habit. Now this habit is acquired by frequently doing the thing. If in this practice we have the affistance of a mafter, or if, without being taught, we have any pattern that we can imitate, we learn much faster. But, even without fuch affiftance, by practice merely, and by obferving what is done wrong, and correcting it, and fo becoming our own mafters, we learn at last to do the thing: and thus the habit is formed by fimilar or homogeneous energies, as Mr Harris has expreffed it, that is, by doing the thing, we learn to do it *. And in this way men have learned to build, and to weave, and to practise other arts; and, among other things, to form ideas.

do

If it be objected, That it is impoffible to

any thing before we have learned to do it, and that therefore we cannot learn to do any thing by doing it; the answer is, That we must have from nature the faculty of doing fomething of the kind, though very imperfectly; and upon that foundation going on, we learn at last to do the thing as it should

* Α γαρ δει μαθοντες ποιειν, ταύτα ποιούντες μανθανομεν, οἷον οικοδόμουντες οικοδόμοι γινονται, και κιθαριζοντες κιθαριστας. Ethic. Nicomach, lib. 2. cap. 1.

be done *. Thus a man could never learn to build, if he had not from nature the faculty of laying a stone; nor to weave, if he could not ftretch out and arrange threads; nor to fpeak, if he had not organs for that purpose from nature, and could not move them in certain posi

thofe

and organs,

put

tions. In like manner, we could not form ideas, if we had not sense and memory; and, befides thefe, the faculty of feparating things that are joined in nature, and of comparing two or more things together. This feparation, and this comparifon, will at first be very clumfily performed, like the rudiments and first beginnings of all arts. Things, for example, will not be fufficiently feparated or fifted, but taken together, as it were, in great lumps; and the comparisons will be inaccurately made; fo that fimilitudes will be observed which do not exist, and many will be overlooked that do exift. In this way, the ideas at firft will be exceedingly imperfect, and hardly deferving the name.

This objection was made by the Sophifts in the days of Ariftotle, as appears from his Metaphyfics, lib. 9. cap. 8.; where it is anfwered very shortly, and indeed but in a word, according to the manner of Aristotle in his Efoteric works; but I think in the fame way that I have answered it.

But the practice being conftantly continued, they will be improved by degrees, till they come to be good enough for the ordinary purposes of life, and at last fo perfect, as to be fit for the objects of fcience.

And thus, I think, I have proved, that the ideas of the objects of fenfe, as well as those of the operations of our own mind, are not from nature, but acquired; and if I fhall be able to fhew, from facts and examples, by what degrees they have been acquired, as I hope I fhall in the fequel, the evidence I think must be allowed to be complete; for then the propofition will be proved, both a priori and a pofteriori; that is, from fact as well as from theory.

CHA P. XIV.

Conclufion of the Subject of Ideas. General View of Human Nature, and the Rank it poffeffes in the Scale of Being, compared with fuperior Natures.

I

Cannot conclude this fubject, without ta

king a general view of human nature, according to the account that I have given of it; which, I am perfuaded, will be found agreeable to the general analogy of nature: For it feems to be a law of nature, that no fpecies of thing is formed at once, but by fteps and progreffion from one ftage to another. Thus naturalifts observe several different appearances betwixt the feed and the vegetable, the embryo and the animal. The principles of body in general, are, points, lines, and surfaces, which are not body *; and of number,

It is in this way that the antient Sceptics argued against the principles of geometry. What is a point? faid they: Is it body? or is it spirit? And if it be neither one nor t'other, it has no existence at all. The answer is, That though it be not body, and much less spirit, it

the monad, and duad, which are not numbers; and, in general, the elements of things are different from the things themselves. There is the fame progress, according to my hypothefis, in the formation of man, and the fame diftinction betwixt the elements of this fpecies, and the fpecies itself. The progress of his body I am not concerned with at prefent: But, with respect to the mind, the first obfervable step in its progress is fenfation, or perception by sense; but, even before we arrive at that, there is a progress, though not commonly obferved. For, as we have feen, fenfe is very imperfect at first; and it is only in process of time that this primary faculty, of all others the most natural, becomes complete. Next in order comes the faculty by which thofe perceptions, otherwife fleeting and tranfitory, are retained in the mind; for I am perfuaded it is not fo early as fenfation, and therefore does not exist at all in new-born infants, nor perhaps for fome confiderable time after the birth. This retentive faculty is of two kinds; or perhaps only affumes two diffe

is the element of body. See Sextus Empiricus adverfus geomet.