of party government in England, which in certain noteworthy particulars is quite different from our own. Parliament is the legislating body; and legislation on public questions is very completely under the control of the Cabinet. That body, which differs essentially from the Cabinet of an American President, is composed of the King's Ministers, chosen from the dominant party in Parliament. It performs a threefold function: it leads its party, controls legislation in the House of Commons, and administers the executive functions of the Government. In its legislative capacity the power of the Cabinet is wellnigh absolute so long as it commands a majority in the Commons. In fact, a prominent authority on the government of England has said: "To say that at present the Cabinet legislates with the advice and consent of Parliament would hardly be an exaggeration. . . . It does not follow that the action of the Cabinet is arbitrary; that it springs from personal judgment divorced from all dependence on popular or Parliamentary opinion. The Cabinet has its finger always on the pulse of the House of Commons, and especially of its own majority there, and it is ever on the watch for expressions of public feeling outside. Its function is in large. part to sum up and formulate the desires of its supporters, but the majority must accept its conclusions, and in carrying them out becomes well-nigh automatic."

It follows, from the function of the Cabinet as the real legislative body and from the principle of party government, that a Ministry which has been defeated in the House of Commons on any but the most unimportant measures cannot continue in office. In the contingency of an adverse vote in the Commons, two alternatives are before the Cabinet.

It may

resign, when the Crown must select some statesman, generally of the opposite party, to form a new Cabinet; or it may dissolve Parliament and appeal to the country at a general election.

Parliamentary elections (which are the only elections in England except those for purely local purposes) are held, then, not at stated intervals, but whenever a Ministry loses the support of the House

1 Except in the rare case that a Parliament has expired by statutory limitation at the end of seven years.

of Commons and decides, as a consequence, to appeal to the country.

It is the support of the House of Commons, be it noted, that determines the status of the Cabinet, and therein lies the anomaly of the present crisis. "A Cabinet," says Lowell in his "The Government of England," "never thinks of resigning on account of the hostility of the Lords; nor is its position directly affected by their action."

So it has been in the past. But so it was not in the year of grace 1909. action of the House of Lords very directly affected the position of the Cabinet; and while the hostility of the hereditary chamber did not make the Ministry think of resigning," it did make it appeal to the country. A Financial Bill (otherwise Budget) stands on a very different footing from other bills. If it be not enacted, the sources of the country's revenue are dried up. Taxation, the very breath of life to a government, in large measure ceases, and a continued failure to enact a Finance Bill would quickly produce chaos. A Cabinet which cannot pass its Budget must either give way to its opponents or secure from the country a mandate which its opponents cannot ignore.

This is the first time in hundreds of years, if not in the history of England, that the House of Lords has rejected a Budget. The situation brought about by its action could have but one outcomedissolution and a general election-for the Cabinet, with a majority of 230 in the Commons, could not resign. The course adopted by the Lords, therefore, set up two contentions, from both of which the Liberal party dissented: First, the right of the House of Lords to interfere in financial legislation; secondly, the right of the House of Lords to force a dissolution of Parliament and an appeal to the electors.

The Liberal party, therefore, went before the people on two questions, one fiscal, the other constitutional: Shall the principles of taxation embodied in the Budget-the increased taxation of property and the wealth that comes from natural resources-be adopted by the nation? Shall the right of the House of Lords to share in the control of the nation's finance and to force at its pleasure a dissolution