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CONTENTS OF THE FIRST PART.

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CONTENTS OF THE SECOND PART.

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CHAPTER II.-OF REASONING AND OF DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE 393

Sect. I.

ibid.

1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between the Powers

of Intuition and of Reasoning.

2. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction often mistaken

for Intuitive Judgments

397

II.-Of General Reasoning,

401

1. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treating of Ab-

straction

ibid.
2. Continuation of the Subject-of Language considered as an

Instrument of thought

413

3. Continuation of the Subject.–Visionary Theories of some Logi-

cians, occasioned by their inattention to the Essential Distinc-

tion between Mathematics and other Sciences

417

4. Continuation of the Subject.—Peculiar and supereminent Ad-

vantages possessed by Mathematicians, in consequence of

their definite Phraseology

422

III.-Of Mathematical Demonstration

424

1. Of the circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence essen-

tially depends

ibid.

2. Continuation of the Subject.—How far it is true that all Mathe-

matical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Propositions 432

3. Continuation of the subject.—Evidence of the Mechanical Phi.

losophy, not to be confounded with that

which is properly call-

ed Demonstrative or Mathematical.-Opposite Error of somo

late Writers

439

IV.–Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent Truths · 453

1. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence. Of Demonstrative

Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as in Practical

Geometry : and with those of Sense and of Induction, as in the

Mechanical Philosophy.—Remarks on a Fundamental Law of

Belief, involved in all our Reasonings concerning Contingent

Truths

ibid.

2. Continuation of the Subject.—of that Permanence or Stability

in the Order of Nature, which is presupposed in our Reason-

ings concerning Contingent Truths

458

559

1. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Experience and

Analogy.-Of the grounds afforded by the latter for Scientific

Inference and Conjecture

ibid.

2. Use and Abuse of Hypothesis in Philosophical Inquiries.—Differ-

ence between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and those which are sup-

ported by presumptions suggested by Analogy.-Indirect Evi.

dence which a Hypothesis may derive from its agreement with

the Phenomena.-Cautions against extending some of these con-

clusions to the Philosophy of the Human mind

570

3. Supplemental Observations on the words Induction and Analogy,

as used in Mathematics

585

V.-Of certain misapplications of the words Experience and Induction

in the phraseology of Modern Science. Ilustrations from Me-

dicine and from Political Economy

590

VI.-Of the speculation concerning Final Causes

. 601

2. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject. Final Causes rejected by

Des Cartes, and by the majority of French Philosophers.-Re-

cognized as legitimate Objects of research by Newton.-Tacitly

acknowledged by all as a useful Logical Guide, even in Sciences

which have no immediate relation to Theology

ibid.

2. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in the Philoso-

phy of the Human Mind

Conclusion of Part Second

.621

. 613

INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes : First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life.

The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded, as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics, there are some, which are essentially distinguished from the rest, both by the de gree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit, into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen.

In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which I propose to investigate ; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applications of which they are susceptible. In stating these preliminary observations, I may perhaps appear to some to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by those, who have studied with care the prin.

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