the free intercourse of commodities over an area that has everything to gain from free trade. Czechs and Austrians, we are told, will not buy Hungarian wine, though before the war the gourmets of Prague and Vienna were ready enough to order sweet Tokay. The Rumanian Government places Hungarians in Transylvania under severe disabilities, and in general it may be said that the Treaty of Trianon has been interpreted by the victorious neighbors of Hungary in the spirit of Væ Victis.

'It is easier to explain than to condone this state of mind. Under the old régime Rumanes and others were denied political freedom by their masters the Hungarians, and the persecution of the last few generations is now recoiling upon its authors. The Magyars are a manly, truculent race, accustomed to command; and it is particularly galling to them to be ordered about by those they have ruled for a thousand years. They apparently cherish the hope that they may yet resume their sway over the "lost provinces." That illusion must be dismissed from their minds if they want Europe to help them.

'Whatever the disadvantages of the present economic arrangements, the territorial settlement cannot be reopened now. The temporary dislocation of a transitional period must on no account be allowed to form an excuse for the revision forthwith of a treaty concluded by the great and small Powers in conference and accepted by Hungary. Chaos and war would be the inevitable consequence of tampering with the Treaty of Trianon. It was ratified only in July 1921. There can be no question of its revision less than two years afterwards. If- and the contingency is a remote one - the inhabitants of the ceded districts should after fair trial of their new masters

definitely place before the League of Nations a request to be returned to their old allegiance, then, and not before, the question of a territorial rearrangement may be legitimately discussed.

'Meanwhile there is every reason why the Western Allies should do all in their power to induce the Secession States to adopt a more conciliatory economic policy. Much has already been done by the enlightened Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, M. Bénès. But there are others who still seem to consider that the Danube, instead of being a connecting link between all the c riparian countries, offers a wonderful opportunity to each to obstruct the commerce of the other. The Danube 2 basin forms a natural economic unit, and it is as foolish as it is shortsighted to carve it up by jealousy and distrust into a chessboard of small economic e entities, none of which possesses all the is commodities that it needs.

"The Reparations Commission is t likely soon to take up definitely the question of how much money may properly be demanded of Hungary. A generous attitude is necessary, in the t opinion of our Special Correspondent, if stability is to be restored to Hungarian finances. With the example of Germany before us we may well deem it advisable to recommend that the greater part of the Reparations claim should be waived. At the same time it would not be fair to forget that the Secession States renounced their claims to restitution from Germany on the understanding that they would be t refunded by Austria and Hungary. Their consent must be obtained to any concession made to Hungary; and no concession should be granted without a proviso that Hungary on her part accepts without any mental reservation the territorial settlement concluded at Trianon.'

e

ย

12

How shall we characterize the press the campaign on the other side of the Channel, which purports to describe French militarism and the political isolation of France? While the English publicists are straining every nerve to show the whole world that their own isolation is 'splendid' they redouble their endeavors to demonstrate that French isolation is suspect and dangerous. If you read Lloyd George's speech after the Geneva Conference, you would really think France on the eve of a new catastrophe. The Bolshevist-German Alliance was a valuable bugbear for that cunning manipulator, that daring balancer of European political affairs, to use in bringing pressure upon French statesmen. The political and military results of the Treaty of Rapallo were enlarged beyond measure and exaggerated to suit his taste. Lloyd George's overfertile imagination displayed before us whole forests of RussoGerman bayonets- a kind of punitive expedition of Asiatic and Prussian culture-bearers-marching in the very near future against bourgeois France and all Western civilization. In the inevitable distress that was approaching, Mr. Lloyd George saw no other isle of safety for France save his own 'tight little island,' but he deliberately forgot that the military guaranty had already been drowned in the Channel.

0

English opinion is almost unanimous

with regard to the danger that threatens the French nation, of which they think Great Britain is the only possible preserver. But another reflection suggests itself to those who follow English policy closely and impartially: While all the English statesmen and their newspapers are in perfect agreement over the danger threatening France, they violently oppose their ally's measures for her own security, which they term imperialism and militarism. Heartily glad that their own island is effectively protected by the waves, they generously proclaim that France ought to entrust her fate to Providence. They insist upon seeing in her military precautions an instrument of domination that delays the reconstruction of Europe. These gentlemen in Downing Street never cease to weep crocodile tears with the economist John Maynard Keynes over Germany's terrible lot, meanwhile preaching gentleness and mercy.

Albert Sorel, the famous French historian, used frequently to repeat in his lectures on the diplomatic history of England at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques: 'Remember that England is an island.' He meant that the same laws cannot be applied both to the European Continent and to Great Britain, whose citizens regard the protection of their country after a fashion peculiarly their own. The successor

(1) Every Englishman is filled with belief in the superiority of England. What is made in England is always better than anything outside.

(2) The English statesman never troubles himself with considerations of a legalistic nature. In his firm determination to attain his end, he regards that end as justifying the means.

(3) The diplomacy of the Foreign Office does not understand the word 'Alliance' in the same way as Continental diplomats.

In English foreign policy there is a line of conduct from which no statesman of the island ever departs. This unity of opinion constitutes the strength of that formidable empire, which dominates the world, and whose power is based on an unvarying foreign policy. A striking likeness appears between the acts of the successive diplomats of England in the various epochs of history and shows us that the English are always struggling toward a single end: to consolidate their mastery of the sea by jealously guarding the route to India. History teaches us that no English politician takes the responsibility of mortgaging his country's future by any engagement whatever that can hamper the freedom of action of his successors for any length of time. This way of thinking is too characteristic and too well established during the centuries by the traditional policy of the island for anyone to think of modifying it to-day. These characteristics ought to be a political compass for Continental diplomats in everything that concerns Great Britain.

It is absolutely useless to cling constantly to England with a view to securing a guaranty of French security. or to seek execution of the treaties in England. The successive appeals to London diminish French prestige indefinitely. We saw M. Clemenceau, C give up essential clauses in the Treaty! of Versailles in order to obtain a pact of guaranty with England - and why? In 1919, the Entente Cordiale was already deada fact that is so clear and evident that there is no use trying to show it. From that date, France has been constantly playing the part of the horse in the 'alliance of the man and the horse' of which Palmerston spoke.

In analyzing impartially political events then and since, we must understand that at Versailles France simply capitulated before the Anglo-Saxons. The reason is simple: Russia's place at her side was empty. The French nation, however, was not alone in surrendering to the island. All the rest of the Continent did likewise. The balance sheet of war and peace thus far shows that the hegemony of Prussianized and materialistic Germany before the war — which, however, was tempered by the Franco-Russian Alliance has been replaced by the hegemony of England. There is no doubt that it is a domination of the most civilized kind, but domination none the less it is.

Our disillusion was complete when the American Senate wholly rejected the engagements that President Wilson had made in Europe. Each of the two Anglo-Saxon worlds took refuge beneath its own particular umbrella. The English vanished under the doc-| trine of 'splendid isolation,' while the Americans returned to the 'Monroe Doctrine.'

Another combination was eventually to guarantee the future of France and

the order of Europe. This was the League of Nations, the great illusion of tour day. As we look at this institution in operation, and at the elements that dominate in it, we must recognize it as a marvelous piece of political machinery that aids the Anglo-Saxons in their exercise of world domination. The rôle of the British Empire in this world confederation is exactly that of Prussia in her ancient Bundesrat. The English Secretary-General is a good sound stick in English hands wherewith to master the smaller members, just as the Chancellor of the German Empire once was in the hands of the Kaiser.

-

We know a thing or two, we Serbians. The terrible ultimatum launched at us in the name of the League of Nations last year and all because we were defending our frontiers against the Albanian bandits taught us that but one will is to be respected in this organization, which supposedly grants equality to its members- the will of England. The dictator, Lloyd George, was pitiless toward us. In spite of our haste to carry out his personal direcstions strictly, in order not to disturb him further, he haled us before the bar of justice, and this at the side of the Albanians.

Another event which took place when the Bolsheviki invaded Poland proves that Great Britain acts as the master of the League of Nations. When certain members of that League spoke of intervening to save Poland, Lloyd George cried ironically: 'No use appealing to the Council of the League of Nations, since you are sure in advance there will be no unanimous decision.' That imperfect institution, however, offers no one a guaranty · since it has no armed force at its disposal it cannot impose its will, as the cases of Poland and Prussia show clearly.

A third and last combination might

perhaps have procured for France a kind of guaranty - I mean a Latin Alliance. But this is a bad horse for the international political race, one which France ought not to mount on any pretext, for she will come tumbling off at the first obstacle.

To put it in a nutshell, France can count neither on the Anglo-Saxon world nor on the Latins, still less on the League of Nations. Is there any other way for the French nation to protect itself against a revengeful Germany? Of course there is. The Little Entente seems obviously indicated, and the whole of the younger Slavic world asks nothing better than to tighten the links of friendship binding it to France.

There is no use troubling our heads with chimerical possibilities. One political alliance only is capable of giving our great ally guaranties in case of war, and of bringing to Europe the necessary stability. That is a Slav alliance. The European War proved it. While on one side the Anglo-Saxons were hesitating and their Latin brothers were changing from one alliance to another- the Rumanians were selling their wheat for German gold and letting German cannon pass through their country to Turkey- the French and the Slavs were already fighting in firm and brotherly association on every front.

After a glance at the course of political events in Europe since the catastrophe, we are justified in drawing one conclusion: the principle of equilibrium will dominate in the twentieth century as it has in all those that have preceded. We are at present in a period of transition, while the regrouping in quest of a balance of power in the Old World is taking place. In this undeniable state of chaos, alliances seem the only means of guaranty against states that seek to make themselves dominant.

It is of special importance to draw a

distinction between political agreements that arise from the nature of things and artificial agreements whose origin is purely diplomatic. Natural alliances are those in which identical interests exist, and they do not change for a long period. Such alliances are ordinarily demanded by the geographical situation. Two countries whose territories are diametrically opposed, while their interests are identical, naturally approach one another. As Bismarck said: "The Franco-Russian Alliance results from circumstances.'

History furnishes us with two examples of artificial alliances, due merely to occasion-Italy in the Triple Alliance, and England in the Entente Cordiale. In spite of treaties constantly renewed and reënforced, Italy not only abandoned her German ally at the first opportunity, but was not slow in turning against her. Great Britain's position in the Entente Cordiale at the beginning of hostilities is especially significant, and is but another illustration of her statesmen's special way of seeing things. Although bound by definite engagements in elaborate treaties, the English replied to M. Poincaré's telegram with a great deal of courtesy and kindness, but without promising anything. It was only when one Belgian fort after another was falling, and the Kaiser's troops made their appearance on the Channel, that the diplomats and the Foreign Office suddenly remembered the existence of a treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality and bearing the signature of their country.

That shows that neither England nor anyone else came to fight by France's side for the fun of it. Under the common menace of German imperialism, the powers naturally drew closer to one another. They fought together so long as the danger existed. Once that was gone their community of

interest no longer existed, and eac resumed the traditional policy suite to it. They drew further apart quite as logically as they had drawn closer together, pursuing new purposes conforming to the interests that their new circumstances created.

An alliance due to the nature of things can be concluded to-day only between France and the Little Entente. France, being a Continental power. must naturally be concerned first of all with her position on the Continent. Prudence bids her throw in her lot with that of other Continental states whose interest requires the execution, not the abolition, of the treaties. The moment seems to have arrived for a thoroughgoing application of Talleyrand's celebrated doctrine- to group middlesized states, especially Slavic ones, about France, in order to stabilize the European situation and procure the execution of the treaties that will produce work, security, and prosperity, and to oppose this Continental bloc to 'Anglo-Saxon hegemony.'

Let there be no mistake. The Little Entente is called on to play a political, military, and economic rôle of the first importance. Supplied by Czechoslovak factories with materials of war, the armies of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, which in time of war amount to two million men, will be a formidable implement in the hands of a clever diplomat. Lloyd George was the first to understand the military importance of our country. Before his fall he offered us Constantinople in order to save the Greeks and the prestige of his personal policy.

How odd are the caprices of fortune! In 1921 the English ex-Premier was overwhelming us with humiliating ultimatums. More recently, all smiles, he was offering us the richest presents. M. Pachitch unfortunately could have nothing to do with such combinations.