Conscious ExperienceThomas Metzinger Imprint Academic, 1995 - 564 strán (strany) The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas Metzinger. |
Obsah
Introduction | 41 |
What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness? | 61 |
The Burning House | 81 |
Sceptical Accounts | 93 |
On the Prospects of a Naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness | 107 |
Towards a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience | 123 |
Introduction | 145 |
TimeGestalt and the Observer | 165 |
On the Persistence of Phenomenology | 293 |
Absent Qualia Fading Qualia Dancing Qualia | 309 |
Introduction | 331 |
Multiple Drafts and Facts of the Matter | 359 |
The Dissociation of Phenomenal States from Apperception | 373 |
Introduction | 387 |
Visual InformationProcessing and Phenomenal Consciousness | 409 |
Holism Homogeneity and Temporal Coding | 425 |
Gaps in Penroses Toilings | 185 |
Introduction | 215 |
A Limited Defence of Phenomenal Information | 243 |
The Antipathetic Fallacy and the Boundaries of Consciousness | 259 |
Qualia | 270 |
Intrinsic Relational or What? | 277 |
Introduction | 465 |
Artificial Consciousness | 489 |
Selected Bibliography 19701995 | 507 |
List of Contributors | 557 |
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absent qualia argument artificial consciousness awareness behaviour belief Bewußtsein binding problem blindsight blue brain Cambridge causal Churchland claim cognitive colour concept of consciousness conscious experience Consciousness Explained Dennett Descartes distinction empirical epistemic example explain explanatory gap fact first-person functional Gulick Hameroff higher-order holism human hypothesis International Klein Blue intrinsic introspective intuitions inverted qualia Journal of Philosophy Lycan Marianna materialist McGinn mental Metzinger microtubules mind-body problem Nagel nature Nelkin neural neurons Neuroscience normally sighted objects one's organization pain Penrose perception perspective phenomenal consciousness phenomenal content phenomenal properties Phenomenological Philosophical philosophy of mind physical Pöppel possible problem of consciousness Psychology qualia quantum question reason relation relevant representational robot role Rosenthal seems sensation sense sensory sky appears space spatial structure subjective supervenience temporal temporal coding theoretical theory of consciousness things thought tion understanding visual visual cortex William Lycan