PREFACE ΤΟ THE TENTH EDITION In the April number of The English Historical Review' Professor Maitland made a most courteous Rejoinder to my Reply, in the eighth edition, to his criticism on my volume in the Fortnightly Review.' In his Rejoinder Professor Maitland restricts himself to the second part of my Reply, the part, that is, in which I ventured to offer some critical remarks on his able work on 'Canon Law in the Church of England.' Perhaps I may infer from this that he thinks I have more to say for myself than he imagined on the other points on which he criticised However that may be, I return him my cordial thanks for the courtesy and gentleness with which he deals with me, an ill-equipped amateur in a field of study where he is a skilled veteran of European reputation. I had some intention of trying to show in this edition that my difference from Professor Maitland on the subject of Canon Law in England, me. as further elucidated in his Rejoinder, is rather a difference of inference than of fact. But other occupations and a tedious illness have made it impossible for me to carry out my intention. I have never intended to deny that the Roman Canon Law prevailed in England, and, speaking generally, dominated our Ecclesiastical Courts for centuries. All I mean is that this was, like the Papal Supremacy in general, by way of usurpation rather than by any formal act of acknowledged right. The deposing power was inherent in the Roman Canon Law, and was tacitly admitted so long as there was no overt attempt to put it in force. When that attempt was made in the case of King John, the Church, quite as eagerly as the State, revolted in wrath against it, and extorted from the craven sovereign in the Great Charter the recognition of the Church's freedom from any foreign usurpation. Tolerance of a usurped jurisdiction does not necessarily prove an acknowledgment of its absolute de jure character. The theory of Papal jurisdiction, as laid down in the Roman Canon Law, makes the Pope Supreme Ordinary in every diocese in Christendom, from whose decision there is no appeal and no remedy. This doctrine was never formally sanctioned in England, and was often repelled when it came into practical collision with some powerful interest or personage. The growth of the Papal power from small beginnings through insidious encroachments to its portentous claim of unlimited supremacy alike in the civil and spiritual sphere is one of the most marvellous phenomena in history, and to challenge it in the meridian of its strength was a very serious thing indeed. We can thus understand how churches and nations should shrink from so perilous a conflict until forced to do so by the instinct of self-preservation. Practical prudence rather than recognition of a de jure right would thus account for the dominance of the Roman Canon Law in England. Courtesy prompts me to offer Professor Maitland this explanation of my position. But the question. is one for experts, among whom I claim no place. Another expert of acknowledged authority on the ecclesiastical history of England in the sixteenth century has done me the honour of reviewing the eighth edition of my book in The English Historical Review': I mean Mr. Pollard, who has lately thrown much fresh light on the characters and careers of Protector Somerset and Dudley. The following passage from Mr. Pollard's article is important: The eighth edition of Canon MacColl's book contains fresh matter in the shape of a lengthy examination of the recent Lambeth Decisions, and a reply to Professor Maitland's article in the 'Fortnightly Review' for December, 1899. With the ecclesiastical questions discussed by Canon MacColl we have here no concern, but there are one or two points of purely or primarily historical importance which call for notice in this Review. The most important of them is the question, When did the first Act of Uniformity receive the royal assent, in the second or in the third year of Edward VI.? The balance of evidence seems to be on the side of Canon MacColl and the third year, and we wonder that he did not cite in support of this view the authority of Sir Thomas Smith, who, as Secretary of State, piloted the Act through both Houses of Parliament. Smith makes it quite plain (De Republica Anglorum,' 1588, p. 42) that the rule was for all Acts of Parliament to receive the royal assent on the last day of the session, which in this case was 14 March, 3 Edward VI., and the entire absence of evidence to the contrary is strong presumption that the usual course was followed in the case of the first Act of Uniformity. Mr. Pollard, however, thinks that if there had been extreme urgency there was just time enough to pass the Act in the second year by giving the royal assent by commission. And he adds: Possibly, too, Canon MacColl builds too much (p. 606) upon the General Act of Pardon; such Acts were passed by most Parliaments, and were usually the last, or next to the last, business of the session. Mr. Pollard has here missed the point of my argument. Mr. Dibdin's main argument to prove that the Act of Uniformity received the royal assent in the second year is that otherwise the prisoners for whom the General Pardon was intended would have remained in prison for some months longer. This Mr. Dibdin regards as a moral impossibility, and he contends that the urgency to let them out at once |