Latin, and, I believe, every language, the nouns of this kind are all derived from the correfponding adjectives; whereas, if the order of things had been followed, and not the progress of our minds, the etymology would have been just the reverfe: For the abstracted quality is undoubtedly prior, in the order of nature, to the quality joined with any subftance. And, accordingly, by philosophical etymology, as I fhall fhew in another part of my work, just is to be confidered as derived from justice, not justice from just.

The next step, I imagine, would naturally be, to form separate ideas of the several circumstances of the time, place, and manner of action-of the perfons acting-whether the first, second, or third perfon-the difpofitions of the mind of the fpeaker with respect to the action-and, laftly, whether the action was suffered, or done. By such abstractions and generalizations, were produced adverbs, conjugations of verbs, tenfes, moods, and voices.

The last part of this progrefs, that appears from the structure of language, is the formation of ideas of the connections and dependencies of things upon one ano

ther, and their relation to one another in respect of time, place, fituation, cause and effect, and the like. From these ideas arise the declension and cafes of nouns, and those parts of speech we call prepofitions and conjunctions. It is by such words that the fyntax of language is chiefly formed; and as fyntax is the last thing perfected in language, it from thence appears, that those abstract ideas of relations are among the last formed by the human mind.

The progrefs, by these steps, I am perfuaded, has been very flow; for which it is not difficult to account, from the explanation I have given, in the beginning of this work, of the nature of abstraction. For, being immersed, as we have shewn, in matter and sense, at our first entrance into this life, and perceiving only by the intervention of bodily organs; when we come to think in this new way, and which may called unnatural, as it feparates what is in nature united, it is no wonder that we go on flowly, and with difficulty, abstracting very little at firft, then more; and still going on from abftraction to abstraction, till at last we arrive at the ideas of

be

highest abstraction, which are of all others

1

the fimpleft, and in the order of nature first, but laft in the order of our conceptions. Nor is it to be wondered that a very small part of mankind are able to ascend so high, when we confider how far those univerfals are removed from our original perceptions.

Thus it appears, that, from the study of language, if it be properly conducted, the history of the human mind is best learned, especially in the first steps of its progress, of which it is impoffible there can be any other record than what is preferved in language.

CHA P. XI.

Several Questions concerning the firft Languages.-What Words of them were firft invented, or what Names of Things.Whether they have any Radical Words.Whether there be only one primitive Language.

I

T may be asked concerning those primitive languages, What words in them were first invented? My anfwer is, That

if by words are meant what are commonly
called parts of Speech, no words at all were
firft invented; but the firft articulate founds.
that were formed denoted whole sentences ;
and those sentences expreffed some ap-
petite, defire, or inclination, relating
either to the individual, or to the com-
mon business which I fuppofe must have
been carrying on by a herd of favages,
before language was invented. And in this
way I believe language continued, perhaps
for many ages, before names were invent-
ed *. For that the firft articulate cries ex-

* And now I will give the explication I promised of
the paffage above quoted from Horace.

"Donec verba quibus voces fenfufque notarent)
"Nominaque invenêre."-

Where Horace makes a diftinction betwixt verba and
nomina, which has not been explained by any commen-
tator, that I know; but which, if rightly under-
flood, agrees perfectly with my fyftem; for by verba he
means, as I understand him, thofe articulate founds ex-
preffing only appetites and defires; and this I think he
has fufficiently explained himfelf by the defcription he
has given of them,-quibus voces fenfufque notarent: Im-
porting, that the firft words marked the inarticulate cries
formerly used, which I understand to be meant by voces,
and by confequence the inclinations and feelings of the
mind expreffed by thofe cries, which I take to be the
meaning of the word fenfus: For that word in Latin
does not denote ideas, or the operations of the intellect,
but the movements of that part of our mind which is

Until words w nawers or viebs tours (by which noted their inclinations or wills and muinze) inven

and nami

Without verbs, nouns would be of litte use: and. Assistentieudals to conn's that it is verts by whe

preffed the names of things, I can no more believe than that the neighing of a horse, or the lowing of a cow, is a name for any thing.

If it be further afked, What names were first invented? My answer is, The names of the objects that they were most converfant with, and had most frequent occafion to name. Thus we fee the Hurons first gave

the feat of defire and inclination, and is called by the Greek philofophers the Orectic, (To ogEXTIxov). So it is ufed by Cicero, lib. 3. de oratore cap. 25.; where he speaks of the fenfus et dolores, quos habet oratio. And every where in his writings, fo far as I obferve, fenfus animi, or fenfus fimply, denote always the affections, inclinations, or what we commonly call the feelings of the mind. And it was used in this fenfe, by a very natural metaphor, from the fenfes of the body, which are denoted by fenfus in its proper fignification; as Quintilian has obferyed, lib. 8. cap. 5. initio. It is true, that Quintilian, in this paffage, tells us, that the ufe of the word, in his time, was extended to fignify all the conceptions of the mind-fed confuetudo jam tenuit, ut mente concepta fenfus vocaremus. But this ufe of the word certainly did not obtain in the days of Cicero, nor, I prefume, when Horace wrote, which could not be long after Cicero's death. If the words be understood in this fenfe, (and I do not fee in what other they can be underftood), Horace very properly places the verba firft, as being undoubtedly firft invented; and then the nomina, which came next in order, and which certainly fignify the names of things, not whole fentences expreffing fome defire or volition.