of which any man might be proud. Fiscal Reform in connection with a closer union with the Colonies, which closer union was at the root of all his ideals for his country's future, had long attracted him, and in 1903, the year of Mr Chamberlain's famous Birmingham speech, he published a pamphlet, "The Case for Enquiry," written after elaborate study of Board of Trade returns, books, papers, and pamphlets. In the years that followed, his room at the House of Commons became a centre of attraction for those interested in Tariff Reform. The same year saw the resignation of Mr Chamberlain, followed by that of the Duke of Devonshire and other members of the Cabinet; and Mr Balfour, who had succeeded Lord Salisbury as Premier, had to reconstruct his Government. In October he offered to ArnoldForster the portfolio of Secretary of State for War, rendered vacant by Mr Brodrick's transfer to the India Office. Throughout Arnold-Forster's life Army Reform had been very close to his heart. The first article he ever wrote, as early as 1881, was an attack upon the Cardwell system of linked battalions. In 1891 he wrote a series of letters to 'The Times' on military organisation, published later as a book. In 1898 he wrote a further series; and in September 1900, when the Boer war had continued nearly a year, he published "The War Office, the Army, and the Empire," to which Lord Rosebery contributed the preface. The leading contentions of this pamphlet were— 1. That no sufficient provision had been made by either service for the wants of the other, and no combined plan of operations for the defence of the Empire had been worked out. 2. That our military organisation was not suited to the needs of the nation, and that when put to the test it was bound to fail in doing those things which might reasonably be demanded of it. 3. That we could not despatch any efficient body of troops from this country in an emergency without either destroying the whole regimental system at home or calling out the reserves. 4. That our reserve was & reserve in name only, and that when war came we should have to use up the whole of the army reserve, not to supplement the regular army, but to fill up the places of incompetent men for whose upkeep the country paid, but whose services it did not receive in time of war. 5. That in maintaining a large force of militia and volunteers at home, without any of the organisation or equipment necessary to transform a crowd into an army, the War Office was squandering public money, trifling with the nation, and exposing the country to the gravest danger. 6. That the artillery was insufficient in numbers, and the guns unsatisfactory in quality. 7. That the want of proper field training of officers at home would lead to disasters in war. 8. That the absence of any organised staff during peace time would lead to a grave disadvantage in war. 9. That the War Office would be compelled, under the stress of war, to attempt to do in the face of the enemy those things which it had refused to do in time of peace, and which it had declared to be unnecessary or undesirable. Finally, he pleaded for the organisation of the Army and of the Empire on a business footing. Such was the creed which Arnold-Forster had recited in 1901. In 1903 he was asked to become Secretary of State for War, and accepted the post; thus, as it were, taking up the challenge to make good his denunciations of the army system and of the War Office, and to establish both upon a business footing. The task before him meant nothing less than the complete throwing overboard of his predecessor's plans and the abandonment of the Cardwell system of linked battalions, which had held the field for thirty years. To carry this through and substitute a better system would tax the energies of the strongest man; it would require the most thorough support of a united Cabinet; it would need time and the confidence of Parliament. But the conditions under which he approached the task were all against him. "Some weeks before the personnel of the new Government was announced, a crushing blow had fallen on Oakeley's life. . . . Towards the close of his holiday, and before returning to London, when riding a young and high-spirited horse on his heart severely. The injury that the Wiltshire Downs, he overtaxed was done was grave, and the heart never recovered from it." At the time when he accepted office he was confined to his room under the orders of his medical advisers to take prolonged and complete rest. Of his colleagues in the Cabinet one was the author of the existing schemes of army organisation and recruitment which Arnold - Forster called a "damnosa hereditas"; the majority of the remainder had approved and supported those schemes. The short service system of enlistment had broken down, and instantaneous action was necessary to find the drafts for foreign service. The Unionist party was in a parlous condition, torn by conflicting views as to Fiscal Reform, and had, as was shown by the next General Election, for the time lost the confidence of the country, and might at any time lose the reins of power. The War Office was under suspicion and distrust. With characteristic courage and sense of duty, ArnoldForster faced his difficulties, only to meet with disappointment and comparative failure. A committee of three was formed to reorganise the War Office. It had been hoped that Lord Kitchener's talents might be available for this committee, but he could not be spared. Lord Esher, Admiral Sir John Fisher, and Colonel Sir George Clarke formed the committee. An interim report was presented by them in January 1904. It recommended the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief, and the formation of an Army Council on lines similar to those of the Board of Admiralty, and it advised the removal of all the existing Heads of Departments. It is almost incredible, but it is a fact that Lord Roberts and all these distinguished general officers were left to learn their dismissal from the columns of 'The Times,' which on the first Monday in February published the Report and the Government's approval of it. No one regretted this more than Mr Arnold-Forster, who courteously and kindly explained to his military colleagues that this publication was without his knowledge or approval; but a painful impression had been created that was not favourable to the Secretary of State. During the greater part of the three months in which he had already held office, he had been deprived of the personal assistance of Lord Roberts through illness; and now there was a military interregnum, before the new members of Council, summoned from distant stations, could arrive; and when they came, they were for the most part without the experience of their predecessors in office, while some of them were slow to accept their responsibilities or recognise the limitations of their powers under a new régime that was foreign to military methods of thought. Meantime the Secretary of State had been hard at work; he had obtained a great amount of information and had submitted his own ideas for financial examination. It is impossible here to enter at length into these plans. We must be content with saying that the proposals which he laid before the Cabinet abolished the Cardwell system of linked battalions, substituting for it a long service army for peace time, and a short service army for purposes of expansion in time of war, both armies to be available in case of need for war overseas the long service army to garrison our possessions at home and abroad in peace, the short service army to serve at home only in peace, but to furnish a large reserve for use in war. These proposals were put forward during the interregnum; they could not yet have the approval of the new Army Council; the Cabinet hung back, and urged above all things that the estimates must be reduced, and that nothing should be done affecting the susceptibilities of the auxiliary forces. But the proposals involved the disbandment of at least forty-two battalions of the existing Militia, the remainder to be converted into Home Service Regular battalions. The baneful influence of party politics struck at the root of his scheme; what was considered of greatest importance was not military efficiency for the nation's sake, but re newal of the agreement with Japan was within a short stage of completion, and could be secured if the Government could hold on till the prorogation of Parliament. Against his own considered judgment he held on, and accepted the compromise. This sacrifice of his convictions he made from a sense of duty; but, says his wife "He did not, for a moment, dishopes were over, and that the comguise from himself that his high promise made had jeopardised most gravely the fulfilment of his great ambition-namely, the creation of an Army, efficient for war, which would satisfy the needs of the Empire.” There will be many who will regret that, in the interests of the nation, higher than those of any party, he did not resign. We wonder what advice William Forster, had he been alive, would have given. Arnold-Forster continued to do the best he could under these crippling conditions. The General Staff was established, and minor reforms introduced. In June 1905 he made a further effort with the Cabinet, but the Militia question again blocked the way. In December Mr Balfour and his Government resigned office. In July the Government accepted his proposals, with the exception of the part relating to the Militia, which was the very basis of the whole scheme. Mrs Arnold - Forster tells us that those nearest to him eagerly desired his resignation of office at this juncture. But it was urged upon him not to bring on a Parliamentary a Parliamentary crisis at a moment when the one hope for the Government and were present throughlay in following the line of least resistance, and exciting the least possible amount of controversy; when, too, the re In 1906 further very severe illness confined Mr ArnoldForster for many weeks to bed; but in 1907 he he and his wife joined Sir Alfred Jones in his visit to Jamaica, out the Kingston earthquake, of which their letters give a most vivid description. He continued constantly at work. In the last three years The words spoken of him by Mr Balfour at a great meeting in London, shortly after his death, might fitly have formed his epitaph of his life he wrote three books, 'The Army in 1906,'English Socialism of Today,' and 'Military Needs and Policy,' the last appearing in the very week of his death in 1909. The condition of his heart grew worse; the pain which he had constantly suffered since the overstrain of 1903 became so long-continued and so severe as to tax even his great habitual fortitude. He told his wife it was a great mystery, but that this terrible pain was somehow making him better. The strong spirit shone through the frail body. Even so late as 4th March 1909 he spoke in the House of Commons. In the following days, while compelled to remain in bed, he dictated letters on military affairs to the Press. His last letter was to Mr Balfour, a vindication of his policy and work for the Army. On the 12th March, suddenly and apparently painlessly, the tired heart failed, and death came, as he had always wished it to come, quickly, in the midst of a life every hour of which had been gladly given up to working for the country he loved so much. "He was a man of the highest temper of courage that I have almost ever known. He had a single eye to the great national and imperial needs which are filling now so much of our thoughts. He cheerfully and gladly faced death for many years, conscious that every great effort he made, by speech or otherwise, might end, as it ultimately did end, in his sudden decease; and yet, with the shadow of death for ever hanging over him, never did I know a absolutely absorbed in a great and unselfish desire to carry out his own public duty, and to see that the great imperial interests of which he was man more one of the trustees did not suffer while he had anything to do with our national destinies.” But it was still left to a loving wife to show to those who only knew him through official intercourse that gentle side of his character which his own letters amply indicate, his devotion to and respect for his "father," his thoughtful affection for his "mother," his tenderness to children, the beauty of his domestic life; and so to set forth as a lamp in the dark mists of political strife this example of a pure and noble life. |