes, is probably not so much the nature of the emotion as the desire of good or evil which attends it. It is on the basis of this division that we propose to proceed in the examination of this subject.

It is proper to remark here, that the term PASSIONS, in conformity with the authorized usage of language, is susceptible of being employed as entirely synonymous with AFFECTIONS. In this sense we shall sometimes have occasion to use it; although it is frequently the case that it is employed also as expressive, not merely of the existence of the affections, but as implying their existence in a raised ɔr eminent degree.

§ 344. Of resentment or anger.

The first of the MALEVOLENT affections which we propose to consider (that which may be termed the foundation or basis of all the others) is Resentment or Anger This affection, like all others, is of a complex nature, involving an unpleasant or painful emotion, accompanied with the desire of inflicting unpleasantness or pain on the object towards which it is directed. In its original or natural state, the desire appears to be, to some extent, the counterpart of the emotion; that is to say, having experienced an unpleasant or painful emotion, in consequence of the actual or supposed ill conduct of others, we naturally desire, in the exercise of the Resentment arising under such circumstances, a corresponding retribution of pain on the offending agent. But in saying that they are reciprocally counterparts, we do not feel at liberty to assert, although there seem to be grounds for such a suggestion, that they possess to each other a precise and exact correspondence.

There are various modifications of Resentment, so disinct from each other as easily to admit of a separate notice and to be entitled to a distinct name, such as Peevishness, Jealousy, and Revenge. These will be considered, although in as brief a manner as possible, in their proper place. It is necessary to remark a little more at length

apon the passion now before us, which may be regarded as in some important sense the foundation and the place of origin to all the others.

§ 345. Illustrations of instinctive resentment.

The AFFECTIONS, agreeing in this respect with what has been said of the Appetites and Propensities. have a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary; operating, in the one case, suddenly and without thought; in the other, operating on reflection and with deliberate purpose of mind. Accordingly, we proceed to remark, in the first place, on the instinctive form of resentment. The occa

sions on which this form of resentment arises or is liable to arise, are all cases of harm or suffering, whether such harm or suffering be caused intentionally or not. The harm which we experience is followed by the resentment at once; the rapidity of the retributive movement may be compared to that of a flash of lightning; quick as the operation of thought is universally allowed to be, there is no opportunity for its interposition between the harm which has been experienced and the resentment that follows. Under such circumstances it is, of course, impossible that the resentment should be regulated by the con sideration whether the hurt which we have experienced was intentional or not. It is the harm, in itself considered, which arouses us, exclusive of any reference to the cirumstances under which it is inflicted.

We not unfrequently see instances of instinctive resent ment corresponding to what has been said. It is under the influence of this form of resentment that the child who has been accidentally hurt by a stone or a billet of wood, wreaks a momentary anger upon the inanimate object; that the Savage breaks and fiercely tramples on the arrow which has wounded him; and that men, in the first moinents of their suffering, almost universally discover a sudden and marked displeasure with the cause of it.

§ 346. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment. The object (or FINAL CAUSE, as it is sometimes termed) for which the principle of instinctive resentment is implanted in man, seems to be to furnish him with a degr

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of protection in the case of sudden and unforeseen attacks. The reasoning power is comparatively slow in its operation; and if the constitution of our-nature were such as to require us always to wait for its results before acting, we might, in some cases, fail of that protection which an instinctive effort would have given. Hence the practica. importance of this form of the principle under considera. tion.

It may be added, that instinctive resentment has no moral character. It is the glory of the moral nature, that it lays back, if we may be allowed the expressions, of the intellective nature; and that it does not, and cannot, act independently of the antecedent action, to a greater or less extent, of the intellect. In other words, the nature of conscience is such as to require as the basis of its action a knowledge of the thing and its relations, upon which it is about to pronounce its opinion; which knowledge can be acquired only by the perceptive and comparing acts of the intellect. But such is the rapidity of instinctive action, that it entirely excludes a suitable knowledge of the event which calls it forth; and as it in this way excludes the cognizance and authority of conscience, it cannot be said to have a moral character, either good or evil.

§ 347. Of voluntary in distinction from instinctive resentment. The second, and, in a practical and moral point of view, the more important form of this affection is what may be denominated Voluntary Resentment. By inquiring into the cause of the resentment which we have in stinctively experienced, and by suggesting reasons either for its increase or diminution, we are enabled to modify its action, and to impart to it the character of voluntari ness and accountability.

The proper occasion of deliberate cr Voluntary, in distinction from instinctive Resentment, is INJURY, as it stands distinguished from mere harm or hurt. That is to say Voluntary resentment, when exercised in accordance with the intentions of nature, takes into view, not only the harmo or suffering which has been occasioned, but the motive or intention of the agent. The final cause or object of in

stinctive resentment is immediate protection; nor does it appear to have anything further in view. The final cause of voluntary resentment is not only protection, but justice In other words, while it aims to secure protection, it does not propose the attainment of that object, except in conformity with what is strictly proper and right. It al ways, therefore, in its appropriate and legitimate exercise, dispenses its retribution, not simply with a reference to the harm, loss, or suffering which has been endured, but chiefly with reference to the feelings which at the time existed in the mind of the agent or cause of the suffering

A moral character, accordingly, attaches only to the voluntary form of resentment. If there is an exact proportion between the resentment and its cause; in other words, if resentment precisely corresponds to what justice requires, it is right. But if it exceeds this just proportion, it is wrong. This statement is made on the supposition that we are considering the subject by the mere aid of the light of nature, exclusively of the Scriptures. If, under the Christian dispensation, we are required, for high and holy reasons peculiar to that dispensation, to subdue resentful feelings which otherwise might have been justly exercised, that circumstance evidently places the subject in a different light.

§ 348. Tendency of anger to excess, and the natural checks to it. Few principles are more operative in man, in point of fact, than that of resentment. And although, reasoning on the principles of nature merely, without taking into view the duty of forgiveness inculcated in the Scriptures, we may justify its deliberate and voluntary exercise in many cases, it must be admitted, on the whole, that it is particularly liable to a perverted and excessive action. It is too frequently the fact, that man is found wreaking his anger on those who, on a full and candid examination of all the circumstances of the case, would be found entitled to no such treatment.

One cause of the frequency of excessive and unjustifiable resentment is to be found in the fact, that, in consequence of the suffering or loss we endure, our thoughts are wholly taken up with our own situation, and we find

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