ed only by force and fear, and without any gravity or compofure in their gait and behaviour, such as the Orang Outang has.

But, although they have not the affections or difpofitions of men, it must be confeffed that they have a great deal of the human fagacity. They do not use a stick for a weapon as the Orang Outangs do, but they use miffiles, and will pelt a man with nuts, or any other hard fruit, And they use this method of throwing, in their contrivance to rob an orchard, as described by Kolben in his account of the Cape of Good Hope.* They have something too of the human faculty of imitation: But it appears to be entirely confined to mimicry, or imitation by geftures; for they do not imitate by the voice, as man does. And this is by fome thought to be the reason why they have not invented a language. But I think there are two better reafons for it. The firft is, that they are not capable of intellect, or of forming ideas, And, 2dly, They do not appear to have been ever so closely united in society as is neceffary for the invention of a language. But, suppose that their capacity were greater, and

See the paffage quoted by Buffon, Nat. Hift. vol. 14 pag. 136.

that they could form ideas, it is certain that they have not the faculty of imitation by the voice, such as a parrot or jackdaw has, otherwise they might be taught to speak, as these animals are taught.

CHA P. V.

Continuation of the Subject-General Rules for Definition-Application of thofe Rules to the Definition of Animals in general and of Man-That this Definition applies to the Orang Outang-Differences between us and the Orang Outang accounted for.

W

Hat is man? is a question of such curiofity and importance, that the reader will readily excuse my bestowing another chapter upon it. In order to judge of what is, or is not a proper definition of man or any other animal, we must know fomething in general of the nature of definition. I will, therefore, begin with laying down fome rules concerning it, such as I have learned from the study of antient phi

lofophy. For, as definition is the foundation of all science, there is nothing more accurately treated of by the antient philofophers, particularly those of the peripatetic school; nor is there any thing that Aristotle has bestowed more pains upon, having treated of it with great accuracy, both in his fecond Analytics, and in his books of Metaphyfics. The philofophers of the prefent age have not thought it worth their while to bestow fo much pains upon this subject; and, particularly, it has been much neglected by our natural philosophers, though, according to their method of philofophifing, there is nothing they should have studied more. The antients, in phyfics, as in every thing else, began with general principles, fuch as matter, form, and motion, of which Aristotle has treated at great length in his eighth book of General Phyfics, entitled in Latin De Naturali Aufcultatione*. Of fuch principles, arranged and put together by divine intelligence, they framed their system of nature; whereas, in natural philosophy, the moderns appear to me to be little farther advanced than natural hiftory, which indeed we have made more full and complete than it was among

Περι Φυσικής ακροάσεως

the antients. But we have nothing that I think can be called science with respect to natural things, except the arrangement and diftribution of them into feparate and diftinct claffes. Now,for this,definition is abfolutely neceffary, as well as divifion, with which, as shall be fhewn, definition is intimately connected. And yet, the two great naturalifts of this Linnaeus and Mr Buffon, appear to me age, not to have studied either fufficiently. As to Linnaeus, if he has defined and divided properly, when he makes a genus of the animal man, and divides it into speciefes, by fuch specific differences, as the having longer or fhorter arms, and the having or not having a film which comes over the eye, he has learned or invented an art of definition. and divifion very different from what I have learned, or is to be found in any book of philosophy, antient or modern, that I know. As to Mr Buffon, he rejects altogether Linnaeus's divifions into genuses or claffes, and infists much upon nature having only formed individuals*. But, as I have elsewhere fhewn, there can be no science of individuals, and we have no knowledge of any thing

.

*Hift. Natur. vol. 1. p. 14. Vol. 2. p. 160. Vol. 4. P. 384. et paffim,

but by the genus or species to which it belongs. To be convinced of this, let any man try to describe any particular object of fenfe, and he will find, that he can do it no otherwise than by referring it to fome genus or species; or, if it be a thing of a species unknown to him, he will describe it by certain qualities known to him, that is, of which he has formed ideas. Thus, for example, he defcribes the thing by a certain colour or figure, which he fays it has; but, before he can do that, he must have the idea of that fpecies of colour or figure. Nothing therefore can be known but by knowing either directly the fpecies to which it belongs, or by knowing other specieses, which enable us to form fome notion of the object unknown. If this be true, there can be no philofophy or science of any kind, without knowing the genuses or specieses of things; and, as that cannot be attained without definition and divifion, it fhould seem that a good fyftem of logic, of which the art of defining and dividing is a principal part, is the foundation of all science. As therefore the fubject is of fuch importance, I will fhortly lay down the rules concerning definition and divifion, as I have learned them