those that are neceffary for the subsistence of the individual, or the continuation of the kind. And, if we are to fuppofe that man could not, in any country or climate of the earth, fubfift, even in fmall numbers, upon the natural produce of the ground, but ftood in need of certain arts, as we fee is the cafe of the bee and the fpider, they must be arts, fuch as tilling the ground, fishing, or hunting, which contribute immediately and directly to the fuftenance of man. Now, language is none of these; for, with it, men may starve, and, without it, they may, as we have feen, be supported. So that, if we hold language to be either natural or revealed to man, we muft alfo maintain, and with much better reason, that the more neceffary arts of life, fuch as thofe juft now mentioned, are likewife either natural or revealed.

Objection, That the Law of Nature, as it is treated of by modern Writers, fuppofes men to have been originally rational and political.-Anfwer to that Objection.

B

EFORE I conclude this book, I

will endeavour to answer fome objections that may be made to my fyftem, beginning with one which will readily occur to those who have ftudied the law of nature and nations; a ftudy that was very fashionable fome years ago, but I think has become lefs fo of late. It will be faid, That, according to my fyftem of human nature, it is impoffible to fuppofe, that man, in his natural state, can be fubject to any law or obligation, not being confcious of any rule of action, nor having any ideas of right or wrong, because he has no ideas of any kind. If this be fo, they will fay, what are we to think of thofe volumes that have been written within thefe latt hundred years upon the law of nature, all fuppofing that man is by nature, and in his original state, ratio

nal and focial; and, therefore, fubject to certain laws and rules, which are laid down in thofe authors at great length?

My short answer to this is, That those gentlemen plainly beg the queftion, and fuppofe, what I think is clearly difproved, by fact and experience, as well as argument, that man, in his original state, is rational and political. I think I have fhewn, that his natural ftate is no other than that of the mere animal; and, therefore, he can be only fubject to that common law of the animal nature, well known by the name of instinct; a law much fuperior to all laws of human inftitution, or founded upon human inftitutions, and proceeding from a much higher original.

As to the authorities quoted against me, the first who reduced this law of nature into a fyftem, and gave it the form of a fcience, was Hugo Grotius, a name well known in the learned world. This he did in his excellent treatise De jure belli ac pacis, written with a most commendable intention, to try if he could establish any rule of right and wrong among perfons who may be faid in

*

*That fuch was the intention of his work, is evident from what Grotius himafelf fays in his προλεγόμενα, § 3

deed to live in a ftate of nature, fuch as Hobbes has described, of war of every one against every one, and a state infinitely more terrible than the flate which he supposes: For there only fingle favages fight,

-Glandem et cubilia propter;

but here leviathans † indeed of enormous fize take the field, having not hundreds of hands only, like the giants of the poets, but hundreds of thousands, armed with deadly weapons, with which they wage moft cruel war. To speak without a figure, the destruction of modern war is fo prodigious, by the great armies brought into the field, and which are likewife kept up in time of peace, and, by the extraordinary wafte of men, by fatigue, difeafes, and unwholesome provifions, more than by the fword, while the internal policy of Europe at present is fo little fitted to fup

• Videbam per Chriftianum orbem, vel barbaris gentibus 'pudendam, bellandi licentiam: Levibus aut nullis de caufis ad arma procurri; quibus femel fumptis, nullam jam divini, nullam humani juris reverentiam, plane ' quafi uno edicto ad omnia fcelera emiffo furore.'

+ This is the name which Hobbes gives to the great corporations or political bodies we call states.

ply fuch deftruction, that, unless the princes either fall upon fome other way of deciding their quarrels, or provide better for the multiplication of people, Europe is in the utmoft hazard of being again depopulated, as it once was under the Romans, but without the resource which it then had of barbarous nations to repeople it.---But to return to our fubject.

In this work, Grotius understands by the law of nature, a law which is common to the rational and focial nature *, in contradiftinction to what is called civil law, which is peculiar to each fociety or nation of men. It is the fame with the law of nations, at leaft in the common use of authors; tho' Grotius has made the diftinction betwixt them, making the law of nature to arife immediately from the dictates of reason, and to be of universal obligation, without any consent or compact; whereas the law of nations is founded upon the confeat of nations t. But he confeffes, that the terms are used promiscuously, even by the beft authors ‡. Now, * Lib. 1. cap. 1. § 10. & 12.

+ Proleg. § 6.

Cicero, in a paffage quoted by Grotius, lib. 1. cap. 1. 12. fays, In re confenfio omnium gentium jus naturæ putanda eft.