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priori has been stated by preceding writers, he proposes a new one of his own, more clear, (according to him) and more conclusive.

But whatever opinion be formed upon the argument a priori, all parties must allow that the argument a posteriori is more level to the comprehension of ordinary men, and more satisfactory to the philosopher himself. Indeed, in inquiries of this sort the presumption is strongly in favor of that mode of reasoning which is the most simple and obvious.

The existence of a Deity, however, does not seem to be an intuitive truth. It requires the exercise of our reasoning powers to present it in its full force to the mind. But the process of reasoning consists only of a single step, and the premises belong to that class of first principles which form an essential part of the human constitution. These premises are two in number. The one is, that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause. The other, that a combination of means conspiring to a particular end implies intelligence.

CHAPTER SECOND.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION.

SECTION I.

Of the Foundations of our Reasoning from the Effect to the Cause, and of the Evidences of Active Power exhibited in the Universe.

It was before observed that our knowledge of the course of nature is entirely the result of observation and experiment, and that there is no instance in which we perceive such a connexion between two successive events as might enable us to infer the one from the other as a necessary consequence.

From experience, indeed, we learn that there are many events so conjoined that the one constantly follows the other. It is possible, however, that this connexion, though a constant one as far as our observation has reached, is not a necessary connexion; nay, it is possible, for any thing we know to the contrary, that there may be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena we see; and if there are any such connexions existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them.

With this principle, when stated in general terms, most people I apprehend will now agree. Nor is the principle a new one, (as has been commonly supposed) and peculiar to Mr. Hume's system. Of this assertion I have produced sufficient proof in a note, at the end of the first volume of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, where I have quoted various passages from Hobbes, Barrow, Butler, Berkeley, and others, demonstrating clearly that their notions on the subject were precisely the same with Mr. Hume's.* To the list of names there mentioned, perhaps that of Socrates ought to be added, who, as Xenophon tells us in the Memorabilia, blamed

*For some curious passages to the same purpose, see Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. Note (0.)

the sophists for inquiring τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων. And he adds, Αλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντί ζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. Afterwards he says, Εθαύμαζε δὲ, εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν.*

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From this view of the subject, with regard to cause and effect in physics, Mr. Hume has deduced an objection to the argument a posteriori for the existence of the Deity. After having proved that we cannot get the idea of necessary connexion from examining the conjunction between any two events, he takes for granted that we have no other idea of cause and effect than of two successive events which are always conjoined; that we have therefore no reason to think that any one event in nature is necessarily connected with another, or to infer the operation of power from the changes we observe in the universe.

In consequence of these alarming inferences, a number of Mr. Hume's opponents have been led to call in question the truth of his general principles with respect to the relation of cause and effect in natural philosophy. But it has always appeared to me that the defect of this part of Mr. Hume's system does not lie in his premises, but in the conclusion which he has deduced from them; and which, I flatter myself, I shall be able to show cannot be inferred from these premises by a legitimate process of reasoning.

Of the objections that have been stated to Mr. Hume's premises some are extremely frivolous. Dr. Beattie has opposed them by some instances. "There are now," says he, "in my view two contiguous houses, one of which was built last summer, and the other two years ago. By seeing them constantly together for several months, I find that the idea of the one determines my mind to form the idea of the other; so that, according to Mr. Hume's definition, the one house is the cause, and the other the effect." But Dr. Beattie has overlooked one circumstance mentioned by Mr. Hume. That author had evidently in his view not coexistent objects,

Lib. prim. Cap. I. 11. 13.

† Essay on Truth. Second Edit. p. 332.

but events succeeding each other in the order of time, for he always ascribes priority to the cause.

The same remark may be made on another instance which Dr. Beattie mentions. 66 Day and night," says he, "have always been contiguous and successive,—the imagination naturally runs from the idea of the one to that of the other; consequently, according to Mr. Hume's theory, either day is the cause of night, or night the cause of day, just as we consider the one or the other to have been originally prior in time; and its being the one or the other, depends entirely on my imagination." * Now it is evident that this conclusion can never be formed according to Mr. Hume's theory, for he tells us that when two events are conjoined we affix the idea of causation to that event which happens first in the order of time. But day and night happening alternately, the one cannot be considered as prior to the other, and therefore it is quite impossible that the idea of causation can be affixed to either.

But taking for granted the truth of Mr. Hume's premises, let us consider the accuracy of his subsequent reasoning.

In order to form a competent judgment on this point, it is necessary to recollect, that, according to his system, "all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions; or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses." Having proved, therefore, that external objects, as they appear to our senses, give us no idea of power or of necessary connexion, and also that this idea cannot be copied from any internal impression, (that is, cannot be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds) he thinks himself warranted to conclude that we have no such idea. "One event," says he, "follows another, but we never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary con

* Essay on Truth. Second Edit. pp. 332, 333.

clusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life."

Are we therefore to reject, as perfectly unintelligible, a word which is to be found in all languages, because it expresses an idea, for the origin of which we cannot account upon a particular philosophical system? Would it not be more reasonable to suspect that the system was not perfectly complete, than that all mankind should have agreed in employing a word which conveys no meaning?

With respect to Mr. Hume's theory concerning the origin of our ideas, it is the less necessary to enter into particular discussions, as it coincides in the main with the doctrine of Locke, to which I have elsewhere stated some objections, which appear to me insurmountable.* Upon neither theory is it possible to explain the origin of those simple notions, which are not received immediately by any external sense, or derived from our own consciousness, but which are necessarily formed by the mind while we are exercising our intellectual powers upon their proper objects.

These very slight hints are sufficient to show that we are not entitled to dispute the reality of our idea of power, because we cannot trace it to any of the senses. The only question is, if it be certain, that we annex any idea to the word power different from that of constant succession? The following considerations among many others, prove that the import of these two expressions is by no means the same.

First, then, it is evident, that, if we had no idea of cause and effect different from that of mere succession, it would appear to us as absurd to suppose two events disjoined which we have constantly seen connected, as to suppose a change in external objects to take place without a cause. The fact, however, is, that nobody finds it difficult to conceive that two events which are constantly conjoined may not be necessarily connected;

Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 94, et seq. Sixth Edit. VOL. V. 30

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