might infer from the character of the processes whether they were conscious or not, but the quality of consciousness is directly revealed only to the brain's owner. This brings us to another doctrine peculiar to Prof. Alexander. The subject of the cognitive relation who is aware of the colour, &c., is said to contemplate' the sensum, but to enjoy the conscious process which results from the compresence of sensum and mind. He enjoys his own acts of cognition. Consciousness, if we use the word to stand for the totality of the individual's conscious life, is made up of enjoyments. Whenever his neural apparatus, which operates as a great selecting agency, being capable of entering into relation with only certain other existents, is set in commotion of the right order, the subject is aware of x, the object which is in appropriate relation to the neural process, and further, he enjoys the act of cognition.

The only relation allowed between mind and its object is one of contemplation, a cognitional relation. Pleasure, its opposite, and the various emotions are cognitive relations, relations between mind and its own vital processes. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are of the same order as the organic and kinaesthetic sensa. All the mind's acts are conations. 'Cognition is nothing but the conation itself in so far as it is compresent with and refers to an object.' (ibid., vol. ii, p. 118.)

Now to return to the ideal elements in perception. When a yellow patch is in relation with the retinal apparatus and one is aware of an orange, the response, awareness of an orange, is the response to a sensum and to ideata. The neural process is not merely visual, but the neural processes of touching, tasting, smelling are also involved. The response made is appropriate to the compresence of mind and a particular object. The subject is aware of this orange. Similarly, if, in the absence of any sensa, the neural processes appropriate to given sensa are excited centrally as a consequence

of some mental act or through some vital process, the response will be, as before, awareness of the real object which originally called forth the neural processes. The object is the image, which is said to be real, non-mental. It is strictly parallel to the sensum. There is no room here for a difference in kind between sensum and image.

Now so far there is nothing which can be called memory. The only difference between the above and the Behaviourist's account of behaviour is that the response made to the presence of an object is not only a bodily act but also a mental act, awareness. This is, however, only a part of Prof. Alexander's doctrine. The object in sense perception and the object in memory and in constructive imagination are definitely non-mental and real. So far so good, but it is necessary to show that such images can have the characteristics of memory objects.

There are two features to be accounted for: the object known should be known as past, and further, as belonging to my past. The act of remembering is an act of appropriating. Prof. Alexander arrives at its features by comparing it with an act of expectation. The act is said to be a kind of desire directed backward. When this sort of act takes place in relation to an image, that image is taken up into the present and is remembered as mine. As regards its' pastness', the image for Prof. Alexander is always the object, or at least a part of the object remembered, and it is declared to bear on its face the mark of the past. The object is compresent with mind as past.' The past. . . is revealed as past.' This is stated and is apparently regarded as a fact obvious to any one who has the experience of remembering.

What needs explaining in regard to both these features is the difference between revelations of the past and the images which, although they are known, are not past in the sense in which memory images are past. Prof. Alexander himself recognizes the existence of these images, quasi

memories, as he terms them; e. g. the picture of a man running or of a landscape which we call up on the basis of past sights of men running and of landscapes.

Prof. Alexander reminds us that we have not in memory itself any reference to the perceived.' (ibid., vol. i, p. 115.) Nor again are we in the position of the angel who is supposed to contemplate both our minds and the world to which the minds respond. In spite of the protest, however, it is possible that Prof. Alexander has allowed himself to occupy the position of the angel. His argument seems to run: The object really was past, therefore we know it as past; whereas he admits, of course, that the second statement is our only warrant for the first. In his reply to Mr. Broad's comments (Mind, vol. xxx, pp. 25-39, and 129-50), Prof. Alexander says,

'I am accustomed to compare this apprehension of a real object when it is not present to the senses to turning round in order to see it. When the stimulus from the blood sets my enjoyment into the dog attitude, that is like turning me round to see the dog that is really present.' (Mind, vol. xxx, p. 425.) Prof. Alexander recognizes that not every, may one say, réchauffé of the neural events concerned, turns him round to see a past dog. What then is the differentiating feature? To repeat a comment which I made previously on this point:

'I may have exactly the same imagery when I remember my dog's welcome of last night and when I expect his welcome to-night.' (Aristotelian Proceedings, vol. xii, p. 214.)

Of course the organic sensations of the two moments may be different and the whole attitude of mind is different; but the latter fact would throw us back on enjoyment as giving the essence of memory. In the same paper I raised the difficulty of understanding the relation of the mark of the past and the mark of the future, worn by images on their foreheads, to the acts of cognition. The images have the mark of the past or future, because of the conation involved in knowing

them. The conation is remembering or expecting because of the terminus a quo or ad quem.' Prof. Alexander replied,

When I say that images have the mark of the past or the future because of the conation involved in knowing them, I mean only that because your mind moves in the two cases in the two different directions of enjoyment, the corresponding object appears to you as past or present. Barring illusion the object really is (i. e., non-mentally) past or present, but you are aware of it as such by means of the conation into which your mind is thrown for one reason or another in respect of the object.' (Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, vol. xii, p. 208.)

Now this reasoning seemed then, and seems still, circular; 'pastness' is tossed to and fro. The object really is past, therefore the appropriate act of conation has a given character. The act of conation has a given character, therefore the object is past. Underlying it all is the belief that the object 'really is past'. Dare one suggest that there is an unlaid ghost of representative perception hovering behind the passage quoted? But if our sole source of knowledge that the object is past lies in memory, then we must seek the clue in the character of the act of cognition, and as a matter of fact this is what in most cases Prof. Alexander would seem to do. Here we come upon the difficulty of Prof. Alexander's doctrine that we cannot know the character of an act of cognition, we can only enjoy it. Applied to memory and quasi-memory this means that we contemplate object x and we contemplate object y; in the case of x we enjoy pastness, in the case of y, we do not. (cf. Space, Time and Deity, vol. i, p. 120.) This, however, gives us no warrant for saying that we contemplate x with a mark of the past upon it, or that we are compresent with an x bearing the mark of the past on its forehead. If we do say so, we are treating an enjoyed character of our own act of cognition as the guarantee for a character in x, but such attribution of a character to the object known falls outside the cognitive relation of compresence. Mind as a finite among other finites has no

prerogative to attribute features to these finites, on the ground of characteristics which it enjoys in its own emergent character of consciousness. Does Prof. Alexander abandon his own principles here? The road which was open to Reid is barred to the New Realist.

When we come to analyse 'the experience of remembering a past state or act of mind, as distinguished from the past object', the coil becomes more involved. There is the act of appropriating as in the case of the past object, but the image of a past state of mind' (whatever that expression may mean here), is not an object. It cannot be contemplated. The past enjoyment is enjoyed as past. One is forbidden to say that the past enjoyment is renewed. That, according to Prof. Alexander, would be to confuse the standpoint of the ideal spectator who could see that the enjoyment in question was 'now', or of the physiologist who could report on the actual neural events, with the standpoint of the experient. How then are we to think of the experient? Is he lost in the past? Apparently for Prof. Alexander he is. Doubtless this happens, but when it happens, is it true to say the experient is enjoying the past as past? This would be exactly where the ideal spectator or the angel would come in. He, and he alone, could affirm this. For the experient, on Prof. Alexander's view, there is no such relational character as the word 'past' implies, no consciousness of any latent contrast with the present environment, or present organic sensa. Yet Prof. Alexander says, 'the enjoyment has pastness written on its face.' (Space, Time and Deity, vol. i, p. 126.) If so, it would seem as if there must be some recognition of a difference between the two streams of enjoyment making up the totality of consciousness at the moment. Taking Prof. Alexander's example of the sight of a friend calling up the memory of hearing him say such and such a thing in the past, one would say that the enjoyment of the act of seeing the friend and the enjoyment of the hearing him say such and