For Prof. Holt no entity in space and no event in time has any absolute position. Its position is fixed by its relation to other entities. Theoretically one can distinguish between the spatial position of any entity in the cross-section of consciousness and the position of the entity in the whole of which the cross-section is a part. The cross-sections defined by response and environment may be fragmentary as compared with such a whole, but the spatial relations in the cross-section are identical with the spatial relations in the whole, and the space of the cross-section is the space of the entities in the whole.

'Here" is but a focus at which our knowledge of space is most minute and adequate. . . . The "here" is no more in itself a position than any one of the many theres", but all alike have position in virtue of their relations to one another.' 'Our mind's knowledge of space... is discontinuous and fragmentary. . . . It compares with "real" space somewhat as the system of prime numbers with the system of whole numbers.' (The Concept of Consciousness, p. 240.)

A parallel theory is applied to time. Just as the eye is an instrument for responding to entities distant in space, so memory is the instrument for responding to events distant in time. The position of an event in time will be determined by its relations. To use Prof. Holt's illustration: the idea of Noah building his ark is before the idea of Caesar building his bridge, which again is before that of Michelangelo planning the dome of St. Peter's. Just as there is no absolute 'here', so there is no absolute 'now'. For Prof. Holt will not recognize that there is such a problem as that of reconciling a present operation, remembering, with a past event remembered. Just as in the eye the organism has a 'receptor' for distant stimuli, so in the organization of its nervous system the organism has a mechanism of docility' for stimuli distant in past time. The argument, therefore, that one's thought is here and now, because one's nervous system is active here and now, is not valid.' (ibid.,

p. 247.) Again, the 'I' which is declared to be now remembering cannot be defined by reference to a temporal event. The cross-sections which are consciousness contain other relations than those of space and time. 'I,' so far as it means anything, is volitional, it is expressive of purpose. A complete account of the cross-sections of consciousness, following each other from moment to moment, just like a complete account of any other cross-sections of being, would yield a generative law or formula expressive of the sequence of terms. Such a law for consciousness would be purpose. The laws of volition and the laws of nature are 'formulae that generate explicit sequences which "fulfil" them'. (ibid., p. 295.) It will be seen that upon such an interpretation the distinction of final and efficient cause is fatuous. For Prof. Holt the best interpretation one can give to 'I' is that of the 'dominant purpose' of the cross-section. It is the law of the crosssection. But a law neither has position in time, nor is it itself extended in time. Therefore the 'I', in 'I am now remembering', is not defined by reference to any 'present event. Can'now' then have no correspondence with 'real' time? The answer is that just as ' here' was the focus where knowledge of space was most minute and was to all intents and purposes itself so much of space ('real' space), so 'now', the specious present, will be the focus of that knowledge of the temporal system which is most adequate and which approximates to so much of time ('real' time).

It will be seen that this account of memory ignores many of the questions raised by other writers. Just as for Mr. Russell there was no distinction between sensation and sensedatum, so for Prof. Holt there is no distinction between image and object remembered. Prof. Holt deals very lightly with the distinction between memory and imagination which in other writers calls for some theory as to the nature of belief. He declares that imaginary ideas are in the great realm of being equally with perceptions, and their position in con

sciousness is determined, just as in the case of perception, by the responses of the nervous system. We are warned against the error of the hod-carrier', with whom Prof. Holt would bracket the idealist; viz., that of regarding nervous responses as functions of some ectodermal impact'. This, however, does not help us to understand how or why the ideas of memory are differentiated from the ideas of imagination. Presumably Prof. Holt would in the end deal with the difference in the same way as he deals with the difference between truth and error in general. Truth and error belong only to relations. Error is that conflict of relations which when expressed in propositions becomes contradictory propositions. Similarly, it might be maintained that only ideas in their relations could be contrasted as respectively memory and imagination. Ideas of imagination would be such as imply conflicting relations. When contrasted with memory they would give rise to conflicting temporal relations; when contrasted with perception, conflicting spatial relations. In other words, the difference between memory and imagination must lie in their contents. But in that case a train of memory which by reason of lacunae lacked self-consistency ought to be ipso facto a train of imagination.

But to return to memory as knowledge of the past. The contrast between past and future in relation to the present is for Prof. Holt a spurious temporal relation. It is the relation of entities to volition, not their relations to one another as before and after. Present, past, and future are terms whose import is in behaviour. They express differences in the conditioning of response by environment. Prof. Holt suggests that it might be better to recognize only two categories 'the entities on which the will does not operate and those on which it does'. (ibid., p. 254.) What bearing has this on memory as knowledge of the past? Suppose I remember a series of events, say, the arrival of a train, my friends' greeting, the bustle of the station, the drive in a cab,

and so on; there will be 'before' and 'after', identity with 'real' time, let us say, but what is meant by terming the whole series' past'? Is this a spurious temporal relation? If one could continue the whole series of events in memory until it is terminated in a position in time which was adequately known, the 'now', to call it past would be to regard it as 'before' this position, and I presume everything would be plain sailing for Prof. Holt. But in the absence of such a completion of the memory series in the 'now', what is meant by terming the events past? Are there always in the cross-section events known with the minuteness of 'now', a focus of reference in relation to which all memories are before', or are the memories past only in the sense that they are events on which the will does not operate? This whole question of volition and purpose is difficult. When one reads of the ' entities on which the will does not operate and those on which it does' as tantamount to the past on the one hand and the present and future on the other, one cannot feel sure that the organism's responses, instead of discreetly defining the boundaries of that cross-section which is itself consciousness, have not quietly been changed into conscious attitudes towards the cross-section (cf. pp. 253, 254, and ch. 14). The volitional pastness' of memory becomes something very like a subject's attitude towards the known. In the 'I am now remembering' one is puzzled as to how the purpose of the cross-section constituting consciousness (the law of the cross-section already referred to) becomes known. To adapt Mill's phraseology, how can something which ex hypothesi is the generative law of consciousness be aware of itself as such a law?

Does Prof. Holt give us any explanation of the difference between remembering our own past experiences and remembering such facts as those he cites, viz., that Noah built his ark before Caesar built his bridge? Let us say that last night I visited a certain room, opened a drawer and saw

within it a key. To-day I remember this. The cross-section to-day at the moment of memory would seem on Prof. Holt's theory to be a repetition of the cross-section of yesterday with all the sequences preserved, but if one insists that the memory to-day is not merely of the key lying in the drawer, but of my seeing the key lying in the drawer, how does repetition account for it? My seeing' was ex hypothesi not part of the cross-section yesterday. It defined the crosssection, but could not fall within it. How then can it be remembered. Some new interpretation for my seeing' must be found. It may be argued that I saw parts of my own body, that I responded to organic stimuli when seeing the key, and that it is these facts which are in the cross-section of to-day and which cause me to say that I not merely remember the key, but remember seeing the key. In reply one may urge that it is straining facts to declare that some part of the organism is always in the cross-section which is constituted by one of its responses to environment, and that even so it is not clear how the present cross-section of memory appropriates the part of the organism which was in the original cross-section. The relation between the key and the organic stimuli, or the key and the seen arm, in the cross-section of memory should be what it was in the original cross-section of perception. Yet in the perceptual cross-section there was nothing to give rise to such knowledge as is expressed by the memory: 'I remember seeing the key.' On the contrary we seem to be up against one of those private facts which cannot be analysed into relations between fragments of the neutral mosaic. Any neural response in the cross-section to which the object may be said to be related, can only be related to it as one object to another within consciousness. There can be a seen neural response, but not a seeing response. I suspect that here, as in volition, the response, which should merely define the cross-section, is made to play the part of experiencing subject. This, I take it, is the difficulty which Prof. Alexander had