PART III

THE BOER ULTIMATUM AND ARMAMENT

WAR

AR became officially inevitable on the 9th of October, 1899. Unofficially, it had been inevitable for nearly twenty years. During the whole of that period the Transvaal and the Free State Governments had been arming themselves, upon a scale entirely inconsistent with any mere purpose of maintaining their position among South African States> They were in no danger of aggression from their white neighbours, and they were already sufficiently armed to safeguard them against native risings.

The warlike preparations assumed, after the Jameson Raid, proportions which told all too plainly the end in view. An enormous number

This section and Chapter VII., and the Summary of Events since the relief of Kimberley, have been prepared in London, under the author's direction, as his absence at the seat of war made it impossible for him to consult the records, and gather the material himself.

of field guns of the latest Krupp and Creusot patterns, guns of position, such as the famous "Long Tom," Mauser rifles by the hundred thousand, and cartridges by tens of millions, were poured into Pretoria and Bloemfontein, mainly through the ordinary trade avenues of Cape Colony and Natal.

The British Government took no notice of all this, though foreign residents in Johannesburg knew perfectly well what was going on, and to them, at least, it was no secret that, when the time came, the Dutch Republics would strike a blow for independence.

Still the British Government took no notice. Computations were made by the landrosts and field cornets as to the number of available fighting men, and it was openly stated that at least 60,000 burghers, practically all mounted, could be put into the field. Why? The decisive moment arrived, as has been stated, on the 9th of October, when, after months of shilly-shallying, the Boer Government presented to the British agent at Pretoria a document, which was described by Lord Salisbury as "an audacious defiance."

Although not in form an ultimatum as usually understood in diplomacy, it was so in effect. It

threw off every vestige of allegiance to the British crown; it repudiated any right on the part of her Majesty's Government to interfere in the affairs of the Transvaal; it complained of the massing of troops on the borders of the republic; and it made the cool demand that the troops on the borders should be instantly withdrawn; that all our reinforcements which had arrived since January 1st, 1899 should be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time; and that her Majesty's troops then on the high seas should not be landed in any part of South Africa.

Failing a satisfactory answer to these demands before 5 p.m.," the message continued, "the Transvaal Government will, with great regret, be compelled to regard the action of her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, for the consequence of which it will not hold itself responsible. Any further movement of troops in the nearer direction of the Transvaal borders will

also be regarded as a formal declaration of war.">

The British reply was brief and to the point. It merely announced that her Majesty's Government had no further communication to make to Mr. Kruger at that moment. There was then in

Natal a total British force of about fourteen thousand men; in Cape Colony there was only the ordinary garrison. Practically the whole of the British frontiers were undefended, and what this meant was perceived clearly enough, although too late, when it was announced that the Orange Free State intended to throw in its lot with the Transvaal.

Nothing was at that time accurately known as to the armaments of the Boers. All that the British Government seemed aware of was that the Boers had laid in an enormous store of artillery, and small arms, and ammunition. Nor was anything very clearly understood as to the disposition of the Boer forces. Mr. Kruger's chief complaint against Great Britain was that it had enormously increased its troops on the borders of Cape Colony and the two Republics.

In point of fact, as we knew to our cost later, he himself, and his brother President of the Orange Free State, had made far more extensive and aggressive preparations for war on their sides of the frontier Large camps had been formed at Volksrust and Sandspruit in Transvaal territory; the Free Staters had gathered strong forces at Harrismith; and all was in readiness to

occupy Laing's Nek, and the other passes through the Drakensberg mountains.

On the British side there was only the Natal field force of fourteen thousand men, while, on the other frontiers at Kimberley and Mafeking, there were only three thousand and two thousand five hundred respectively. Even then the British Government do not appear to have realised the seriousness of the task before it. It was not until the war had made some progress, and the surprisingly large strength of the republican forces became developed, that the Government at home made up its mind to anything like effective action.

When, however, it did act, it made a show of considerable vigour. It decided to despatch to South Africa, under General Sir Redvers Buller, a complete army corps of fifty thousand men. This corps was mobilised with great rapidity, and in a very few days the troops were on the transports and afloat. Divisional commands were given to Lord Methuen, Sir William Gatacre, and Sir Francis Clery.

As time went on, and the fortunes of war went steadily against the British, measures were taken on a still vaster scale, and so important were these that they ultimately rose to the dimen