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intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, we are accountable also. So far as the action, whether physical or mental, is either involuntary or instinctive, it is not an appropriate object of the notice and adjudication of conscience; for all such action, although it belongs to, and is not separable from, the agent, is nevertheless not under his con trol. Accordingly, when the moral agent, in the exercise of. all his various powers, does what he ought to do, he stands approved. When, in the exercise of the same powers, he fails to do what he ought to do, he stands condemned. The extent of his capability is the basis of his duty; and the law of conscience is the measure of its fulfilment. And this simple statement intimates both the rule by which he is judged, and the vast amount of his responsibility.

End

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

393. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience. We are now prepared, in view of what has been said the last Chapter, particularly in connexion with the subject of the grounds or principles on which changes take place in moral emotions, to proceed to another subject not more interesting than it is practically important.

-The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that those moral decisions or judgments, which, as moral beings, we are capable of forming, are the direct results of REASONING. The advocates of this doctrine, rejecting the idea of a distinct moral principle or conscience, appear to regard the reasoning power as entirely adequate to the causation of all those results in the mind which have a moral aspect. In a word, they may be regarded either as denying entirely the existence of conscience, or, what is philosophically, if not practically, the same thing, as identify. ing it with mere ratiocination.

It is not surprising, on the whole, that this mistake.

which is certainly a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider how close the relation is which reason sustains to conscience. It will be noticed that we speak without any hesitation of the doctrine referred to as a mistaken one. We do not suppose it to be necessary, after what has already been said, to attempt to show that reasoning and conscience are not identical, and that the moral nature has a distinct and substantive existence. Nevertheless, we freely admit the intimate and important relation which they sustain to each other. A relation so important, in a practical as well as in a philosophical point of view, that we shall delay here for the purpose of entering into some explanations of it.

394. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning.

Reasoning, it will be recollected, is purely an intellectual process; consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions, but, in itself considered, involving nothing which is properly called an emotion or desire. This single circumstance separates the reasoning power entirely from the moral nature; which, in its appropriate action, never originates, like the reasoning power, perceptions or new intellectual views, but merely moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation. Probably every one can say with confidence that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement, which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness, there can be no doubt that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the in tellectual perception or suggestion, involved both in the process and the result of reasoning, is another.

Although the reasoning power and the conscience or moral being are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are closely connected in their relations, as has been intimated already, inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the

foundation or basis of moral action.

We must first know

a thing; it must first be an object of perception before we can take any moral cognizance of it. And this is not all. The moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intellectual cognizance. That is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions, in conformity with new facts perceived Consequently, we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision which is founded upon a premature ɔr imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.

395. Illustration of the preceding section.

The views of the preceding section may be easily ilustrated. When, for instance, one man is alleged to have stolen the property of another, we find the conscience, as a general thing, ready to discharge the duty which the Author of our nature has assigned to it; but it is sometimes the case, that its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us, perhaps, that the theft was long and coolly premeditated; and was committed, not only without any special temptation to it, but with a full knowledge of the aggravation of the crime. In view of this state of things, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us, that the theft was committed at a time of extreme want and consequent great temptation; and, furthermore, was committed upon a species of property, in respect to which the right of individual possession is regarded by common consent as less strict and exclusive than in other cases. The conscience here, as in the former instance, condemns the criminal, but probably with a mitigated sentence. On further inquiry we learn, that although the property was taken, and that, too, much to the damage of the owner, it was taken wholly by mis take; it was a thing entirely accidental. In this case conscience, adapting itself to 'he newly-discovered cir

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cumstances, pronounces the supposed thief altogether guiltless.

The conscience, therefore, hc wever distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by the various powers of perception and comparison, particularly by the reason. The reasoning power, however high the rank which we justly ascribe to it, sustains, in this case at least, a subordinate position; and is to be regarded as the servitor and handmaid of the moral power. And, moreover, the latter will vary in exact accordance, if there are no collateral disturbing influences, with the new facts and the new relations, which are from time to time presented by the former. It is in consequence of this close connexion, and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind that this erroneous notion should be corrected, and that the precise relation, existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature, should be fully understood.

§ 396. Of the training or education of the conscience.

We infer, from what has been said in this chapter, that there is such a thing, philosophically considered, as a training or education of the conscience. We propose to remark more fully on the subject of moral education in another place; but we may properly refer to it a moment here, in connexion with the views which have now been taken. No man is at liberty to say, in regard to any given case, that I am willing to refer this case to conscience, and to abide by the decisions of conscience, without first taking the pains to lay the case fully and fairly before the power that is to sit in judgment upon it We might as well expect the judge in a court of civil justice to give an upright decision without facts, without evidence, and without law, as to expect a correct decision from the spiritual judge, that exercises authority in the judgment-seat of the Sensibilities, without a ful and fair presentment of the facts by the Intellect. And when we say it is necessary to make a full statement of the facts, we may add further, that they are to be stated not

only in themselves, but also in their relations and bearings upon each other. This is one form of moral training or moral education. In other words, in order to have a right conscience in respect to the vast multitude of things, which are the proper subjects of moral adjudication, it is necessary to extend the field of our knowledge; to know much, to think much, to compare much.

◊ 397. Of guilt, when a person acts conscientiously. The question has sometimes been started, Whether a person is in any case to be considered as guilty, and to be punished for actions done conscientiously; for instance, when certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act conscientiously in leaving their aged and infirm parents to perish. In view of what has been said in this Chapter, we seem to be prepared to answer this question in the affirmative.

We have seen that the moral nature, in consequence of its intimate connexion with the powers of perception and reasoning, is in some measure under our own control. On the one hand, it may be enlightened and guided; on the other, darkened and led astray, and in some cases be made to approve of actions of the most unworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are to have a right conscience; this great and exalting principle is to receive, and ought to receive, the very first attention; and they are accountable whenever it is neglected. Otherwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse for all the cruelties of the Inquisition, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by the Catholics, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by each other, for all the acts of unkindness and tyranny which have ever been exercised upon individuals and communities.

And the position, that men are accountable and guilty for having a wrong conscience in proportion to their means of knowledge and their ability of rectifying the conscience, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degraded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations. It is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judging in all cases what that degree of guilt is; for no one is competent to it. All that is meant

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