have been able to give to this great question that for many years has occupied my mind, and from every day's experience to the prefent hour, I am more and more convinced that the refering the right of voting univerfally to every man, not incapacitated by nature for want of reafon, or by law for the commiffion of crimes, together quit annual elections, is the only reform that can be effectual and permanent. I am further convinced that it is the only reform that is practicable. All other plans that are of a palliative nature have been found infufficient to intereft and animate the great body of the people, from whofe ennettaefs at ne any reform can be expected. A long exclufion from any fhare in the legislature of their country has rendered the great mals of the people indifferent whether the monopoly that fibits continues in the hands of a more or lefs extended company; or whether it is divided by them into thares of fomewhat more or lefs juit proportions. The public feels itfelf unconcerned in thefe contefts, except as to the opprettions it Endures, and the exactions it futters, which it knows mult continue to long as the people remain deprived of all control over their reprefentatives. This indifference of their's, when the latt attempt was made for additional county members, was ufed by our opponents as an argument against all retorm; it was atked with a triumphant air, where are the petitions from the inhabitants of Birmingham, Manchetter, Hallifax, and other great unreprefented towns? And their lence was deemed a proof their acquiefcence and fatisfaction in the prefent form of elections! The truth is, that the people have been to often deceived, that they will now fcarcely truft any fet of men; and nothing but felf-evident conviction, that a measure tends effectually to the recovery of their rights, can, or indeed ought to intereit them in its favour.

The letter reform has been attempted with every pollible advantage in its favour; not only from the zealous fupport of the advocates for a more effectual one, but from the affittance of men of great weight both in and out of power. But with all thefle temperaments and helps it has failed. Not one profelyte has been gained from corruption, nor has the leaft ray of hope been held out from any quarter that the Houte of Commons was inclined to adopt any other mode of reform. The weight of corruption has cruthed this more gentle, as it would have defeated any more ethcacious plan in the fame circumftances. From that quarter, therefore, I have nothing to hope. It is from the people at large that I expect any good. And I am convinced that the only way to make them feel that they are really concerned in the butinefs, is to contend for their full, clear, and indifputable rights of univerfal reprefentation. I call them fuch, not only from my own conviction, but from the admition of the friends to the more moderate plan, who, in the fecond addrefs of the Yorkinire Committee to the people, contels that our claims are founded on the true principles of the conftitution, and only object to them on account of impracticability. But their plan has now had a fair trial, and (if it is from the inclination of parliament that practicability is to be expected) has been found as impracticable as our's. The

more extenfive plan, at the fame time that its operation is more complete, depends on a more effectual fupport-that of the people.

I am alio perfuaded that if the theme for additional county members had proceeded any farther, intinite difficulties would have arilen in adjusting it. Neither the Yorkshire Committee nor Mr. Pitt have given the detail of their plan. A just reprefentation would have been a moit intricate task, for where different interefts are feparately reprefented, the proportion is not very eafy to afcertain. The doubt you ftate concerning this mode of reform appears to me well founded; a few great families might divide a county between them, and chute the meribers by a Houfe Lift, like Eat-India Directors. Another ditficulty from the inercafe of the number of members, which might render the Houfe more tumultuous than deliberative, has its weight. But the greatest objection, in my opinion, to this and to every other narrow and contracted plan of reform, is, that it proceeds upon the fame bad principle as the abufe it pretends to rectify; it is still partial and unequal; a vaft majority of the community is ftill left unreprefented; and its mott effential concerns, life, liberty, and property, continued in the abfolute difpofal of thofe whom they do not chufe, and over whom they have no control. In the arrangements of plans of this kind, there is no leading principle to determine that the addition ought to be one hundred, fifty, or two hundred; that the allotment thould be according to the population, property, or taxes paid in each county; that any fuppofed proportion between the landed and trading intereft is the jutt one, and that the divifion of county and city members will correfpond with this proportion when found All is at fea without any compafs, to enable us to diftinguith the fate from the dangerous

courie.

But in the more liberal and great plan of univerfal reprefentation a clear and distinct principle at once appears, that cannot lead us wrong? not conveniency but right: if it is not a maxim of our contitution, that a Britith fubject is to be governed only by laws to which he has confented by himself or his reprefentative, we should instantly abandon the error; but if it is the efential of freedom, founded on the eternal principles of justice and wildom, and our unalienable birth right, we thould not hesitate in afferting it. Let us then but determine to act on this broad principle, of giving to every man his own, and w. thall immediately get rid of all the perplexities to which the narrow Lotions of partiality and exclusion must ever be fubject.

In the digesting a plan upon this noble fourdation we thall not find any difficulty, that the moft common undertanding and pains will not easily furmount. It does not require half the ingenuity of a common tax-bill; and as a proof of this flertion, I myfelt drew the form of a bill for this purpofe, which I prefented to the Houfe of Lords in 1780; not as a perfect work, but merely to thew how easily the objections to the practicability of the plan, and the inconve niences that are fuggested, might be got over.

I believe the fending you a copy of my bill will be the best way of capluning its op.rations. 324

I have not one ready at this moment, but it thall foon follow this letter.

I fhall, therefore, only mention at present a few of its provifions, which I think entirely remove the most plaufible objections that have been urged against it.

The prefent number of members in the Houfe of Commons is preferved, fo that all apprehenfion from too numerous an aflembly ceates.

An account of the whole number of males of age in the kingdom is to be taken and divided by the number of members to be fent, which will find the quota of electors to chufe one member; from the best accounts I can now get, it will be about two thousand fix hundred; thefe are to be formed into districts or boroughs from the most contiguous parishes; and by having all the elections throughout the kingdom in one and the fame day, and taken in each parifh, all fear of riot and tumult vanilhes.

The great expence of elections, which arifes chiefly from the coft of conveying electors to the place of poll, and entertaining them there and on the road, will be no more when every man will vote in his own parith. Bribery mutt entirely ceafe; in a figle borough it would be difficult, on fo many as to have any effect, impoffible. The numbers to be bought would be infinitely too great for any purfe. Besides, annual parliaments, by their frequency, and by their hortnefs, would doubly operate in preventing corruption.

The vaft expence of petitions to parliament, on account of illegal returns, would be reduced almoft to nothing. The points on which thefe contents generally turn, are the qualifications of the electors under the numberlefs refrictions the prefent laws have impoted, which require the attendance of witnefles, the production of records, and are fubject to infinite difpute. But when no other qualification fhall be neceffary but that of being a British fubject, and of age, there can be but little left to contend upon as to the right of electors to vote. All other questions that could afford ground for a petition would be trifling, and might be decided in one day. Many other objections are obviated by the bill, but it is needlets here to mention them.

But diere.. another fort of objection against which no previfion can be made, as it is merely imaginary. It is teared by fome, that the influence of power and riches will give to the arifocracy fo great a lead in thofe elections as to place the whole government in their hands. Others again dread, that when paupers and the lowest orders of the people thall have an equal vote with the first commoner in the kingdom, we shall fall into all the confufion of a democratic republic. The contrariety of thefe two apprehenfions might of itflf be a fufficient proof that neither extreme will take place. It is true, that the poorest man in the kingdom will have an equal vote with the first, for the choice of a perion to whom he trufts his all; and I think he ought to have that equal degree of lecurity againit oppreffion. It is alfo true, that men of fuperior tortunes will have a luperior ccgree of weight and influence; and I think that as education and knowledge generally attend property, thote who pollefs them

ought to have weight and influence with the more ignorant. But the effential difference will be, that although the people may be led they cannot be driven. Property will have its weight, as it ever must have in all governments; and I conceive that in this plan, it will precifely find its juft proportion combined with talents and character. A man of great property that is beloved and esteemed will, as he ought, have the greateft fway; but tyranny and oppreffion, though attended with riches, may be refitted, and will no longer be attended with a burgage

tenure at command.

Another fubject of apprehension is, that the principle of allowing to every man an equal right to vote tends to equality in other refpects, and to level property. To me it feems to have a direct contrary tendency. The equal rights of men to fecurity from oppreffion, and to the enjoyments of life and liberty, ftrike me as perfectly compatible with their unequal shares of induftry, labour, and genius, which are the origin of inequality of fortunes. The equality and inequality of men are both founded in nature: and whilst we do not confound the two, and only fupport her establishments, we cannot err. The protection of property appears to me one of the most effential ends of fociety; and fo tar from injuring it by this plan, I conceive it to be the only means of picferving it; for the prefent fyftem is hattening with great ftrides to a perfect equality in univerfal poverty.

It has been faid, that this plan of extending the right of voting to every individual creates much uneafinefs in the minds of quiet and well difpofed perfons; and that if paupers, vagabonds, and perions of no property, were left out, there would be no objection to extend it to all householders and perfons paying taxes, and that the fame divif'on into diftricts might take place. My anfwer is, that I know of no man, let him be ever fo poor, who, in his confumption of food and ufe of raiment, does not pay taxes; and that I would with to encourage an enthusiasm for his country in the breath of every fubject, by giving him his juft fhare in its government. readily admit, that fuch an alteration would be a vaft improvement; but I must prefer the adhering rigidly to a felf-evident principle, efpecially when attended with no inconvenience in the execution, that I can forelee. Belides, we 1hould again fall into the difficulties of drawing the line of feparation, and into the difputes about qualification.

The apprehenfions that our government will become too democratic, have been urged on another ground. It has been faid, that the Houte of Commons has ufurped the whole power of government: that the crown in reality no longer poifeiles its negative, and muft in all things be ruled by the Houfe of Commons: that the Houte of Lords, in confequence of its exclufion (by the will of the Houte of Commons, and not by law) from interfering in money bills, no longer in fact exercifes the functions of a branch of the legislature: that the only means by which the balance of the conftitution is now in any degree preferved, is by the irregular influence of the Crown and of the Peers in the Houte of Commons: and that it they are totally excluded

As to the 7th question, whether it would not be equitable or expedient that boroughs now in the polletion of individuals thould be purchafed by the nation; I think, that although no man can have a strict claim in equity to be refunded the lofs of what neither buyer nor feller had a right to barter, yet it will be wife to purchate the good-will, or at least to feften the refiftance of the prefent powertul pofleflors of boroughs by a molt ample compenfation. The liberties of a nation cannot be bought too dear, but the whole cost of thefe boroughs would not amount to the profits of one jobbing contract.

I have now anfwered all the questions you have been pleased to propote, but I muit mention another advantage, which ought to recommend the measures you are purfuing to every friend to the internal peace and quiet of the kingdom, which is, that when the people have obtained a regular, legal, and fpeedy way of giving effect to their fentiments, there can no tonger be any apprehenfion of their endeavouring to redrels themfelves by mobs and tumults; and even fuch regular and well-conducted meetings as your's will become needlefs. I mention this circumitance with the more fatisfaction, as it tamps your conduct with the most unequivocal marks of difinterested patriotifm. Power, when once acquired, is generally endeavoured to be preferved by its pofleflors; but you, after having taken up your's from neceffity, and employed it ufefully, are now endeavouring with unexampled virtue to render its continuance unnecetiaTV. For great as your fervices have been, in fo foon, forming a complete army, in the advanTages you have procured for your country, in the good order you have preferved, and in the efficacy you have given to law, you will derive till greater credit, in my opinion, from your good fenfe in feeing that a great military torce totally unconnected with the civil government cannot be a permanent eftablithiment in a free country, whofe first principle is, never to truft abfolute power in any hands whatever. Your prefent endeavours to restore the conftitution to rs purity and vigour evidently tend to make this and every extraordinary institution unneceffary; for when the people are fairly and equally reprefented in Parliament, when they have annual opportunities of changing their deruties, and through them of controlling every abufe of government in a fafe, eafy, and legal way, there can be no longer any reafon for recurring to thofe ever dangerous though fometimes necellary expedients of an armed forc:, which nothing but a bad government.can juíhite, Such a magnanimous end to your proceedings, when, after having restored liberty," coinmerce, and free government to your country, you shall voluntarily retire to the noble character of avate citizens, peaceably ploying the bleflings

have procured, will crown your labours with everiefting glory, and is worthy the geDuine patroric fphit which animates the Irish

Volunteers.

Betore I conclude, I beg leave to exprefs a with, that the mutually ellential conne tion between Great Britain and Ireland may foon be fettled on iome liberal and txir footing. That

which did fubfit was on fuch narrow and abfurd principles that no friend to either kingdom can regret its lots. Founded on constraint and dependence, incompatible with the condition of freemen, Ireland had an indifputable right to diffolve it whenever the chose so to do. But furely, if we do not mean a total feparation, it would be right to agree upon fome new terms by which we are to continue connected. I have always thought it tor the intereft of the two islands to be incorporated and form one and the fame kingdom, with the fame legislature meeting fometimes in Ireland as well as in England: but if there are difficulties to fuch an union not to be got over at prefent, fome fort of fæderal union at least between the two kingdoms feems neceifary to afcertain the many circumstances that concern their joint interefts; and an union of this fort may now be formed with much greater propriety than before, as it will be fanctified by the free content of independent nations.

I do conceive that fome ftep of this fort is abfolutely necellary, becaufe the prefent footing, of feparation, rather than union, is too unfair to be able long to fubfift. England, befides the load of the whole debt contracted for the ufe of both kingdoms, bears all the burdens of naval defence and foreign negociations, and by far more than its proportion of the land fervice in time of war. But what is worie, is, that there is no certainty now left that we shall have the fame enemies and the fame friends: different interefts, as they may appear, may lead one kingdom to think a war neceflary, and the other to remain in peace: the fame King, in his different kingdoms, may think it wife to follow the advice of his refpective parliaments: 1 need fcarcely add, that the unavoidable confequences of fuch a difference are a war between the two kingdoms. Unlefs fome fettlement takes place upon thefe and many other impor tant fubjects, I am far from being clear that it will be for the advantage of liberty in either kingdom, that its monarch fhould continue the fovereign of a neighbouring ftate with which it his no connection. I am fenfible that there are great difficulties attending the adjustment of fuch an union, and that it requires great wifdom and temper to form it, cfpecially on the part of Irciand, which muft feci that the ought to give the preponderance to Great Britaiif; but I am fure the bufnels ought not to be neglected, and that every true friend to both kingdoms ought to give it his mott zealous affittance.

I beg pardon for having gone into a subject not imidiately belonging to that upon which you have detired my opinion; but I thought it io connected with it, and at the fame time fo important, that I truit you will excufe my having introduced it. I fear I have been very long; but it was impoffible for me to compress to much matter into a lets compais; and when you withed to have my opinion, I thought it best to give it fully, or at least as fully as I could in a letter I it contains one thought that can be uietul, I fhall be happy. I have only to affure the committee of the real I feel for the caufe the Voluntier have undertaken, to the fupport of