inquiry becomes the more interesting, as well as of greater curiofity, when we confider, that it leads us back to what may be called the origin of the human race; fince, without the use of reafon and speech, we have no pretenfions to humanity, nor can with any propriety be called men; but must be contented to rank with the other animals here below, over whom we affume so much superiority, and exercise dominion chiefly by means of the advantages that the use of language gives us. From this birth of human nature, as it may be called, we will endeavour to trace its progress to its ftate of maturity. This progrefs, in the individual, is very well known; but we propose here to exhibit the fpecies itfelf in its infancy,-firft mute; then lifping and stammering; next by flow, degrees learning to speak, very lamely and imperfectly at firft; but, at laft, from fuch rude effays, forming an art the moft curious, as well as most useful among men. The fubject is, fo far as I know, entirely new; no author, antient or modern, that has fallen. into my hands, having profeffedly treated of it. And though I have met with hints concerning it in the courfe of my reading, they

are fuch as have rather excited than fatiffied my curiofity.

These reasons have induced me to set down, and give to the public, my thoughts upon this subject, which are the fruit of much study and inquiry, continued with fome interruptions for feveral years, and of many materials collected during that time. But if, notwithstanding, in this undiscovered country, where I am guided by no light or track, I have loft my way, I hope to be forgiven by every reader of fenfe and candour, who will allow at least this merit to my work, that I have opened a new field of speculation, in which even my errors may be of use, by ferving as beacons to direct into the right courfe men of greater learning and abilities.

The work will be divided into three parts. The first will treat of the origin of language, and of the nature of the firft languages; or, as they may be more properly called, rude effays towards language, which were practised before the art was invented. The fecond will explain the nature of the art, fhewing in what it chiefly confifts, and how it differs from those first untaught attempts to speak. In

this part of my work, I will give an account of those parts of language which appear to me the moft artificial, and of moft difficult invention. I will alfo treat of style, or compofition in words, as belonging to the art of language; and I think it will not appear foreign to my fubject to say something likewife of poetry and rhetoric, being arts of which language furnishes the materials.The fubject of the third and last part will be the corruption of language; of which I fhall endeavour to affign the causes, and trace the progrefs.-The first part will be chiefly philofophical, mixed however with a good deal of hiftory, and facts, by which I shall endeavour to fupport my theories, and philofophical fpeculations. The two iaft parts will be grammatical and critical. The style will be plain and didactic, fuch as is fuitable to a fubject that is to be treated as a matter of fcience. It will not therefore have that mixture of the rhetorical and poetical, which is fo common in the fashionable writings of this age, whatever the subject be, and which pleases the vulgar fo much: For, as I do not write for the vulgar, I will not adapt my ftyle, any more than my matter, to their taste.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I.

Definition of the Subject.—Whether Language be from Nature, or acquired Habit.

Y language I mean the expreffion of

BY

the conceptions of the mind by articulate founds. These conceptions are either of particulars, i. e. individual things, or of generals. No language ever exifted, or can be conceived, confifting only of the expreffion of individuals, or what is commonly called proper names: And the truth is, that these make but a very inconfiderable part of every language. What therefore conftitutes the effential part of language, and makes it truly deserve that name, is the expreffion of generals, or ideas, according to the language of the philofophy that I have learned. For, as to the name of general ideas, by which they are commonly

known, it fuppofes, that the conceptions of individuals, that is, the perceptions of fense, are likewife ideas; from which it is neceffary to diftinguifh the conceptions of generals by the naine of general ideas. But I cannot approve of introducing into philofophy a language which confounds under one name two things fo different in their natures, as the operations of fenfe and of intellect ; a confufion which, in my apprehenfion, has given rife to very great errors in philofophy, and to fome extravagant paradoxes, that have been advanced of late years, as repugnant to the common fenfe of mankind as to found philofophy. The definition fo underflood I hold to be what is properly called language. For, though we say, the language of looks, and of geftures, or figns, fuch as our dumb perfons ufe; also the language of inarticulate cries, by which the brutes fignify their appetites and defires; yet, in all thofe fenfes, the word is used metaphorically, and not as it ought to be used in the ftyle of fcience. And thus much may fuffice at prefent for the definition of our fubject. We fhall endeavour, in the sequel, to make it fuller; and, particularly, we shall explain in what way language