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CONTENTS OF THE FIRST PART.
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND PART.
1. Additional Remarks on the distinction between Experience and
Analogy.-Of the grounds afforded by the latter for Scientific
Inference and Conjecture
2. Use and Abuse of Hypothesis in Philosophical Inquiries.—Differ-
ence between Gratuitous Hypotheses, and those which are sup-
ported by presumptions suggested by Analogy.-Indirect Evi.
dence which a Hypothesis may derive from its agreement with
the Phenomena.-Cautions against extending some of these con-
clusions to the Philosophy of the Human mind
3. Supplemental Observations on the words Induction and Analogy,
as used in Mathematics
V.-Of certain misapplications of the words Experience and Induction
in the phraseology of Modern Science. Ilustrations from Me-
dicine and from Political Economy
VI.-Of the speculation concerning Final Causes
2. Opinion of Lord Bacon on the subject. Final Causes rejected by
Des Cartes, and by the majority of French Philosophers.-Re-
cognized as legitimate Objects of research by Newton.-Tacitly
acknowledged by all as a useful Logical Guide, even in Sciences
which have no immediate relation to Theology
2. Danger of confounding Final with Physical Causes in the Philoso-
phy of the Human Mind
Conclusion of Part Second
Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.
The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes : First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life.
The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded, as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics, there are some, which are essentially distinguished from the rest, both by the de gree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit, into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been classed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable disquisitions of the schoolmen.
In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which I propose to investigate ; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applications of which they are susceptible. In stating these preliminary observations, I may perhaps appear to some to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by those, who have studied with care the prin.