CHAP. III. Of the Powers and Faculties of Human Na ture. Hus far of powers and faculties in TH ge neral. But, before we come to speak of the faculty of speech in particular, it may bryos, which are no more than plants and animals in capacity: And, with refpect to works of art, the statue is in the block of marble duvaμes, but it does not actually exift till it gets its form from the artift; and the artist himself was at first only an artist in capacity. This progress, by which every thing in nature or art is produced, is what is commonly called motion: Which is therefore fomething more than mere capacity, but lefs than energy or actual existence; for it cannot be faid to have any fixed or permanent existence of any kind, nor to be in any ftate, being truly a paffage betwixt two ftates; so that it exifts only in fucceffion, and not any two parts of it together. This fo fhadowy being, and -fo difficult to be apprehended, Ariftotle has, with wonderful acuteness and subtlety, defined and made an object of intellect And as it lies betwixt two extremities, capacity, and energy, or actual existence, he has given us a twofold definition of it, the one taken from the one extreme, and the other from the other. The first is taken from the ftate of capacity from which it proceeds: And in this way it is defined to be, εντελέχεια του ἐν δυναpes v duvaμes; which may be tranflated thus, the perfection of what is in capacity, confidered merely as in capacity. The meaning of the laft words is, that nothing is confiVOL. I. B not be improper, first, to take a general view of the powers of human nature, beginning with those that are from nature immediately, and next confidering fuch as are acquired. dered in the thing that is moved, but merely its capacity: So that motion is the perfection of that capacity, but not of the thing itfelf. The reason why it is faid to be the perfection of capacity is already hinted at, namely, that it is fomething more than mere capacity; for it is capacity exerted, which, when it has attained its end, fo that the thing has arrived at that ftate to which it is destined by nature or art, ceases, and the thing begins to exift vegg: And therefore Ariftotle has very properly called this exertion the perfection of capacity, fince capacity can go no further. The other definition is taken, as I have faid, from the other extreme, namely, the ftate to which the progreffion is, that is, energy, or actual exiftence. And in this way it is defined to be isgysia άteans, or imperfect energy; for, as it is the perfection of capacity, fo it is the imperfection of energy. It is capacity carried its utmost length; but it ftops on this fide energy. This is the account given by Ariftotle, in his books of General Phyfics, (commonly entitled De Phyfica Auditione), of the nature of motion, taken, as we fee, from a comprehenfive view of nature and art, and of every kind of. generation and production. None of our modern philofophers, fo far as I know, have given a general definition of it that is in the leaft fatisfactory, though they must all confefs, that it is the grand agent in all natural operations; and therefore the knowledge of its nature must be the foundation of all natural knowledge. Mr Locke has faved himself the trouble of feeking for a definition of it, by telling us, that it is undefineable, because it is a fenfation, or perception of fenfe; and he has en The first operate without any previous use, exercise, or inftruction: The other are the fruit of our own industry; and, before they can be exercifed, the habit must be firft formB 2 deavoured to ridicule Ariftotle's definition of it in a barbarous tranflation, not understanding, as I fuppofe, Ariftotle in his own language. The reafon that he gives for its being undefineable, will apply equally to every perception of fenfe, of whatever kind: And to be fure it is true, that no individual fenfation or perception of fenfe can be defined; for this very reafon, that it is a perception of fenfe, and not an object of intellect. But Mr Locke ought to have confidered, that, from thofe perceptions of fenfe, the mind forms ideas, which are the proper objects of intellect; and therefore capable of definition; and of fcience, which cannot be without definition. And all thofe perceptions of fenfe which he calls fimple ideas of fenfation, might, when generalifed by the intellect, be defined as well as the perception of motion, by a genius as acute as Ariftotle's, affifted by proper obfervations and experiments. But the great defect of Mr Locke's philofophy is, that having, in the very outletting, confounded the operations of fenfe and intellect, under the common name of ideas, he never afterwards fufficiently distinguishes them. Other modern philofophers have attempted to define motion by change of place or fi tuation. But that is no more than the effect of motion; and it still remains to be inquired, what fort of thing it is that produces this effect. Befides, if it were a good definition, it is not general enough, comprehending only one kind of motion, viz. that from place to place; whereas Ariftotle's definition comprehends every kind of change or alteration in body, whether with refpect to place, magnitude, or quality. ed, by art, experience, or custom. Of the first kind, moft certainly, are those with which we are born; and with them therefore we shall begin. They are but few in number: one of the moft remarkable of them is the power of motion, and that natural impulfe above mentioned, well known by the name of instinct, which directs an infant to apply that power of motion to the drawing its nourishment from the breaft of the mother by the action of fucking. Besides this, we have that habit of body which makes us fufceptible of nourishment, of growth, and all the vital functions. Whether we have distinct perceptions of fenfe, fuch as of feeing and hear This is the general doctrine of capacities and energies, and the transition from the one to the other, according to the notions of the Peripatetic fchool: But there is still a higher philofophy upon this fubject, which teaches us, that this distinction betwixt capacity and energy takes place only in inferior beings; and that there is a higher order of being, in which there is no progrefs, motion, or change of any kind, and in which there is not the imperfection of mere capacity, but all is habit and faculty, not productive of energies occafionally, as with us, but conftantly energising. Sec Arift. Metaph. lib. 9. cap. 8. But this belongs to a philofophy far beyond fenfe and nature; and which, for that reafon, is very properly defcribed to be μετα τα φυσικα that is, with refpect to our capicities, and the order of teaching, after phyfics; but, with refpect to the nature of things, the first philofophy. ing, I think may juftly be doubted; and I will endeavour to fhew, in the following part of this book, that we have them not in any the least degree of perfection, till in process of time the organs have acquired a certain degree of firmnefs, and we by experience have learned the proper use of them, These seem to be all the faculties which we are actually in poffeffion of when we firft come into the world. The reft of our nature at that time is made up of capacities merely, or, to use the fashionable word, which I think not improper, of capabilities: for it is with us, as with other animals, at the time of our birth, almost all the powers of our nature lie concealed, and, as it were, folded up, till time and opportunity display them, and bring them into exertion: And indeed in that state, I cannot discover, that, with refpect to actual powers, either of mind or body, there is any difference betwixt us and those other animals; or, if there be any, the advantage is on the fide of the brute; for his body then is commonly more vigorous, and his inftincts stronger and more active. But with respect to latent powers and capabilities, there appears to be a wonderful |