nature, which it is the province of the moralist not to criticize, but to listen to with reverence. By employing our reason to interpret and to obey this, and the other moral suggestions of the heart, we may trust with confidence, that we take the most effectual means in our power to augment the sum of human happiness;-but the discovery of this connexion between virtue and utility is the slow result of extensive and philosophical combinations; and it would soon cease to have a foundation in truth, if men were to substitute their own conceptions of expediency, instead of those rules of action which are inspired by the wisdom of God.*

* The theories of Hume, of Paley, and of Godwin, how differently soever they may have figured in the imaginations of their authors, are all equally liable to the fundamental objections stated in the text. The same objections are applicable to the generous and captivating, but not always unexceptionable morality inculcated in the writings of Dr. Hutcheson.—The system, indeed, of this last philosopher, may be justly regarded as the parent stock on which the speculations of the others have been successfully grafted.

Mr. Hume entered on his Inquiries concerning Morals, at a period when Dr. Hutcheson's literary name was unrivaled in Scotland. The abstract principles on which his doctrines are founded, differ widely from those of his predecessor, and are unfolded with far greater ingenuity, precision, and elegance. In various instances, however, he treads very closely in Dr. Hutcheson's footsteps; and, in the final result of his reasonings, he coincides with him exactly. According to both writers, a regard to general expediency affords the only universal canon for the regulation of our conduct.

It is a curious circumstance in the history of ethics, that the same practical rule of life, to which Dr. Hutcheson was so naturally and directly led by his cardinal virtue of disinterested benevolence, has been inferred by Dr. Paley from a theory which resolves moral obligation, entirely into prudential calculations of individual advantage. For the very circuitous, and (in my opinion) very illogical argument, whereby he has attempted to connect his conclusion with his premises, I must refer to his work.-Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. 1, 2-6.*

The political justice of Mr. Godwin is but a new name for the principle of general expediency or utility. "The term justice," he observes," may be assumed as a general appellation for all moral duty. That this appellation," he continues, "is sufficiently expressive of the subject, will appear, if we consider for a moment, mercy, gratitude, temperance, or any of those duties which, in looser speaking, are contradistinguished from justice. Why should I pardon this criminal, remunerate this favor, abstain from this indulgence? If it partakes of the nature of morality, it must be either right or wrong, just or unjust. It must tend to the benefit of the individual, either without intrenching upon, or with actual advantage to, the mass of individuals. Either way, it benefits the whole, because individuals are parts of the whole. Therefore to do it is just, and to forbear it is unjust. If justice have any meaning, it is just that I should contribute every thing in my power to the benefit of the whole."-Polit. Justice, vol. i. pp. 80, 81. It is manifest, that, in the foregoing extract, the duty of justice is supposed to coincide exactly as a rule of conduct with the affection of benevolence; whereas, according to the common use of words, justice means that particular branch of virtue which leads us to respect the right of others; a branch of virtue remarkably distinguished from all others by this, that the observance of it may be extorted by force the violation of it exposing the offender to resentment, to indignation, and to punishment. In Mr. Godwin's language, the word justice must either be understood to be synonymous with general benevolence, or-assuming the exist ence of such an affection-to express the moral fitness of yielding, upon all

The theory of Dr. Paley has been very ably examined by Mr. Gisborne, in a treatise entitled, The Principles of Moral Philosophy investigated, and briefly applied to the Constitution of Civil Society. (London, 1790.) The objections to it there stated appear to me quite unanswerable; and they possess the additional merit of being urged with all the deference so justly due to Dr. Paley's character and talents.

It must not be concluded from the foregoing observations, that, even in ethical inquiries, the consideration of final causes is to be occasions, to its suggestions. "It is just," says Mr. Godwin, "that I should contribute every thing in my power to the benefit of the whole.-My benefactor ought to be esteemed, not because he bestowed a benefit upon me, but because he bestowed it upon a human being. His desert will be in exact proportion to the degree in which the human being was worthy of the distinction conferred. Thus, every view of the subject brings us back to the consideration of my neighbor's moral worth, and his importance to the general weal, as the only standard to determine the treatment to which he is entitled. Gratitude, therefore, a principle which has so often been the theme of the moralist and the poet, is no part either of justice or virtue." (Ibid. p. 84.) The words just aud justice can, in these sentences, mean nothing distinct from morally fit or reasonable; so that the import of the doctrine amounts merely to the following proposition, That it is reasonable or right, that the private benevolent affections should, upon all occasions yield to the more comprehensive ;-which is precisely the system of Hutcheson disguised under a different and much more exceptionable phraseology.

This abuse of words is not without its effect in concealing from careless readers the fallaciousness of some of the author's subsequent arguments; for although the idea he professes to convey by the term justice, be essentially different from that commonly annexed to it, yet he scruples not to avail himself, for his own purpose, of the received maxims which apply to it in its ordinary acceptation. In discussing, for example, the validity of promises, he reasons thus: "I have promised to do something just and right-This certainly I ought to perform. Why? Not because I promised, but because justice prescribes it. I have promised to bestow a sum of money upon some good and respectable purpose. In the interval between the promise and my fulfilling it, a greater and nobler purpose offers itself, which calls with an imperious voice for my co-operation. Which ought I to prefer? That which best deserves my preference. A promise can make no alteration in the case. I ought to be guided by the intrinsic merit of the objects, and not by any external and foreign consideration. No engagements of mine can change their intrinsic claims.-If every shilling of our property, every hour of our time, and every faculty of our mind, have already received their destination from the principles of immutable justice, promises have no department left upon which for them to decide. Justice, it appears, therefore, ought to be done, whether we have promised it or not."—Ibid. p. 151.

It is quite evident, that, in this passage, the paramount supremacy indisputably belonging to justice in its usual and legitimate sense, is ascribed to it when employed as synonymous with benevolence; and of consequence, that the tendency of the new system, instead of extending the province of justice, properly so called, is to set its authority entirely aside, wherever it interferes with views of utility. In this respect, it exhibits a complete contrast to all the maxims hitherto recognized among moralists. The rules of justice are happily compared by Mr. Smith, to the strict and indispensable rules of grammar; those of benevolence to the more loose and general descriptions of what constitutes the sublime and beautiful in writing that we meet with in the works of critics. According to Mr. Godwin the reverse of this comparison is agreeable to truth; while, at the same time, by a dexterous change in the meaning of terms, he assumes the appearance of combating for the very cause which he labors to betray.

Of the latitude with which the word justice had been previously used by many ethical writers, a copious and choice collection of instances may be found in the learned and philosophical notes subjoined by Dr. Parr to his Spital Sermon. (London, 1801.) "By none of the ancient philosophers, however," as he has well observed, "is justice set in opposition to any other social duty; nor did they employ the colossal weight of the term in crushing the other moral excellences, which were equally considered as pillars in the temple of virtue."-pp. 28-31.* * Having mentioned the name of this eminent person, 1 eagerly embrace the opportunity of acknowledging the instruction I have received, not only from his various publications, but from the private literary communications with which he has repeatedly favored me. From one of these, (containing animadversions on some passages in my Essay on the Sublime,) I entertain hopes of being permitted to make a few extracts in a future edition of that performance. By his candid and liberal strictures, I have felt myself highly honored; and should be proud to record, in his own words, the corrections he has suggested of certain critical and philological judgments which, it is highly probable, I may have too lightly hazarded.

rejected. On the contrary, Mr. Smith himself, whose logical precepts, on this subjeet I have now been endeavoring to illustrate and enforce, has frequently indulged his curiosity in speculations about uses or advantages; and seems plainly to have considered them as important objects of philosophical study, not less than efficient causes. The only caction to be observed is that the one may not be cocivuried with the other.

Between these two different researches, however, there is, both in physics and ethics, a very intimate connexion. In various cases, the consideration of final causes has led to the discovery of some general law of nature: and, in almost every case, the discovery of a general law clearly points out some wise and beneficent purposes to which it is subservient. Indeed, it is chiefly the prospect of such applications which renders the investigation of general laws interesting to the mind.

As the main purpose of this section is to combat the logical doctrine which would exclude the investigation of final causes from natural philosophy, I have not thought it necessary to take notice of the skeptical objections to the theological inferences commonly deduced from it. The consideration of these properly belongs to some inquiries which I destine for the subject of a separate essay. On one of them alone I shall offer at present a few brief remarks, on account of the peculiar stress laid upon it in Mr. Hume's Posthumous Dialogues.

"When two species of objects," says Philo, “have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other: and this I call an argument from experience. Bat bow this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me, with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe mast arise from some thought and art, like the human, because we bave experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. Can you pretend to show any similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of the universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory."

This celebrated argument appears to me to be little more than an amplification of that which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Aristodemus, in his conversation with Socrates, concerning the existence of the Deity. "I behold," says he, "none of those governors of the world, whom you speak of; whereas here, I see artists actually employed in the execution of their respective works." The reply of Socrates, too, is in substance the same with what has been since retorted on Philo, by some of Mr. Hume's opponents. "Neither, yet, Aristodemus, seest thou thy soul, which, however, most assuredly governs thy body: although it may well seem, by thy manner of talking, that it is chance and not reason which governs thee."

Whatever additional plausibility Philo may have lent to the argument of Aristodemus is derived from the authority of that much abused maxim of the inductive logic, that "all our knowledge is entirely derived from experience." It is curious, that Socrates should have touched with such precision on one of the most import ant exceptions with which this maxim must be received. Our knowledge of our own existence as sentient and intelligent beings, is, as I formerly endeavored to show, not an inference from experience, but a fundamentel law of human belief. All that experience can teach me of my internal frame, amounts to a knowledge of the various mental operations whereof I am conscious; but what light does experience throw on the origin of my notions of personality and identity? Is it

CONCLUSION OF PART II.

IN the foregoing chapters of this Second Part, I have endeavored to turn the attention of my readers to various important questions from having observed a constant conjunction between sensations and sentient beings; thoughts and thinking beings; volitions and active beings; that I infer the existence of that individual and permanent mind, to which all the phenomena of my consciousness belong? Our conviction that other men are, like ourselves, possessed of thought and reason; together with all the judgments we pronounce on their intellectual and moral characters, can not, as is still more evident, be resolved into an experimental perception of the conjunction of different objects or events. They are inferences of design from its sensible effects, exactly analogous to those which, in the instance of the universe, Philo would reject as illusions of the fancy.*

But leaving for future consideration these abstract topics, let us, for a moment, attend to the scope and amount of Philo's reasoning. To those who examine it with attention it must appear obvious, that, if it proves any thing, it leads to this general conclusion, that it would be perfectly impossible for the Deity, if he did exist, to exhibit to man any satisfactory evidence of design by the order and perfection of his works. That every thing we see is consistent with the supposition of its being produced by an intelligent author, Philo himself has explicitly acknowledged in these remarkable words: "Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses; would it be possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of nature? What, indeed, could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures?" The skeptical reasonings of Philo, therefore, do not, like those of the ancient Epicureans, hinge, in the least, on alleged disorders and imperfections in the universe, but entirely on the impossibility, in a case to which experience furnishes nothing parallel or analogous, of rendering intelligence and design manifest to our faculties by their sensible effects. In thus shifting his ground from that occupied by his predecessors, Philo seems to me to have abandoned the only post from which it was of much importance for his adversaries to dislodge him. The logical subtilties, formerly quoted about experience and belief, (even supposing them to remain unanswered,) are but little calculated to shake the authority of principles, on which we are every moment forced to judge and to act, by the exigencies of life. For this change in the tactics of modern skeptics, we are evidently, in a great measure, if not wholly, indebted to the lustre thrown on the order of nature, by the physical researches of the two last centuries.

Another concession extorted from Philo by the discoveries of modern science is still more important. I need not point out its coincidence with some remarks in the first part of this section, on the unconscious deference often paid to final causes by those inquirers who reject them in theory; a coincidence which had totally escaped my recollection when these remarks were written. I quote it here, chiefly as a pleasing and encouraging confirmation of the memorable prediction with which Newton concludes his Optical Queries; that "if Natural Philosophy, in all its parts, by pursuing the inductive method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of Moral Philosophy will be enlarged also."

This last consideration is ably stated by Dr. Reid. (See Essays on the Intellectual Powers, pp. 631, 632. 4to. edit.) The result of his argument is, that "according to Philo's reasoning, we can have no evidence of mind or design in any of our fellow-men."-At a considerable earlier period, Buffier had fallen into the same train of thinking. Among the judgments which he refers to common sense, he assigns the first place to the two following: "1. Il y a d'autres etres, et d'autres hommes que moi au monde. 2. Il y a dans eux quelque chose qui s'appelle verite, sagesse, prudence," &c. &c. (Cours de Sciences, p. 566. Paris, 1732.) I have already objected to the application of the phrase common sense, to such judgments as these; but this defect in point of expression, does not detract from the sagacity of the author in perceiving, that in the conclusions we form concerning the minds and characters of our fellow creatures, (as well as in the inferences drawn concerning the invisible things of God from the things which are made,) there is a perception of the understanding implied, for which neither reasoning nor experience is sufficient to account.

relating to the human understanding: aiming in the first place, to correct some fundamental errors in the theories commonly received with respect to the powers of intuition and of reasoning; and. secondly, to illustrate some doctrines connected with the groundwork of the inductive logic, which have been either overlooked or misapprehended by the generality of preceding writers. The bulk to which the volume has already extended, renders it impossible for me now to attempt a detailed recapitulation of its contents;-nor do I much regret the necessity of this omission, having endeavored in every instance, as far as I could, to enable the intelligent reader to trace the thread of my discussions.

In a work professedly elementary, the frequent references made to the opinions of others may, at first sight, appear out of place; and it may not naturally be thought that I have too often indulged in critical strictures, where I ought to have confined myself to a didactic exposition of first principles. To this objection I have only to reply, that my aim is not to supplant any of the established branches of academical study; but by inviting and encouraging the young philosopher, when his academical career is closed, to review with attention and candor his past acquisitions, to put him in the way of supplying what is defective in the present system of educa tion. I have accordingly entitled my book, Elements-not of Logic or of Pneumatology, but-of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; a study which, according to my idea of it, presupposes a general acquaintance with the particular departments of literature and of science, but to which I do not know that any elementary introduction has yet been attempted. It is a study, indeed, whereof little more perhaps than the elements can be communicated by the mind of one individual to that of another.

In proof of this, it is sufficient here to hint, (for I must not at present enlarge on so extensive a topic,) that a knowledge of the general laws which regulate the intellectual phenomena is, to the logical student of little practical value, but as a preparation for the study of himself. In this respect the anatomy of the mind dif fers essentially from that of the body; the structure of the former (whatever collateral aids may be derived from observing the varieties of genius in our fellow-creatures) being accessible to those alone

"A purpose, an intention, a design," says Philo, "strike every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of nature, without any religious purpose; and from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican systemis the maxim, That nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy: and thus all the sciences lead us almost insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention."