ness, which would neglect or despise what is excellent, because united with something that is weak or mistaken.

We regret that the editor has not given us a more parti. cular account of her social life, as we conceive that the example of a Christian who so well understood the nature of holiness, and the means of improvement in all virtue, would have been particularly useful; we, however, cordially agree with him in the opinion, that "it may be safely presumed, that no unprejudiced person can peruse this little volume, without having his heart religiously affected, and his mind considerably improved."

ARTICLE XI.

God not the Author of Sin. A Discourse delivered before the Second Congregational Church and Society in Marblehead, June 20, 1819. By JOHN BARTLETT, Pastor of said Church.

CERTAIN theological opinions are still popular among us, which seem, at least, to represent God as the author of sin in a sense incompatible with his justice, goodness and mercy. It is the object of this discourse to vindicate the divine character from any such imputation; and to shew that those theological opinions in which any such imputation is expressed or implied are and must be irrational, unscriptural, and therefore false. The passage of scripture which Mr. Bartlett has selected for his text, is from Isaiah v. 4. "What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" After a short and pertinent introduction he proceeds.

"The passage we have selected we think authorises the following general position, and the inference which is drawn from it, viz.

I. That God has done every thing which an infinitely wise, holy, just and good Being could do, consistently with his moral perfections and with our freedom of agency, to prevent our sin and misery, and to make us holy and happy. Therefore,

"II. Any sentiment which either directly or by implication, makes our sins to appear necessary as the effect of divine appointment; or inevitable as the consequence of any constituted inability, or through the want of sufficient means to prevent them, cannot be correct and is not taught in the Bible." p. 4.

His main position he afterwards goes on to establish, in a style of great perspicuity and directness,

"by arguments drawn from the nature of God, which is essentially opposed to sin; from the nature which he has given to men. by which they are made capable of moral excellence, and furnished with a defence against sin; from the laws which he hath prescribed to us, inculcating holiness and prohibiting sin, and enforced by the most solemn sanctions; from the connexion which he has established between sin and misery even in this world; from the wonderful fact that he has sent his only begotten and dearly beloved Son into the world on purpose to redeem men from sin; and bestowed his Holy Spirit, all whose operations oppose sin, and whose office is to purify the soul.

"To these arguments might be added others, drawn from the declarations of God's word, and from the methods of his providential government of the world; but what has already been offered we think sufficient to convince any reasonable man, whose mind is not warped by system nor fettered by prejudice, that God cannot be the author of sin; but has done and is doing every thing which a wise, holy, just and good Being can consistently do to prevent it." p. 9.

Why then has he not actually prevented it? If God could prevent sin, but would not, where is his goodness? and if he would prevent sin, but could not, where is his power? These difficulties the writer of this discourse has not thought proper to attempt to solve. To account for the origin and existence of sin in God's moral creation he seems to suppose impossible, and assigns this as a reason for not pursuing the inquiry any further. His object is not to establish any theory of his own on this dark subject; but to refute one already established. We apprehend, however, that he has not thought sufficiently on the extreme difficulty, may we not say the impossibility of persuading men to give up any theory which they have for a long time regarded as true, unless another theory is offered them in its room equally plausible and not liable to the same objections. Men like to account for things; they do not care so much upon what system, but they will have some system. What they account for in one way to-day, you may persuade them to account for in a better way to-morrow; but you will not succeed in persuading them that it cannot be accounted for at all. Men love to have a theory for every thing, though, as we before remarked, they do not care much what it is, if it do but answer its purpose. The only way therefore, in which we can hope to dislodge an erroneous theory from their minds, is to supplant it with the true one, which may fill the place, or at least answer for the absence of the one that is put away.

Since then the difficulties under consideration are such as will be likely to influence our views of God's character and providence, accordingly as we account for them; and since they are difficulties on which men will speculate, notwithstanding whatever may be said to dissuade them from doing it; we think it adviseable to go a little deeper into the subject, and

make a few suggestions that may lead them to conclusions, not free perhaps from all objections and cavils, but liable certainly to fewer than those which they now may hold. The investigation we well know is, above all others, intricate and perplexing-but since men will plunge into the labyrinth, there is so much the more reason that some clue should be given to guide them through its mazy windings. The dryness of the subject shall not drive us from our purpose, though it may our readers; not that we intend to give the subject a full discussion, but only to offer a very few remarks illustrative of those commanding points on which, as we believe, the whole controversy turns.

Dr. Hartley has observed with his accustomed sagacity, that in regard to the introduction of sin into God's world, most of the confusion and inconsistency in the minds and writings of men, has arisen from their mixing together the popular language with philosophical language. It must be a fact familiar to all acquainted with metaphysicks, that there are two methods of speaking upon a variety of subjects-the one popular-the other philosophical-the former representing things as they ap pear to be; and the latter as they really are. Thus, in popular language, we say there is fragrance in the rose, flavour in the peach, and colour in the plum: and this, considered as popular language, is true-true in the sense in which it is understood-true enough to answer all the purposes of common conversation. But considered as philosophical language, it is not true; for fragrance, flavour, and colour are not and cannot be qualities of external bodies-but only sensations of the mind. We see therefore that the popular mode of speaking and the philosophical are often at variance. We may use either, and be clear, and consistent, and sufficiently accurate so long as we keep it distinct from the other: but if we mix and confound them together, we shall be led to endless confusion and paradox. It is from this abuse of language that we often hear such silly paradoxes as the following, gravely announced by men who have just gotten a smattering of modern philosophy. "There is no more heat in fire than in ice." Heat in popular language we use to signify not only the sensation of heat in the mind, but also the quality in the external body that produces that sensation. Understanding, therefore, this term, in the expression quoted, in a popular sense, in which it ought to be understood from its connexion-the assertion is not true. But limiting the term heat to its philosophical acceptation-by which it is made to signify only the sensation of heat in the mindthere to be sure it is true. Thus it is that by mixing and con. founding popular language with philosophical, we can make

numberless imaginary paradoxes, which can be so explained as to appear true, but which, by being so explained, become at the same time idle and unmeaning.

We apprehend that most of the difficulties and metaphysical abstrusities that have embarrassed our speculations on the origin of moral evil, have arisen from our allowing ourselves to be cheated and fooled by paradoxes, like the one we have just mentioned. When men directly affirm that God is the author of sin, or, which is the same thing—when they maintain doctrines that either amount to or imply the affirmation that God is the author of sin; they give to the terms used a meaning very different from their popular acceptation. Though therefore, they may be able to support and vindicate their doctrines in the sense in which they say they mean them to be understood they by no means support and vindicate them in the sense in which they would probably be, and are, in fact, generally understood. They do not prove by all their long and laboured argumentation any thing more, than what a man of plain good. sense would readily concede to them without any argumentation at all. They prove that what they mean by their doctrines is true, by proving that they do not mean any thing by them; that is, any thing different from what others believe, who would express their faith in very different language. Many of their doctrines we conceive to be like the paradoxes we have alluded to above, a mere play upon words, No one we should think could fail of being struck with the correctness of this remark, in reading the works of that very acute and ingenious metaphysician, President Edwards.

Without doing any great violence to language, no doubt there is a sense in which God may be said to be the author of all our actions. But it is not the popular sense, the common sense, the sense in which such an assertion would be understood by the great mass of the people. In popular language we say that man is the author of his own actions, the agent of his own work. Indeed all human language is founded on this assumption. Who does not say, man runs, man fights, man steals? And we should hardly be able to treat one with a due degree of seriousness, who should gravely tell us that we are all wrong in this; that we must alter our phraseology, and say, God runs, God fights, God steals. In fact if we should make any such alteration, we should in a degree do violence to the nature and defeat the purposes of language. Language is in itself essentially popular, and designed for popular use. Should we therefore endeavour to change its nature and design, we might perhaps be able to puzzle, and unsettle, and confound men's minds, but we should not be able to do any thing more.

We should not be able to elucidate what is dark, or correct what may be erroneous in their understandings.-The fact is, when we say that man is the author of his own actions, we do not mean, and we are not understood as meaning any thing but what is strictly and philosophically true. When the plain country man affirms, and persists in affirming, that there is heat in fire, it is certain, as Dr. Reid has abundantly shewn, that he does not mean that there is any thing like the sensation of heat in the fire; but only that their is something in fire which warms those who approach it; and the philosopher cannot deny this. So also when we say that man is the author of his own actions, we have nothing to do with any metaphysical theory on the subject of his volitions, but we merely mean, and we are understood as merely meaning, that there is something in man on account of which he is to be considered the immediate author of such and such actions. Will the philosopher deny this? Now if you go to the plain man and contradict him-telling him that there is no heat in fire-he will of course understand you as contradicting what he means; that is, he will understand you as saying, that there is no quality belonging to the fire which causes in our minds the sensation of heat; so that instead of correcting an error in him, you will, though perhaps unintentionally, lead him into an error. Just so it will be if you represent men as not being the authors of their own actions. So far as they may be able to understand you at all, they will misunderstand you. You will not correct any error in them; for on your own principles they are not in any error, though they use directly contrary language. All you will do will be to introduce infinite perplexity and confusion into their thoughts on human agency.

What we have said against the propriety of calling God the author of human actions in general, applies with tenfold force against the propriety of calling him the author of our sins; and therefore against the propriety of using that sort of language which would seem to imply that he is the author of our sins; for it is obvious that there is no difference between using that language which inevitably implies it, and openly and directly calling him so. Sin, in popular language, is understood to signify a wrong use of our voluntary powers. To say therefore that God is the author of sin, is to say that he is the author of the wrong use of our voluntary powers-which is plainly a solecism. Sin is sin no otherwise, than as it is a wrong use of powers, understood to be strictly voluntary. If our active powers are not strictly and philosophically speaking voluntary, then,strictly and philosophically speaking, there is no such thing as sin. So far as God is the author of our sins, they are not