to, plainly fhew, that it is not from nature, but of human inftitution. For nature is permanent and unchangeable, like its author: And, accordingly, the wild animals, who are undoubtedly in a state of nature, ftill preferve the fame oeconomy and manner of life with no variation, except fuch as change of circumstances may make abfolutely neceffary for the preservation of the individual or the fpecies; and the variation goes no farther than that neceffity requires. CHA P. VII. Authorities in fupport of this Opinion concerning the natural State of Man, from antient Philofophers and Hiftorians, from Fathers of the Church, and modern Di vines. HUS I have endeavoured to prove, THU both by facts and argument, that the political state among men is not from nature, but from inftitution, and that man, in his natural statute, is a wild animal, without language kind. I fhould now proceed or arts of any to affign the caufes that gave rife to civil fo ciety: But, before I do this, as I know my opinion concerning the natural state of man will appear to many very extraordinary, I will endeavour to fupport it by authorities likewife; first premifing, that I would be understood to speak only of his prefent nature, and of his present state of existence, not of any former more perfect state. For, as I have obferved elsewhere, both religion and philofophy teach us, that man did once exist in a more perfect ftate. And I will begin with the authority of Horace, which is clear and decifive in the cafe, as appears from the paffage which I have made the motto of my book, and which I fhall explain more particularly afterwards. And the greater regard is to be had to his authority, that he was not only one of the best poets the Romans ever had, but a very good philofopher; and he was of that fect of philosophy among the antients, which, of all others, attended moft to facts and obfervations: Whereas, the other antient philofophers dealt more in theory and fpeculation, than in facts *. * It was a great faying of Epicurusov μaxeta TOK Qavosvos-And the philofophers of that fchool may be faid to have begun the experimental philofophy. The next authority that I fhall mention is that of another poet, and a philofopher too of the fame fchool, I mean Lucretius, who, in his fifth book, v. 923. et feq. describes the primitive state of our race very accurately, and like a philofopher, who had inquired much into facts. After telling how we lived in the woods and mountains, without the use of fire, he adds, Nec commune bonum poterant spectare, neque ullis After which, he proceeds to relate how men affociated together, which he afcribes chiefly to the fear of wild beafts, and how they built huts, discovered the use of fire, and reared families. Even that way, fays our author, the race would not have lafted. At varios linguae fonitus natura fubegit So that, according to Lucretius, language was invented by men, after they had affociated together, and made fome progress in civility. The ne authority I fhall quote is still a more respectable one. It is that of Plato. He, in his first book of laws, has fpoken much of the renovation of arts, after nations had been destroyed by fuch calamities as I have mentioned in the beginning of this book. He does not indeed reckon language among those new-invented arts; but, that he did not think language natural to man is evident from this, that he has exprefsly faid, that ideas are not natural to man. The paffage I allude to is in the Theaetetus; the words of which I have given at the bottom of the * In order to understand it perfectly, page we are to confider that he had been speaking immediately before of the general ideas of fubftance, existence, difference, likeness, &c.; which ideas, fays he, the mind forms by going over and comparing things together. Then follows the paffage quoted; the fense of which is, That whatever comes to * Ούκουν τα μεν ευθύς γενομένοις παρεστι φύσει αισθάνεσθαι ανθρωποις τε και θηρίοις, ένα δια του σωματος παθημαία επί την ψυχήν τείνει τα δε περὶ τούτων αναλογισμαία προς τε ουσιαν και ωφέλειαν, μαζίς και ἐν χρόνῳ δια πολλών πραγμάτων και παιδειας παραγινεται, οἷς αν και παραγιγνήται. Tom. I. p. 186. edit, Serrani. 'the mind through impreffions made upon the body is by nature perceived, both by 'men and brutes, immediately upon their birth. But the ideas refulting from the comparifon of thofe perceptions, (περί τούτων • vλ) relating to their nature and use, ' come with difficulty, and only in process. ' of time, to those who attain to them, and are the fruit of much labour and instruction.' If this be the fenfe of Plato's words, as. I think it certainly is, he could not have ufed clearer to express my notion, That the perceptions of fenfe are from nature, but the ideas formed from those perceptions are acquired, not without much labour. Another proof of Plato's opinion being the fame with mine concerning the natural flate of man, is what he fays of men having learned to number from obferving the rising and fetting of the fun, the fucceffion of day and night, and months and years *. There was then a time, according to Plato, when men could not count one, two, three; and, if fo, there must have been a time, when they were altogether without arts or civili * Epinomis, p. 1007. Timaeus, p. 1058. edit. Ficini |