parcel of children living fo, would, by the time they came to be of age, have formed fome kind of language. On the other hand, I maintain, that the faculty of speech is not the gift of nature to man, but, like many others, is acquired by him; that not only there must have been fociety before language was invented, but that it must have fubfifted a confiderable time, and other arts have been invented, before this moft difficult one was found out; which appears to me of fo diffcult invention, that it is not easy to account how it could at all have been invented.

CHA P. II.

Of Capacities,-Powers,-Habits,and Faculties in general.

I

THE queftion ftated in the preceeding chapter never has been fully confidered, fo far as I know, though it appears to me curious and interefting. will therefore endeavour to examine it to the bottom; and, as it concerns powers and faculties, before I come to speak of the faculty of speech in particular, I think it will be neceffary, for the better understanding

the argument, to premife fome obfervations concerning powers and faculties in ge

neral.

With respect to which, there are four things that deserve to be diftinctly confidered: ft, The energies, or operations of such faculties. With these I begin; because they are first in the order of our conceptions, being perceived by the sense; whereas powers and faculties are latent things, and an object of intellect, not of fenfe. 2dly, There is the faculty which is the immediate cause of those energies, and without which we cannot conceive them to be produced. 3dly, The habit* or difpofition which is productive of the faculty; for every faculty is the refult of a previous habit or dispofition, without which it cannot exist. And, laftly, The mere power, or capacity of acquiring fuch habit. These two last are both, in the language of antient philofo- c phy, called by the name of power†: But the diftinction is made betwixt that power

The word habit I use in the fenfe of the Greek word

This I think proper to obferve; because the word in English is frequently ufed to denote that cuftom or use by which any habit is formed, by a metonymy, not unufual in language, from the effect to the caufe.

+ Δυναμις,

which immediately produces the act, and that which is remoter, and may be faid to be only the power of powert. And I would chufe to distinguish them by different names, calling the one faculty, and the other capacity. And as faculty and habit, though in their natures diftinct, are so neceffarily conjoined, that the one can never exift without the other, however neceffary may be in other arguments to diftinguish them, I do not think it is fo in this; and therefore I shall, for the greater part, speak of them indifcriminately, under the name of either faculty or habit, as it happens. But as there is no fuch neceflary connection be

it

See this diftinction made by Ariftotle, in his 8th book, De Phyf. Auditione, and explained at length by his commentator Simplicius, fol. 281. The example Ariftotle gives, is that of a man who has not learned any art, but has the capacity to learn; and one who has learned it, but is not actually performing its energies. Both are faid to be artifts durauer, but in different fenfes; which therefore I have chofen to diftinguish by different appellations. Simplicius very well obferves, that this fecond kind of power, or faculty, as I chufe to call it, lies in the middle betwixt mere power, or capacity alone, and energy, participating of each; that is, betwixt what is moft imperfect in nature, and what is most perfect; for mere capacity is most imperfect, pure energy most perfect.See the following note.

twixt the faculty and the energy, or betwixt the capacity and the faculty, (for the faculty may not operate, nor the capacity be carried the length of faculty), these two must be confidered and treated of as diftinct from energy, and from one another.

It will be neceffary, for the fake of those who are unacquainted with the antient philosophy, to illuftrate my meaning by fome examples, both from nature and from art. Every animal, and vegetable too, when it is firft produced, has no more than the mere capacity of generating, or producing its like; but, in procefs of time, this capacity grows into habit, and the confequential faculty; and when opportunity offers, the faculty is exercised, and produces acts and energies. And with respect to art, a man when he is born, has, from nature, the capacity of being a musician, e. g.; afterwards he forms the habit, and acquires the faculty; and then he actually performs when he thinks it proper. These examples will be fufficient to fhew what I mean by the terms I have used; and thefe differences may be obferved betwixt art and nature in this matter. In the 1st place, Capacity merely is all from nature; for, even in matters of art, the

capacity that any man has to become an artift, or that any subject has to be operated upon by art, is from nature fingly. 2dly, Habit or faculty is, in matters of art, acquired by use, imitation, or instruction; whereas, in natural things, it is the production of nature fingly, without any preceeding use, exercise, or inftruction. And, laftly, The energies in natural things proceed either from certain laws of nature, which is the cafe with respect to inanimate things, or from a certain inward principle, commonly known by the name of inftinct, as in the case of brute animals: But, in matters of art, they proceed from that impulfe, moving the rational mind to action, which we call will *.

* What is faid here of powers and capacities, is, I think, fufficient for the prefent purpose. Who would know more of this matter, may read what follows, taken from the abftrufe or Acroamatic philofophy, as Ariftotle calls it, contained in his books of Phyfics and Metaphyfics. All things in nature exift either in capacity merely, or actually and really; that is, as it is expreffed by Ariftotle, either duvaμs, or gysg. Betwixt these two there is a progreffion both in nature and art, and which is the caufe of all the productions of either; for every thing that is generated, or produced, proceeds from a ftate of nothing more than capacity, to a state of actual existence. Thus plants and animals are produced from feeds and em.