the appetite which lies at the basis of that emotion. The instances however in which those traits are very weak approach on that account closely to friendship, and make a kind of debateable ground between them. Friendship can exist everywhere where eros can, but it cannot, generally speaking, be carried up to the same intensity, not because it lacks the element of appetite, but because persons of the opposite sexes are the only persons between whom rivalry can be entirely abolished. This annihilation of rivalry is a circumstance common to the love between persons of opposite sex with only one other kind of love or personal relation, namely, with love to God, or religion, the object of which is an Ideal, as will appear in its place. But wherever the feeling of rivalry can be diminished, there and in that proportion will the love or friendship between different persons be purer and closer; and in these cases friendship proper, or affection between persons of the same sex, will be capable of very great intensity. Such cases will arise between teacher and pupil, patron and client, and generally between older and younger persons; between equals chiefly when their careers are different. Alliances between individuals and between bodies of men are often the beginning of friendship, but they are not friendship itself; there is originally no affection, but the alliance is made for some extraneous purpose; these are cases of Aristotle's φιλία founded on the χρήσιμον. Alliances of every kind, such as between buyer and seller, and makers of any contract, and between citizens of the same state, or between two states, have their own kind or mode of emotion, sympathetic but in the lowest degree; the emotion is some kind or other BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. § 25. The sympathetic emotions. BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. $ 26. The antipathetic emotions. of goodwill, and in these forms too it is the first step to friendship or love. § 26. Before completing this group by the examination of the subordinate or allied emotions, it will be well to turn to the antipathetic group. The direct emotion of aversion becomes, when its object is a person, personal dislike or illwill, the opposite of goodwill or benevolence. When this dislike is represented as reciprocated, the emotion is hate, which of course admits of many degrees, among which we may distinguish, perhaps, bitterness and malice, although we usually employ the word only for great degrees of it. Founded on a small or transient degree of hate is anger, which is hate of any action prompted by dislike. It arises when the mind attributes to another a feeling of dislike which has led it to do something towards the destruction or injury of the object of its dislike. Attributing such an act from such a motive to any person, the mind feels anger towards that person on account of its act; hence anger can be appeased by renouncing or expressing sorrow for the act; not so dislike itself. Revenge is indurated, that is, prolonged and cherished anger. Illwill, bitterness, hate, malice, anger, revenge,-these are the antipathetic emotions which are the opposites of goodwill, love, friendship, and to those subordinates or derivatives of them which are now to be mentioned. Malice seems to stand to the antipathetic emotions as affection stands to the sympathetic. Malice and affection are perhaps the most purely emotional terms in the language, indicating an emotional element with least suggestion of a framework. The readiness of disposition to affection or to malice which makes these emotions seem to prompt the imagina tion to supply a framework, to create their own objects of love or hate, rather than to arise from the representation of such objects, is what is commonly meant by the phrases a good or a bad heart. § 27. 1. Opposed to anger and revenge are two degrees of gratitude; the first might perhaps be called a burst of gratitude for any particular kindness; the second prolonged and indurated gratitude. The object of both of them is the representation of acts prompted by goodwill, love, or friendship. Wherever it is said that acts are the object of emotions, it will always be found that the feeling or emotion prompting, and manifesting itself in, those acts, and of which they are the representational framework, is the real object of the emotion in question. An act is always capable of analysis into its elements of feeling and form, of emotion and cognition; and the act, as it is called, is but the objective representation of these cognitions and emotions as mental qualities, or, in other terms, the embodiment of them. In every case it is an emotion that we hate or love; when we say we hate or love a man, or an action, it is the emotion that makes the man or his action what they are; it is the emotion, which we represent the man as feeling, that gives him his character in our eyes. We represent him as a person at all only by representing him as self-conscious, and the mode of his self-consciousness is what we either love or hate. 2. When good or ill fortune happens to persons whom we love or whom we hate, we feel the derivative emotions of pity or compassion when those we love are injured or unfortunate, of joy and congratulation for them when they are fortunate or BOOK I. PART IV. benefited; the reverse is the case with those we hate, and at their ill fortune we feel joy or congratulation, a feeling which becomes ἐπιχαιρεκακία, οι subordinate to general rejoicing at ill, when there is a tendency to going groups. regard most men as enemies, a feeling which allies. the two fore this group of antipathetic emotions with those of § 28. 1. I turn now to the passions which arise in and belong to these emotions, and which are in deed usually left undistinguished from them. Thus Hume, following his psychological theory and using his Lockian terminology, says, "Ideas are the causes of Passions." Kant however in my opinion saw more clearly when he defined passion by desire in his Anthropologie, Part i. Book ii. § 59 et seq. Passion is the sense of effort or tension, arising in an emotion, and carried up into a desire or volition; the sense of effort must have some distinct content of its own, and this is furnished by the emotion in which it arises; it is a desire or volition to attain to a greater degree of that emotion when it is pleasureable, and to a less degree of it when it is painful. The passion proper to each emotion is accordingly not desire for any object indifferently which may happen to be combined with or included in the representational framework of the emotion, but desire for the increase or decrease of the emotion itself as a whole. The cognitional modification of the framework, corresponding to the passion which is an emotional modification, is the perception of a discrepancy between an old and a new image of the same kind, or between a present state and a pleasanter future state; and the kind of the pleasure is given by the emotion in which the passion arises. 2. Keeping hold of the definitions of the different emotions as they have now been given, which point them out as steps in a series, each defined by the addition of some trait in its representational framework to the framework of the previous emotion, it will now be found that the passions, which have also a framework of their own, a modification of the framework of the previous emotion, form the transitions from one step to another, the genesis of each BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. § 28. Passions belonging to both groups. |