tion, power, energy, efficacy, &c. express nothing, according to his theory, that is intelligible, besides the mere relation of antecedence and sequence.

It is admitted, however, by Dr. B. that almost the whole human race have annexed to these terms, or those which correspond with them, in their respective languages, ideas different from what he considers correct. The structure of all languages furnishes irrefragable proof of this fact. The notion of action, causation, energy, &c. is so common among men, that children and savages entertain it as famili arly as any others. It is an idea which is contained in every active verb, and no man can devest himself of it, or speak half a dozen sentences without using words which plainly convey this meaning. This fact is so manifest, that the ingenious author does not call it in question. He admits that the opinion which he maintains, is contrary "to the almost universal sense of mankind." Now such a general consent is commonly, and we think, justly considered as a strong proof, that the idea or sentiment, in which men so agree, is founded in nature, and accordant with truth. It must be strong reasoning, indeed, which shall demonstrate that an opinion entertained by men of all nations, however different in language, in manners, in education, in government, and in religion, is false. If this could be done, then all difference between truth and prejudice would be obliterated. To establish the certainty of the existence of power or causation, the argument derived from universal consent, appears to us to be irresistible; for we cannot suppose, that all men of all nations, from early childhood to hoary age, could be led to adopt an opinion which had no foundation, without admitting the absurd consequence, that all men are so constitúted, that they are by necessity led to embrace error instead of truth. And this supposition would not answer the purpose of Dr. Brown, as it would render it impossible for him to establish any opinion as true; for that constitution

of human nature which leads men invariably astray, in one case, ought to be suspected in all. The true principles of philosophizing, should have led to a directly contrary course of reasoning. He should have assumed the fact, that all men possessed of reason, entertain from their earliest years the opinion that there is such a thing as power or causation; and this idea being incorporated, inseparably with every language in the world, it is a just conclusion, that this is one of those common notices, or self evident truths, which from the 'very constitution of our nature, we are under the necessity of receiving. Let any man attempt to form a language from which all idea of active energy or causation shall be excluded, and he will soon find that this is no vulgar prejudice, but a fundamental truth; an idea, which if it were removed from the human mind, would leave a vast chasm in all our reasonings and systems of truth, in every branch of science. If a people should ever be discovered, who used a language which did not involve, in every sentence, the conception of power and causation, this single fact would go farther to prove them to be of another species, than all the diversities which have hitherto been observed among the nations of the earth.

But let us see how Dr. B. disposes of this acknowledged fact, of the almost universal existence of the idea of power. He attempts to show, that there are analogous cases, in which, prejudices have, for a long time, had an almost universal prevalence. The instance which he adduces, and to which he often recurs, is the notion of a certain something, existing with all bodies, which the schoolmen, after Aristotle, called form, or substantial forms. This notion, it may be admitted, was as extensive, and existed as long as the Aristotelian logic prevailed. But the case is no how parallel to the one under consideration. The opinion respecting substantial forms, belonged to a peculiar system of philosophy, and as long as that system maintained its ground, it

would, of course, be entertained; but it was never the opinion of the great body of the people. The mass of mankind never heard of such an opinion; and even in those countries, where it was held, it was merely the opinion of the learned. The common people then, knew as little, and believed as little, about substantial forms, as they do now. The idea is not incorporated, as is the case in regard to power, with all languages. It is not common to children and adults; savages, and philosophers. The case adduced, therefore, does not serve to account for the fact of the universal consent of mankind, in receiving this opinion. But it is time to attend to the proofs which Dr. B. offers in support of his theory; and that I may do no injustice to his meaning, I will give them in his own words :-The first is, "That we have, in fact, no other idea in our mind, when we speak of cause and effect, than an invariable antecedence and consequence." "Thus, when a spark falls on gunpowder and kindles it into explosure, every one ascribes to the spark the power of enkindling the inflammables. But let any one ask himself, what it is which he means by the term, and without contenting himself with a few phrases which signify nothing, reflect before he gives his answer, and he will find that he means nothing more than this, in all similar circumstances, the explosion of gunpowder, will be the immediate consequence of the application of a spark. To take an example more immediately connected with our own science, we all know, that as soon as any one in the usual circumstances of health and freedom, wills to move his arm, the motion of his arm follows, and we believe, that in the same circumstances of health and freedom, the motion of the arm will constantly follow the will to move it. If we knew and believed nothing more than that the motion of the arm would uniformly follow the will to move it, would our knowledge of the phenomenon be less perfect? "Let us suppose ourselves then to know all the antece

dents and consequents in nature, and to believe, not merely that they have once or repeatedly existed in connexion, but that they have uniformly done so, and will continue for ever to recur in a similar series; so that but for the intervention of the divine will, (which would be itself in that case, a new antecedent,) it will be impossible for any of the antecedents to exist again without being immediately followed by its original consequent."

Again, "To him who had previously kindled a fire, and placed on it a vessel full of water, with a certainty that in that situation the water would speedily become hot, what additional information would be given, by telling him that the fire had the power of boiling water?"" It is only by confounding casual with uniform and invariable antecedence, that power can be conceived to be something different from antecedence." "Such is the simple, and as it appears to me, only intelligible view of power, as discoverable in the successive phenomena of nature, and how very different from this simple view, is the common, or I may almost say, the universal notion of the agencies which are supposed to be concerned in the phenomena, which are the objects of philosophical inquiry."-"To me it appears indeed so obvious a truth, that the substances which exist in nature-the world, its living inhabitants and their adorable Creator, are all the real existences in nature, and that in the various changes which occur, there can as little be any powers or susceptibilities different from the antecedents and consequences themselves, as there can be forms differing from the co-existing particles of matter which constitute them."

The author feeling, however, that it was incumbent on him to account more fully for the fallacy whiuh he supposes to exist almost universally in regard to the nature of a cause, attributes it to "abstraction aided and perpetuated by the use of language." But the principal cause to which he ascribes this universal prejudice, is "the imperfection of the

senses."

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"We are frequently," he observes, "incapable of perceiving the immediate antecedent to a consequent, and are, therefore, in danger of connecting it with a wrong antecedent; by this means we are led to inquire after the true causes of things, that is, after their real and immediate antecedents." "As our senses are at present constituted, they are too imperfect to enable us to distinguish all the elements that coexist in bodies; and of elements which are themselves unknown to us, the minute changes which take place in "And since it is only them, must of course be unknown." between immediate antecedents and consequents that we suppose any permanent and invariable relation, we are, therefore, constantly on the watch, to detect, in the more obvious changes that appear to us in nature, some of those minuter elementary changes, which we suspect to intervene." "He who for the first time listens to the delightful sound of a violin, if he be ignorant of the theory of sound, will very naturally suppose that the touch of the strings by He the bow is the cause of the melody which he hears. learns, however, that this primary impulse would be of little effect, were it not for the vibrations excited by the violin itself; and another discovery still more important shows him that the vibration of the instrument would be of no effect, were it not for the elastic medium interposed between his ear and it. It is no longer to the violin, therefore, that he looks, as the direct cause of the sensation of sound, but to the vibrating air; nor will even this be long considered as the cause, if he turns his attention to the structure of the organ of hearing. He will then trace effect after effect, through a long series of complex and very wonderful parts, till he arrives at the auditory nerve, and the whole mass of the brain." "The expectation of discovering something intermediate and unknown between all known events is easily convertible into the common notion of power, as a secret and invisible tie."