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for which such unity may be the basis, and thus can reach the Law of Redintegration, which is wider than any Law of Suggestion based on coexistence or immediate sequence in time. In this doctrine of the interplay of ideas there is a parallel to Herbartian teaching. But whereas Herbart treated ideas as forces, fusing with one another, opposing one another, complicating one another, Hamilton postulates an active subject, whose relation to the ideas which are themselves modifications of mind energy it is hard to determine. In this he has bequeathed a problem to writers of the present time.

In conclusion, let us sum up the questions which stand out in the psychology of these writers and which are the heritage of modern investigation :- In the older philosophers, the question of the relation of the memory image to the original of sense, the epistemological value of memory knowledge, the forms of relation between ideas and the epistemological value of such relations; in the Association school, the search for the elements and the fundamental laws of their connexion; and in the writers of the Scotch school, the conditions of suggestion and of obliviscence.

These writers accepted memory as it is for adult human consciousness without reference to anything simpler, in the sense of more primitive ; further they accepted it as a fact to be described rather than explained. The parallelism between habit in action and memory in knowledge is not stressed and only in Spencer are the two brought together for common treatment. Memory is pre-eminently a matter of knowledge, not of conduct. But only here and there is the problem of memory as knowledge of the past made explicit. In Reid, the distinction is made between memory as an operation of the mind and memory as idea, in the sense of the object known by memory, but in the writers of the empirical and of the associationist school no parallel distinction is drawn between memory-image and memory idea, in the sense of an item of knowledge; they are used as synonymous expressions.

Looked at broadly, the method of all the writers of the Empirical English School is a method of dissection. They start by sorting out the known contents of adult mind; they analyse and classify them, pointing out their relations to one another, and take it for granted that the totality is the equivalent of human understanding, human nature, human mind. Fortunately, or unfortunately, it is items of knowledge which respond best to dissection. The faculties or powers of mind and the laws in accordance with which ideas are related will thus necessarily be just those which such an analysis of ideas requires. Reid and Hamilton, but particularly the latter, illustrate the opposite method ; viz., the method of starting with a theory as to the nature of mind and its faculties, and deriving therefrom mental phenomena and the laws of their relations; thus Hamilton's psychology is deductive and more akin to the rational psychology of Wolff. Modern psychology has inherited all the problems

. of philosophical psychology, and in so far as she pursues them her methods must be the old methods, since in their essence these are exhaustive. She can only be more rigorous in their prosecution and more catholic in their combination. The modern titles, Experimental Psychology, Genetic Psychology, Comparative Psychology, indicate lines of procedure wherein the old empirical inductive and rational deductive methods are refined in application and extended in scope. Upon the old problems of philosophical psychology have been superposed problems from biology.

But when all is said and done, modern psychology may be seen to be fashioned by one school after the pattern of Hamilton, by another after the model of Hume. Here the unity of mind is stressed, there the plurality of contents proclaimed. The lines of division in method cross and recross as opposing philosophical ideals shape psychological theories. They may cross again as this one accepts biology and that one physics as the model of method and the gauge of progress. IV



We considered the objective standpoint of the Behaviourist as arising out of the standpoint of the biologist, as being in fact an extension of biology into the field of psychology. But curiously enough this objective standpoint finds itself acclaimed by the epistemology of New Realism. The Realist has found it a fairly easy task to rewrite the psychology of sense-perception in such a way as to make it accord with his view of the cognitive relation, but the psychology of memory has proved rather intractable. Behaviourism, however, has

, supplied some branches of the school with exactly the psychology which their epistemology demanded.

The writers considered in our historical survey all made their study of memory with the mind qua ‘knower' as the centre of their philosophic inquiry. The New Realist may be interested in memory as a kind of knowledge and in the relation of the image to the original of sense, but he makes his inquiry from an entirely different point of departure. Bain wrote, “There is no possible knowledge of a world except in relation to our minds. ... We are incapable even of discussing the existence of an independent material world ; the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world presented to our minds.' This is just the position which the Realist denies. He denies the fatality of what has been illuminatively styled the 'ego-centric predicament '. From being the centre of the universe mind takes its place side by side with other finite existences. Within the whole of reality finites stand in various relations to one another. Mind's cognition of the material world is a relation, and instead of being the basis for all discussion of the nature of reality, is merely one among the many relations in which finites stand to one another.

In opposition to the theories based on the 'ego-centric

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predicament' the Realist claims independence for whatever may enter into cognitive relation with mind.

Realism does not deny that when a enters into a relation such as knowledge, of which it is independent, a now acquires that relation, and is accordingly different by so much; but denies only that this added relation is necessary to a as already constituted. Thus when a is known, it is a itself, as constituted

a without knowledge, that is, independently of that circumstance. The new complex known-a is of course dependent on knowledge as one of its parts.' (The New Realism, A Realistic Theory of Independence, R. B. Perry, p. 118.) When mind is aware of a red patch, the relation between mind and the finite in question in no way affects the nature of that finite; we may not attribute any character to that finite in virtue of the relation except the character of being in the relation. The feature redness is independent of the relation, being known by mind.

We may regard the principles so far described as being fundamental for Realism generally. But Realism is not all of one pattern, and in relation to memory we must consider the parting of the ways. It is possible to take up the position that a complete account of the relationships constituting knowledge is in itself a complete account of mind. This is the form of Realism for which Behaviourism may be said to be the only psychology But it is also possible to adopt the position that no account of the relationships of mind to other finites, however complete, can express the nature of mind. There remains as characteristic of mind something for which the word ' experience ' is perhaps the best general term. This form of Realism leaves an opening for a study of mind which shall be in some sense subjective, but here again we find divergence of opinion as to the standing of the data for such a study.

We may look at the form of the memory problem in each of these varieties of Realism, taking Prof. Holt as typical of the first, and Prof. Alexander and Mr. Bertrand Russell


as typical of the second. It is more convenient to begin with the latter, and we will consider how memory knowledge is treated by Prof. Alexander.

In replying to a review of his Gifford Lectures by Mr. Broad (Mind, vol. xxx), Prof. Alexander expresses indignation with the critics who have paid attention to his theory of knowledge apart from his metaphysics. But since he himself tells us that he arrived at the larger task by examining the relation of mind to its objects, one may be pardoned for thinking that his theory of knowledge has significance in and for itself.

The cognitive relation is a relation of compresence between mind and its object. The simplest form of this relation will be the compresence of mind with what Prof. Alexander terms a sensum, say a patch of colour, a sound, a touch. The colour, sound, or touch is a real finite existent which is compresent with mind; the awareness of the colour, &c., is mind's act, its way of responding to the real. In perception mind's response is more complicated; it responds not only to a sensum, but to ideal elements. To understand the ideal elements it is necessary to turn to another thread of the theory; viz., the relation of body and mind. For Prof. Alexander the problem of mind and body is not to be solved by any theory of correlation or inter-action, wherein mental and neural processes are treated as two distinct series of events. For Prof. Alexander they are one.

He sets forth a hierarchy of qualities which in general outline resembles the hierarchy of Prof. Lloyd Morgan (cf. ch. ii). The quality of consciousness is a new quality which 'emerges' in vital processes of a certain character; viz., in certain neural processes, just as vitality itself emerged with certain chemical processes. Neural

which are not mental are not of the same neural order as those which are.' (Space, Time and Deity, vol. ii, p. 8.) A hypothetical physiologist within the brain, capable of observing all that took place therein,


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