of the human mind, would only make it neceffary for him to have an idea of the feveral fpecieses of animals with which he was converfant, not to form a more general idea

fuppofe the unpractifed intellect of favages to go. 2dly, The formation of fuch ideas requires a more extensive knowledge, and more enlarged views of things, than it is poffible for favages to be poffeffed of.

And here we have got to a fummit, from which we may fee the whole extent of metaphyfical philosophy, that is, the knowledge of the principles of things, accor ding to the doctrine of the Pythagorean and Ariftotelian fchool: For thofe philofophers did not ftop at the categories, which, according to the account I have given of them, are all specieses of things formed and complete of their kind; (fee Ammon. in Categor. fol. 47); but they inquired further, whether there were not certain things in nature, which were not themfelves categories, but the principles or elements of categories: For they conceived, that the fpecieses of things were not at once formed by nature, but that there was a progreffion in the formation of them from what was imperfect to what was perfect; that is, from the elemental principles to the things themfelves. Of this kind of elements they found the point, the monad and the inftant, to be; none of which belong to the category of quantity, being neither magnitude, number, nor time; (fee Ammon. ubi fupra, fol. 46.); but they are the principles of all the three; the point being that of magnitude, or quantity continuous; the monad, that of number; and the inftant, that of time. Befides thefe, there is one elemental principle much more general, being the foundation, or fubftratum, as we may call it, of all the cate

comprehending them all. Such an idea would
come only in procefs of time, and after his
fphere of life was fo much enlarged, and reaso-
ning fo far advanced, as to make it neceffary
gories, I mean matter; the feveral categories being dif-
ferent forms, which, joined to this univerfal matter,
conftitute the whole vifible world. But how does this
union happen? How do matter and form join to-
gether to produce the feveral fubftances and their
qualities? Or, in other words, How are things ge-
nerated? The answer is, by motion. Here then is ano-
ther univerfal, which is not a category neither, but
may be faid to be the road or paffage to all the catego-
ries, as no fpecies of thing here below can exift without
motion; Ammon. ibid. 47. Matter then must be mo-
ved, and must undergo fome change, before it can re-
ceive thofe forms which conftitute the nature of things.
If fo, it must have in itself the capacity of being moved,
which, when brought into exertion, is what we call mo-
tion, as I have explained in a former note, p. 16. & feq.;
and, according to Ariftotle, is in the body that is mo-
ved, not in what moves. And therefore he has defined a
natural body to be that which has in itself the principle
of motion.
And this naturally leads us to a ftill higher
order of being. For, if there be motion, there muft
be a mover. And what can this mover be? It cannot
be body, which is only paffive of motion, and may com-
municate it by impulse to other bodies, but cannot be-
gin it. What then is it that moves or begins motion?
My answer is, That it is not matter or body. It is
therefore an immaterial fubftance, and this fubftance I
call mind. Of which, if we require a definition, I think
the best that can be given is, that it is a fubftance which

8 has in itself the power of moving. And in this way it is
properly distinguished by Aristotle from body; which,

for him to distinguish betwixt animal in general, and the vegetable or inanimated nature; and it would not be till all the neceffaries of life were fupplied, and till men had found leifure

as I have faid, he has defined to be that which has the power of motion, that is, of being moved.

But neither did this philofophy stop here; but they inquired further, whether every mind had originally in itself this power of moving; and they found, that there was but one mind that had this power originally and independently of itself, and that all other minds had it by derivation from this first mind; which therefore is the firft caufe, the author of all motion, and of all generation and production of every kind; and which Aristotle, in the conclufion of his phyfics, has proved to be eternal and unchangeable, immaterial, and without parts.

This philofophy, fo noble in appearance at leaft, and fo extenfive, which, beginning with the perceptions of fenfe, pretends to lead us, by gradual removes from matter, to the most general and abstract properties of material things, fuch as are at a great distance from particular objects of fense; and from thence to conduct us to the principles or elements of thofe general properties, and which are still more removed from matter and fenfe: And, when we have gone thus far, fuppofing us capable of still further progrefs, lead us on to that which is not abstracted from matter, or exifting in matter, such as the univerfals we have been fpeaking of; but that, which, by its nature, is entirely feparated from matter, or, in one word, mind: And, laft of all, from mind in general, leads us to the contemplation of the fupreme inind, and first cause of all things:

-This philofophy, I fay, which, from what is lowe

to philofophife, that they would find out those remote likeneffes which conftitute fuch ideas as thofe of body, fubftance, matter, Space, and the like. And thus it appears, that the

in nature, conducts us, to what is higheft, and ends in the fublimeft theology, fhould at leaft excite the curiofity of fpeculative men among us to look a little more into it, and fee whether it anfwers to this idea that I have endeavoured to give of it.

Many readers will probably think that, in this and fome other preceeding notes, I have gone farther into metaphyfics than the nature of my fubject required. But my apology is, firft, That my digreffions of this kind will not, I hope, appear quite foreign to the purpofe; and, as they are thrown into notes, and have not any neceffary connection with the text, every one may read them or not as he pleafes. Secondly, I must confefs that I intended to give the reader fome fpecimen of antient metaphyfics, in order to fhew how different they are from the fashionable metaphyfics of this age, the one leading to the purest and moft fublime theology, the other to the groffeft impieties and abfurdities, fuch as difgrace this nobleft fcience, the very top and pinnacle of philofophy, from which we difcover, as far as human ken can reach, the whole of nature, and its great Author, But to this height we can climb only by flow and painful fteps, with the affiftance of much learning, and of a good natural genius. Whereas, fome in our times, with but poor natural parts, ignorant of the very clements of philofophy, unaffifted even by the common school learning, and not fo much as knowing the nature of this fcience, have nevertheless engaged in it; and, not content with having thrown away their time

ideas of favages, and by confequence their language, would at firft be confined to the loweft fpeciefes, unless where it happened that the specific differences of fuch specieses were not so readily to be diftinguished. In that cafe it is natural to fuppofe, that they would leap over the loweft fpeciefes, and ascend at once to the genus immediately above them. Thus, ex. gr. they would have the idea of a tree, before they had the ideas of the different fpeciefes, fuch as afh, oak, beech, &c.; but, where the fpecific differences are obvious, as in the cafe of fuch animals as man, horfe, dog, &c. it is impoffible to fuppofe that they would not form the idea of those several fpeciefes before they formed the more general idea of animal.

The last thing I have to obferve, with refpect to the names of fubftances and their

upon fpeculations, for which they were nowife fitted, neither by nature nor education, have, through mere vanity and affectation of fuperior parts, become authors, and fent abroad into the world fuch doctrines as a wife and good man, though he had been moft firmly convinced of the truth of them, would not, out of regard to human fociety, have published. For, though fuch writings are defpifed by men of real learning, they have a very bad effect upon the vulgar and half learned.