look to our enterprising friends of the press to make a vigorous campaign for the advancement of Kansas City, and then each newspaper modestly take all the credit for the successful accomplishment of the desired end. Kansas City for twenty years has virtually had a home-made charter, for the charter of 1875 was drafted by a representative committee and passed without legislative tinkering. It was a good charter, admirably adapted to the needs of the city. The new charter, twice changed by important amendments, is a good charter, but it may be improved. Having due regard to avoiding frequent changes, carefully considering what amendments are wise, the people of Kansas City ought to be satisfied with nothing poorer than the best possible charter, under the Constitution of Missouri. To the attainment of that end I am sure no or ganizations will contribute more than the Commercial Club and the Bar Association. -- merchants, for the purpose of carrying on a coal and fish business, in competition with that of plaintiff, to his damage: Held, that it could not be adjudged that the contract, as alleged, was contrary to public policy, as being in restraint of trade, and that, upon such declaration, it appeared that the plaintiff had a good cause of action. (Anthony v. Hitchcock [U. S. C. C., Mich.], 71 Fed. Rep. 659. CORPORATIONS - CHARTERS. When a corporation is chartered with the right to manufacture and sell gas, the right to charge a reasonable rate for all gas furnished is implied, and forms a part of its contract with the State, which cannot be impaired by legislation. (Cleveland Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Cleveland [U. S. C. C., Ohio], 71 Fed. Rep. 610. EQUITY PRACTICE-ANCILLARY RECEIVERSHIPS. — Receivers of a Missouri corporation were appointed by the Circuit Court for the southern district of New York, at the suit of a New York corporation. The same persons were appointed ancillary receivers by the Circuit Court in Missouri, where the principal part of the business of the corporation had been transacted; the order for their appointment containing a direction to appoint an agent in Missouri to receive service of process, notices, etc., with which the receivers complied. Subsequently, a creditor residing in Missouri applied to the Circuit Court there to determine the existence and amount of a claim against the insolvent corporation, arising out of transactions which took place in Missouri. Held, that, although the New York court was the court of primary jurisdiction, and was the proper tribunal to pass upon the distribution of the fund in the receiver's hands, the Missouri court would not dismiss the croditor's application, but would entertain it, at least so far as to determine the existence and amount of his claim, without requiring him to resort to a foreign jurisdiction to prove the same. (New York Security & Trust Co. v. Equitable Mortgage Co. [U. S. C. C., Mo.], 71 Fed. Rep. 556.) CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-CONNECTING LINES.— A carrier contracting for passage over its own and a connecting line, having agreed to reserve a stateroom on such connecting line, is liable in compensatory damages to the purchaser of a through ticket who was unable to secure his stateroom by reason of the fact that more tickets were sold than there were staterooms reserved. (Bussman v. Western Transit Co. [U. S. D. C., N. Y.], 71 Fed. Rep. 654.) SALE OF BUSINESS-COVENANTS.-Action may be CONTRACTS RESTRAINT OF TRADE.- Plaintiff's maintained on the covenant of an insurance agent, declaration alleged that he was engaged in conduct- in his contract of sale of his business, not to re-ening a coal and fish business at a dock on a navi-gage in the business, though the buyer does not exegable river, and was the owner of adjoining land, with riparian rights, suitable for carrying on a similar business; that he sold such land and riparian rights to defendant, and defendant in consideration of such sale agreed not to buy or sell coal or traffic in the buying or selling of fish, and not to do anything that would conflict with the coal or fish business of plaintiff; yet that defendant, since the execution of such agreement, had leased the premises purchased from the plaintiff to a firm of coal cute to the seller notes for deferred payments, as provided in the contract of sale; the seller having given orders to insurance companies, on the buyer, for the purchase price, which were accepted by the buyer, and the insurance companies having thereafter accepted, in lieu of the buyer's personal liability on his acceptances, the undertaking of his transferee of the business that such payment should be a charge on the business. (Klein v. Buck [Miss.], 18 South. Rep. 891.) Notes of English Cases. BY-LAW REASONABLENESS. A tramway company under the powers of section 46 of the Tramways Act 1870, made the following by-law: "Each passenger shall show his ticket (if any) when required to do so, to the conductor or any duly authorized servant of the company, and shall also, when required so to do, either deliver up his ticket or pay the fare legally demanded for the distance traveled over by such passenger." A further by law imposed a penalty for breach of any of the company's by-laws. The respondent refused to show his ticket when asked to do so by an inspector of the company, but gave a number which was the number of his ticket which he had received from the conductor of the company. He had duly paid his fare and had no intention to defraud, and had not in fact defrauded the company. Held, That the by-law was reasonable and valid, and the respondent ought to be convicted of a breach of it. (Q. B. Div.; Lowe v. Volp, 74 L. T. Rep. 143.) INLAND REVENUE.- A testator who died in 1873 devised to his nephew G. M. in fee simple two freehold houses, which were then let on leases at rents less than the rack rents of the same, and in 1877 G. M. had paid, in respect of these houses, the succession duty as calculated on the rentals reserved by the leases. In 1888 he sold both houses to the lessees of one of the houses, and in December, 1889, the leases of both the houses fell in, and the purchasers then became entitled in possession to the full value of the houses. The crown claimed that succession duty was payable by the purchasers in December, 1889, in respect of the increased value accruing to them upon the falling in of the leases, to be calculated on the basis of an annuity during the residue of the lives of the purchasers equal to the increase of the annual value. Held, that the purchasers were not " successors, and were not liable as such to the duty, but were liable only for what G. M. the alienor would have been liable for, namely, a sum calculated in respect of the increase of value by the falling in of the leases on the basis of the alienor's own life, (Q. B. Div.; The Attorney-General v. Manders and another, 74 L. T. Rep. 103.) SOLICITOR COSTS. The mere pendency of a lunacy petition against a client is not a sufficient ground to disentitle a solicitor to take legal pro- | ceedings on his behalf; provided that at the time of his so doing he believes his client to be of sound mind. proceedings until the result of the lunacy inquiry is ascertained. A solicitor, believing his client to be of sound mind, obtained ex parte an order to tax a bill of costs due by the client to her former solicitors without disclosing the fact that a lunacy petition was pending against her. Held, That this was not such professional misconduct on the part of the solicitor as to subject him to the payment personally of the costs of a successful application to discharge the order. (Chan. Div.; Re. George Armstrong & Sons, 74 L. T. Rep. 134.) WILLS - CONSTRUCTION. A testator by his will, dated in 1862, devised his real estate, subject to certain life interests, upon trust for his brother for life, and after his death upon trust for his brother's four sons in the order named in the will, and their respective heirs male in succession, and he declared that his personal estate should be held upon such trusts as would best correspond with the trusts declared as to the real estate. By a codicil, dated 1873, after reciting the trusts declared by the will as to the real estate, he directed that his will should be read and construed and take effect as if they were contained therein, immediately after the limitations upon trust for his brother's four sons successively, and for their issue male in such order as the testator's wife should by deed or will appoint. The testator died in 1881. His wife died in 1894, having by her will, made in 1886, varied the order of the succession of the four sons to the real estate. Held, That there was only one power of appointment given to the wife, and that it extended to the personalty as well as to the real estate, and that the will of the wife was a valid and effectual exercise of the power, and that the personaity went to the four sons in the same order of succession as the realty. (H. of L., Liddel v. Liddel, 74 L. T. Rep. 105.) WILL CONSTRUCTION. S., by will gave his business to K., charged with the payment of £50 to each man employed in his business at his death who should have been in his service for ten years, and to each other in his service at his decease £10. By another clause in the same will S. direeted his trustees to pay to each man who should have been in his employment in London over ten years the sum of £10 for each year beyond the said ten years. Held, That D., who had been in the testator's employment fifteen years, but left it five years before the date of the will, and nearly ten years before the testator's death, was entitled to £50 under the second legacy. (Re Sharland; Kemp v. Rozey, Chan. In a proper case the court will order a stay of Div., 74 L. T. Rep. 20.) The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, APRIL 25, 1896. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. the innocence of the convict and the unfairness of the trial. But the circumstance to which we have last alluded, is exactly parallel with the case of Mrs. Maybrick. There seems to be absolutely no doubt but that injustice was done to her, and that the facts which led to such a conclusion were repeatedly laid before the Home All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other Secretary upon whom the queen depends for business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] WITHIN advice in exercising her pardoning powers. The Home Secretary, it may be remembered, has considered the subject with due deliberation and after consultation with the officers of the Crown, among whom are to be found some of the ablest lawyers in England. Whatever right or wrong there was in the decision of the Home Secretary the procedure and legality of his action cannot be questioned. Senator Call's resolution states, in reference to this case, that the people of the United States almost universally believe in the innocence of the prisoner. This may or may not be true, but it has no reference to and no weight in the proper consideration of the question either by the English authorities or by the representatives of the people in Congress, for the duty of the latter is plainly to interfere in such matters only as the people themselves have a clear and ITHIN a short time the attention of the public has been called to two celebrated legal proceedings in which women have been prominent features and which has aroused the greatest interest in this and other countries. Senator Call of Florida, within a few days, introduced a joint resolution in Congress in reference to the case of Mrs. Maybrick. It would seem as if such resolutions were entirely out of place, and it would be far better, even if injustice may have been done, to allow the circumstances to remain without any recognition by any legislative body in this country, and without any interference by Congress, because we would by such actions be meddling with a trial which took place in another country and in accordance with its laws. We may be perfectly right in criticising the conviction of Mrs. May-perfect right to act. Again, the language of brick and the means by which it was brought about, but we see no reason why the American Congress should interfere in any way or under any pretext. Mrs. Maybrick, it is well known, is an American citizen; but that fact alone does not call for any action on our part because she was convicted in an English court. If a British citizen had been tried and convicted upon a charge of crime in one of the Federal courts of this country; if public attention had been called to facts indicating that the prisoner was probably innocent and that his trial had been unfairly conducted; if these matters had been laid before the president upon an application for a pardon; and if the president, after a careful consideration of the record in the case, with the advice and assistance of the attorney-general, had determined that there was no sufficient ground for the exercise of executive clemency, the people of this country would think it almost impudent on the part of the British Parliament to adopt a resolution declaring the belief of the English people in VOL. 53 No. 17. - the resolution would rather lead an unprejudiced person to believe that the people at large, who never read the testimony, or who certainly never read all of it, were competent judges of the fact and the law in the premises. It has been stated, even in the English papers, that Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the trial judge before whom Mrs. Maybrick was tried, treated her defense with undue harshness. Less than two years after the trial Mr. Justice Stephen retired from the bench because he had become mentally unfit for further judicial service. Senator Call's resolution states that the defendant was unfairly convicted "before a presiding judge whose harsh rulings were caused by a demented mind, almost bordering on insanity." Whether or not this was true, the Home Secretary must have recognized and known the facts, if it could be claimed that Mr. Justice Stephen was demented at the time of the Maybrick trial, which he has since taken no steps to rectify. The suggestion of the condition of the trial judge at the time Mrs. Maybrick was convicted must have forcibly presented itself to the Home Secretary since the trial, and it would seem that a resolution would not even be necessary to call attention to this state of affairs. One of the interesting points in reference to this case is contained in the recently published memoirs of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, by his brother, Leslie Stephen, Thackeray's son-in-law. In a discussion of the characteristics of his brother, Leslie Stephen says: "On August 7, 1889, Mrs. Maybrick was convicted of the murder of her husband. The sentence was afterward commuted, with Fitzjames' approval, and, I believe, at his suggestion, to penal servitude for life, upon the ground, as publicly stated, that although there was no doubt that she had administered poison, it was possible that her husband had died from other causes. A great deal of feeling was aroused; Fitzjames was bitterly attacked in the press, and received many anonymous letters full of the vilest abuse. Hatred of women generally and jealousy of the counsel for the defense were among the causes of his infamous conduct suggested by these judicious correspondents. I, of course, have nothing to say upon these points, nor would I say anything which would have any bearing upon the correctness of the verdict. But as attacks were made in public organs upon his behavior as judge, I think it right to say that they were absolutely without foundation. His letters show that he felt the responsibility deeply; and that he kept his mind open to the last. From other evidence I have not the least doubt that his humanity and impartiality were as conspicuous in this as in other cases, and, I believe, were not impugned by any competent witnesses, even by those who might doubt the correctness of the verdict." state, however much we may feel that injustice was done. The policy of the resolution, if carried out to any considerable extent, could only lead to questions which, we fear, would be very unsatisfactory, and would lead to all kinds of international disputes. a The second celebrated case in which woman has been the leading factor is recalled by the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the conviction for murder in the first degree of Marie Barberi. It will be remembered that at the time of the trial great interest was aroused by reason of the alleged harsh treatment of the defendant by the trial judge, who had recently been elected to the important office of recorder of the city of New York. Like the Maybrick case, there has been considerable dispute as to whether the trial judge acted in a fair and impartial manner. Whatever may be the facts in regard to this view of the case it is obvious, after reading the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that the court of last resort differs materially in its view of the law from that taken by the learned recorder of the city of New York. Recorder Goff, in his charge to the jury on the subject of premeditation, said: "You may infer all this testimony from the facts of the case and the acts of this defendant. The rule as to deliberation and premeditation has been stated so often as to have become familiar. The time need not be long, and may be short." On this point the Court of Appeals says: The defendant was not guilty of murder in the first degree unless the act was premeditated, not only with the intent to kill, but also with deliberation and premeditation. If the defendant inflicted the wound in a sudden transport of passion, excited by what the deceased then said, and by the preceding events, which for the time disturbed her reasoning faculties, the act did not constitute murder in the first degree. Here, in America, where we have been very much incensed at the trial of Mrs. Maybrick | and by the conduct of the trial judge, we, natu- The defendant had been deceived, betrayed, rally, cannot be expected to sympathize with disgraced, and ruined, but it is not certain that this view given by Leslie Stephen of his she formed the definite intention to use the brother's decision and actions in this famous weapon until she heard the final refusal of the case. But we feel that it would be a bad prece- deceased to marry her. It was only after this dent to establish to attempt, as a country, to hope was gone, after his final refusal, accriticise, either by action of Congress or other-companied as it was by insulting and brutal wise, the trial of a citizen of our country which imputations that might well have aroused the was conducted according to the laws of another most violent passions, that she struck the fatal blow. If at that moment, in consequence of what he said to her and the final culmination of the alleged wrong of which she conceived herself to have been the victim, she became incapable of reasoning or deliberating, the act, we think, would not constitute murder in the first degree. One of the determinations for the jury was as to whether her mind was in that condition. The defendant was entitled to the benefit of all testimony that had any legitimate bearing on that question and to have the jury correctly instructed by the court with respect to the principle of law that governed the inquiry. The condition of the defendant's mind was not to be ascertained solely from what took place in The relation of the parties which preceded the homicide were competent for the consideration of the jury, since they were connected with the tragedy and were of such a nature as to produce a powerful influence upon the mind when recalled at the moment that the defendant heard the final refusal of the deceased to marry her, expressed, as it was, in the most insulting and provoking language. the saloon at the time of the homicide. We are convinced from careful examination of the record that there was a wide departure from these principles in the conduct of the trial. If she was entitled to give the full history of the relations between herself and the deceased, and she certainly had that right, she had likewise the right to produce the testimony of disinterested witnesses to support her testi mony. The difference of opinion between the Court of Appeals and the trial court is very marked, and it would seem, after careful reading of the opinion, as if it was impossible on the same evidence to convict the defendant for more than manslaughter. The case, to our mind, hinges on a very narrow question of fact and involves the most dangerous principle of popular verdicts, which we fear and distrust. In regard to the principle point as to what the evidence in one matter decides, the question is, did the defendant live with the deceased in meretricious intercourse, impelled by promises of marriage or with the desire only of being the mistress of the deceased? If she lived with her seducer, Cataldo, as his mistress, there is a slight presumption of premeditation and an inclination to commit the crime. If, however, she was in duced τό assume improper relations with Cataldo by promises of marriage and other inducements, then and in that event the evidence would tend to show that she committed the crime in a fit of sudden anger, without any premeditation or deliberation. While we do not assume as a legal principle that which we are about to set forth, yet we believe that the defendant was justified in the eyes of men in killing her seducer if he had induced her to assume improper relations with him by promises of marriage, and we know that such a statement of facts would largely influence any jury which might be impanelled. Juries are, to a considerable extent, influenced by public statement, and the dangerous factor in a case of this nature is that public sentiment does not properly adjudge between the betrayed and the mistress. It was for these reasons that the law recognizes no difference; and it certainly would. be a dangerous precedent, as well as a bad principle of law, to openly assert such a doctrine, for under such circumstances there would be no protection to society against a certain class of women. The Maybrick and the Barberi cases also lead us to question whether or not the public are more influenced to cry not guilty whenever a woman is defendant in a criminal case. On April 21, Edward G. Whittaker, President of the New York State Bar Association, Hon. William D. Vedder, of Brooklyn, Chairman of the International Arbitration Committee, together with W. Martin Jones, Esq., of Rochester, also a member of the committee, called upon President Cleveland by appointment, and presented the plan recommended by the State Bar Association of this State, for the establishment of a court to determine questions submitted to it by various countries, in regard to The memorial will be international matters. found in this number. The plan is to establish an International Court of Arbitration, composed of nine members, each to be a member of the Supreme or highest court of the nation. he represents, and to be chosen by the majority of his associates because of his high character, ability and irreproachable integrity. Each member is to hold office during life, or at the will of the court selecting him. The court thus constituted is to make its |