CHAPTER II.

PART III. THE DIRECT EMOTIONS.

Ce qu'il éprouvait échappe aux paroles; l'émotion est toujours neuve et le mot a toujours servi; de là l'impossibilité d'exprimer l'émotion.

Victor Hugo.

§ 16. 1. IN proceeding to the analysis of the emotions it will be well perhaps to enumerate some of the chief distinctions at our disposal. There is 1st, the great distinction between the emotion and its framework of representation; 2nd, the distinction between comparisons where the things compared differ in kind of specific feeling, as colour from colour for instance, and comparisons where they differ in the additional introduction of the formal element, as for instance differently pitched tones in music, or different shapes in space, as circle and triangle; 3rd, the distinction of pleasure and pain from the specific feeling to which they belong; 4th, the distinction of pleasure and pain of enjoyment from pleasure and pain of admiration; 5th, the distinction of sense of effort from pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and from the specific feeling in which it arises on the other ; 6th, the distinction between sense of effort and sense

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of effort for a purpose, or volition; 7th, the distinction between cases where emotions differ in general kind from each other and cases where one emotion differs from another only in circumstantials, and the difference is of variety from species, or species from genus, as for instance in avarice, where the excessive fondness for different kinds of objects gives but varieties of excessive fondness for possessions geneally; 8th, the distinction between the two great modes of representation, direct and reflective; and, within each of these, that between representation which is pure remembrance and representation which is imagination; and 9th, the distinction between the different degrees of complexity, in the emotions and their frameworks at once, which distinction will be the guiding thread of the analysis of the emotions, as it was before in that of the sensations.

2. Casting a glance back over these distinctions and referring to the remarks made in § 8, it becomes clear that the distinction between the direct and reflective modes of representation is the most general of all, breaking up the whole group of emotions into two sub-groups, each of which contains within it all the other distinctions, and thus forming the main fundamental division of the subject. In the next place, each of these sub-groups is similarly divisible into two, by the distinction between representation which is pure remembrance and representation which is imagination; and each of the sub-groups so formed again contains within it all the remaining distinctions. After this we come to minor distinctions which can only be exhibited by applying the canon of greater or less complexity to the emotions in detail. The four sub-groups which are thus laid at

the basis of our examination are those of the direct, the direct and imaginative, the reflective, the reflective and imaginative emotions.

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§ 17. 1. The first great group of emotions is accordingly that of the direct emotions which do not arising from include imagination in their representational framework. These will be found to fall under four heads, first, according as they are or are not mixed with sense of effort or with volition,-emotions proper and desires or passions; secondly, according as they include pleasures and pains of enjoyment or pleasures and pains of admiration. The simplest emotions proper, those which stand nearest to sensations, are those of joy, grief, fondness, and aversion. These arise from representation of external or internal sensations. Suppose a child tastes a bitter kind of food, he feels a pain of taste. When that same kind of food is presented to him again, to see only and not to taste, the painful taste is represented, and there arises a feeling of dislike or aversion to the food, which is quite distinct from the notion of the probability of his having again to eat it, i. e., which has nothing to do with hope or fear. The aversion is a feeling now attaching to the food, arising from the pain of taste, but different from that pain, although it is itself also painful. Suppose a child to suffer from cold, he feels pain; when he suffers from cold a second time, or if the pain of cold is continued the first time, he feels grief or pain of representation. The cold may be said in popular phrase to act on the mind, and produce a painful mental state as well as a painful bodily state. The same reasoning applies to pleasureable states, the emotions of joy and fond

ness.

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2. Now when sensations and representations like those mentioned are attached to objects which are separate from the body of the person feeling them, so as to be capable of approaching and removing from it, it is proper to describe the emotions as aversion and fondness; when they arise within the body itself, then it is proper to describe them as grief and joy. Even in this their simplest shape these emotions admit of as many differences in kind as there are differences in the sensations or groups of sensation, in representing which they arise; and of course also of innumerable differences of degree or intensity. But they do not depend upon imagination, upon the expectation of a future feeling, a feeling different in mode of combination from what has been already actually experienced; nor yet upon reflection, upon the distinction between the self and its modes of feeling. It is true that there is a joy and grief, an aversion and fondness, in reflection; pleasure and pain of all kinds when contemplated in representation are grief, joy, aversion, and fondness, of that particular kind to which their representational framework belongs; and grief and joy, aversion and fondness, are properly defined as the representation of the pain or pleasure of enjoyment in any object, whether direct or reflective, a thing or a person. In reflection it is emotions themselves which, when contemplated as pleasureable or painful, are the objects or frameworks of the reflective modes of joy or grief, fondness or aversion. For instance, the pleasure of being loved, when represented, is joy; the pain of humiliation, when represented, is grief. There is pleasure in being loved, and a further pleasure in the thought or representation of it; there

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is pain in being humiliated, and a further pain in the representation of it. These are in fact often found distinct in point of time, so as to be capable of easy distinction; I mean they are so in the phenomena arising from of paroxysms of grief or of joy, which are the moments when a sense of one's state, as pleasureable or painful, comes home to one as it is called, that is, when a clear representation of it arises. The reflective modes of these four emotions, then, stand at the end of the series of reflective emotions, as their simple modes stand at the beginning of the direct, or rather at the end of the sensations.

3. When the sense of effort arises within these emotions, it is volition, for the representation of the object makes the object of the effort distinct; there is desire of a particular object, or sense of effort with a purpose. This desire being added to grief, joy, aversion, fondness, or, generally, to any emotion, makes the emotion passion. When the emotion is joy or fondness in objects of certain classes of sensation, namely, those of the digestive and reproductive organs, and those of the sense of taste, the corresponding or arising passion has usually been called appetite. All appetite is a mode of passion. The distinct kinds of fondness are most easily marked as attached to particular kinds of separate, remote, objects; hence the corresponding passions, or desires for those objects, are more easily classified also. Fondness of such objects with desire is the love of possessions of various kinds, and its excess is avarice in its various forms, which it is needless to enumerate. But the reflective modes of them must be distinguished from the direct, as in other cases. Power of all kinds is a kind of possession; so also many