Divosque, mortalesque turmas, "Quid prius dicam solitis parentis "Unde nil majus generatur IPSO : Nec viget quicquam simile, aut secundum : The most remarkable passage, however, I recollect in any of the ancient poets for my present purpose, is that in Lucan's Pharsalia, where the following lines are put into the mouth of Cato, in reply to Labienus and others, who advised him to consult the oracle of Jupiter Ammon in Lybia. "Hæremus cuncti superis, temploque tacente, Nil facimus non sponte Dei. Nec vocibus ullis Et cœlum, et virtus ?-Superos quid quærimus ultra? In further confirmation of this doctrine, concerning the religious opinions of the ancient philosophers, a very ingenious (and to my mind most convincing) argument is deduced by Dr. Cudworth from the reasonings of the Epicurean school, which, as he observes, were levelled, not against the supposition of a plurality of Deities, but against the belief of one Supreme God, every where present, and every where exerting the active energy of a superintending providence. "Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto?" "In like manner," continues Dr. Cudworth, Hor. Od. Lib. iii. Carm. 4. Lib. ix. l. 573. † Hor. Lib. i. Od. 12. "when Epicurus pursues the same argument further in Cicero, alleging, that, though such a thing were possible, yet it would be, notwithstanding, absolutely inconsistent with the happiness of any being, he still proceeds on the same hypothesis of one sole and single Deity.". "As Epicurus here speaks singularly," says Cudworth, "so the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought so very great to a multitude of coordinate Deities, when parceled out among them, but would rather seem to be but a sportful and delightful divertisement to each of them. Wherefore," concludes this very learned and profound writer, "it is manifest that such an idea as we have declared of the unity of God is a thing which the ancient atheists, under the times of paganism, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force against it."* I must not leave this fundamental article of Natural Religion, (the existence of the Deity) without taking notice of the support it derives from the universal consent of all ages and nations. However contaminated with error, however debased by the follies of superstition and credulity, the belief of the existence of supernatural and invisible beings presiding over human affairs will be found to be inseparable from the human mind; and, in so far as this belief obtains, atheism is excluded. "Ex tot generibus," says Cicero, "nullum est animal, præter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei: ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat." + Now unquestionably the universal concurrence of mankind in the belief of any proposition is a strong presumption, or rather a positive evidence, that this belief has a foundation in the principles of our nature; and if we find these natural suggestions of the mind confirmed by the authority of the most enlightened philosophers, and above all confirmed by the conclusions of our own reason, we have all the evidence that possibly can be brought in support of any truth what Intellect. System, pp. 207, 208. † Lib. i. De Legibus, 8. ever. Indeed I apprehend there is no truth in the whole circle of human knowledge which so many different kinds of proof conspire to establish, as that which has been now under our consideration :-"Testimonium populorum atque gentium," says Lactantius, "in unâ hac re non dissidentium: "-and in this manner reasoned the best philosophers of old. "What seems true to most wise men," as Aristotle has excellently observed, "is very probable; what most men, both wise and unwise, assent to, doth still more resemble truth; but what men generally consent in hath the highest probability, and approaches near to demonstration, so near that it may pass for ridiculous arrogance, or for intolerable obstinacy and perverseness to deny it."-"A man," he adds, "may assume what seems true to the wise, if it do not contradict the common opinion of mankind." * The following passages are extracted from different writers of antiquity. They all express the same idea, the presumption for the existence of the Deity arising from universal consent. But on a subject of so interesting a nature it is pleasing to place the same truth in various lights, as well as to remark a coincidence of sentiment among those enlarged and cultivated minds which have devoted their talents to the improvement and happiness of the human race. "Multum dare solemus," says Seneca, "præsumptioni omnium hominum; apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam Deos sic esse colligimus, quod omnibus de Diis opinio insita est; nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat." + t To the same purpose Cicero: "Firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt ; id enim vitioso more effici solet: omnes tamen esse vim et naturam Divinam arbitrantur. Unâ autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est." I Arist. Top. I, 8. † Sen. Ep. 117. Tusc. I. 13. In the following passage of Maximus Tyrius, the fact on which the argument proceeds is stated with great simplicity and force. "In such a contest and tumult and disagreement (about other matters of opinion) you may see this one law and speech acknowledged by common accord, that there is one God, the King and Father of All, and many Gods, the children of God and ruling together with him. This the Greek says, and this the barbarian says; and the inhabitant of the continent, and the islander, and the wise and the unwise." * "If you search the world," says Plutarch, "you may find cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without money; but no one ever saw a city without a Deity, without a temple, or without some form of worship." In the passages now quoted their several authors take for granted that the general consent of mankind in admitting any proposition affords a strong presumption that the proposition is true. And that this is a just principle of reasoning appears (among various other considerations) from this, that "truth is one thing, while errors are numberless, and every man has a different one." I select this consideration in preference to the others, because the remark is made by Mr. Hume himself, the most sceptical of all writers. When we find, therefore, a number of unconnected individuals, all led to the same conclusion by different processes of reasoning, the presumption that the conclusion is true is strengthened in a proportion indefinitely great; and in like manner, when among an infinite variety of discordant systems that have arisen in different ages and countries, we find some opinions common to them all, we are inevitably led to consider these opinions as possessing the highest evidence by which any truth can possibly be supported. We may add to this observation, that when among an infinite variety of rites and ceremonies we trace universally the operation of certain common affections and emotions, we have a demonstration that See Barrow's Sermons. these affections and emotions form the constituent part of the nature of man. I am aware of an objection that may be stated to this doctrine, that there are some articles of belief universally received by mankind in ages of ignorance, which come to be generally regarded as mere prejudices in the progress of human reason. Such, for example, is the belief that the earth is at rest, and the sun in motion; and in general all those prejudices called by Lord Bacon Idola Tribus. It may be supposed, therefore, that, for any thing we know to the contrary, the case may one day be the same with our belief of the existence of a Deity. * In answer to this objection I would observe, that wherever a prejudice is found to obtain universally among mankind in any stage of society, this prejudice must have some foundation in the general principles of our nature, and must proceed upon some truth or fact inaccurately apprehended, or erroneously judged of. The suspense of judgment, therefore, which is proper with respect to particular opinions till they are once examined, can never justify scepticism with respect to the general principles or laws of the human mind. Our belief of the sun's motion is not a conclusion to which we are fairly led by any such principle or law, but an inference rashly drawn from the perceptions of sense, which do not warrant such an inference. All that we see is, that there is a relative change of place between us and the sun; and this fact which is made known to us by our senses, no subsequent discovery of philosophy pretends to disprove. It is not therefore the evidence of external perception' which is overturned by the Copernican system, but a judgment or inference of the understanding, of the rashness of which every person must be fully sensible the moment he is made to reflect with due attention on the circumstances of the case. In other words, the Copernican system not only informs us of the real constitution of the universe, but satisfies us with respect to the grounds of this universal prejudice; and *See Trembley sur les Préjugés, p. 21. |