BOOK I. PART IV. $ 29. Emotions comparison. rous, a contest of honour; the mind with its fixed. representation must be satisfied. 5. Nothing shows more plainly than this group arising from of emotions the importance in analysis of the cognitive framework or representational image, which is the object of the emotion. For here it is seen that, when we speak of the man himself,' we mean our image of the man; and a change in the image is likewise a change in the emotion. When we speak of our image of the man, and say that it may be or even must be erroneous or imperfect, and that 'the man himself' must be different from it, we still mean by 'the man himself' another image equal in fulness and correctness to every test that can be imagined, including the subjective feelings attributed to the image itself. Accordingly, strictly speaking, we do not love a man for his qualities or hate him for his qualities, but we love or hate those qualities themselves, as they appear in the combination, or in the image, which we call a man. From our image of what the man is there is no escape, and this is the reason why, in emulation, the rivalry is of a chivalrous character. The superiority of our rival can no longer be ascribed to his circumstances or his fortune, which are already excluded by the representation, and, since the mind itself has formed that image, the mind itself also must witness our equalling or surpassing it, and cannot take refuge in a superiority of externals or in the verdict of any judgment except its own. In whatever characteristics it is that our rival is the mind of another person, stripped of accessories and fixed by our own representation, in those no victory is satisfactory which does not put our own mind on a level or on a higher point than his; the murder of a noble rival, for instance, would not be a victory over him in the characteristics in which we are rivals; it would be a mere victory in externals, and would probably also seal for ever our defeat in essentials. All true emulation is this chi valrous rivalry, the foundation of one of the great kinds of Honour. 6. Looking back now to the whole group of emotions of comparison, four have been mentioned under the head of comparison of Having, namely, Ashamedness Admiration of externals which produce the further passions of Envy and Jealousy. And four have been mentioned under the head of comparison of Being, namely, BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. $ 29. Emotions arising from comparison. Humility Admiration of essentials Scorn, which produce the further passion of Emulation. It is clear that there is hardly any emotion, or indeed any feeling whatever, which does not supply matter for one of these comparisons; in other words, the emotions which rest upon these comparisons refer to or arise upon any other feelings whatever, and pervade the whole of life. The eight heads under which they are here exhibited cannot be anything like a sufficient classification of the countless modifications of which they must be susceptible, and in which they appear in daily experience. But language is a chaos out of which we must be content if we can lay hold of and keep a stray word or two, to serve us in fixing the footsteps of thought which we have made good; and the eight terms here em-. BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. $ 29. Emotions comparison. ployed for this purpose are intended only to mark general divisions, under which the rest may fall as names of some of the countless modifications of the arising from phenomena. Under the head Ashamedness, for instance, may fall the terms diffidence, shyness, modesty; and under its opposite, Admiration of externals, those of reverence for rank and wealth, "which needs no learning," as Mrs. Browning tells us, subservience, complaisance, which, when they are without envy or jealousy, are virtues, but the virtues of an inferior. Under Vanity may fall ostentation, vainglory, pretension, love of praise, and conceit, which is a kind. of indurated vanity; under Contempt, arrogance, and haughtiness. It is impossible to name moods, characters, habits, virtues or vices, without thereby naming feelings; the habits, gas, have mostly been named as being most obvious, but the moments of which they consist, the feelings, άon, have not been named for themselves, but only as characterising the habits. Under the four heads of the second kind of comparison may perhaps be brought abasement, lowliness, meekness, -veneration, reverence, awe,self-confidence, self-reliance, self-assertion,-studied neglect. $ 30. Emotions of reflection on Self alone. § 30. 1. Shame and pride, which are usually connected with the foregoing group, are properly emotions which arise in a somewhat different mode of reflection; at least these names seem the best adapted to be set apart to denote the emotions now to be analysed. It is only when the mind reflects upon itself alone, abstracting from other minds, yet with the knowledge gained by these previous modes of reflection, that those modes of emotion arise which fall under the general titles of shame and pride; and these appear to be the only two kinds of emotion which are peculiar to this mode of reflection, or arise in the representation of its peculiar object. When the different organs of the body and the different bodily and mental functions are compared with each other, we feel shame in contemplating some and pride in contemplating others, and are prompted to conceal and forget the one, to display and dwell upon the others. This in its earliest shape is the first moral judgment that we pass upon ourselves; and the shame which in this way takes its origin, so far from becoming outworn in the progress of reflection, is deepened and its sphere extended; in other words, we become more sensitive and more refined, and a greater number of things are classed among tacenda. The acts which minister directly to the health and nourishment of the body and the gratification of the sensations, and of some of the emotions, and the instruments of these, weaknesses of body and of mind, some kinds of ignorance and want of capacity for mental enjoyments, whatever betrays a low grade of endowment, we cover with a wise dissimulation, as "ills that flesh is heir to." The French term pudeur seems exactly to express the feeling which is called out painfully or wounded by any lifting of the veil of the tacenda. A certain kind of dissimulation appears to be the very condition of escaping from the burthen of these ills, which is only lightened by being forgotten. When however this forgetfulness is not a purposed dissimulation, but the powers and endowments which are its counterpoise are dwelt on as if they were alone the whole nature, then there arises the opposite emotion, pride, an overweening estimate of self. If we do not forget but purposely Book I. CH. II. PART IV. $ 30. Emotions of reflection on Self alone. BOOK I. PART IV. § 30. Emotions of reflection on Self alone. repress the thought of what causes us to feel shame, so as to insist only on the comely and on the honourable, then we may be said to feel proper pride, as it is popularly called; and pride in this sense is better expressed by the name Self-respect, reserving the name pride for the overweening estimate of self, and for the further development of it now to be described. 2. If we suppose this emotion or passion of pride, for indulged emotion is passion, to be combined with the scorn for others of the foregoing group, there will arise the emotion which is most properly to be called Pride, a haughty isolation of self from all other beings, a refusal to admit them as equals, or even as objects of the antipathetic, still more of the sympathetic, emotions; a self-complacency and a selfsufficiency which is its own law, its own tribunal, its own motive, its own end; the opposite of whatever emotion tends to bind men together, the opposite at once of love and of vanity. It is only the root or first beginning of this pride that is the opposite of shame; in its development it is rather the completion of the scorn of the foregoing group, completing it however by carrying it up into a new mode of reflection, one that makes abstraction of the persons who in the former were necessary to the emotion. Here, who and what they are is matter of indifference. The proud man is "himself alone." Pride is, as it has been shown, founded on a delusion, the real forgetfulness of human weakness; it forgets also the laws of nature which bind man to man, not only by the mutual rendering of necessary services, but by the emotions which men feel for one another. The isolated man is then at discord with himself, |