and Sensibility and Sympathy recommended from the Example and Doctrine of Christ.' The subject last mentioned is the title of the IXth sermon, and the sentiments which it contains are as amiable as those in the discourse on Unity among Christians' are liberal.

Only one more extract, however, can we admit, and it shall be from the discourse (No. 20) on the excellence of the Human Frame and Faculties,' in which Dr. Rees exposes the absurdity of those degrading views of human nature which some preachers display with the most complacent satisfaction; as if they honoured the Deity by vilifying his chief work in this world, and prepared Man for great exertion, by telling him that he was "naturally incapable of thinking or doing any thing that was good." We will not assert that this sermon is the gem of the first water in the whole collection: but we may safely pronounce it to be throughout truly creditable to the preacher. He contemplates man in his corporeal frame, in his intellectual faculties, in his moral principles, in his social affections, in his capacity for progressive improvement, and in his destination for immortality. We transcribe that portion of it which displays the excellence of our intellectual faculties:

'It is needless now to enter into any discussion concerning the nature of the human soul. Whilst others, however, strenuously contend, that it is no distinct principle of the human frame; that it results from a peculiar organization of matter; and that the doctrine of the soul has been the source of many errors among philosophers and divines we may be allowed to say, that these assertions are much more easily made than proved; and that both reason and scripture seem to furnish very decisive and satisfactory evidence in favour of the doctrine, which some consider as almost antiquated, and which it is very fashionable to exclude. To me, indeed, the existence of spirit is as easily conceivable as that of matter: and we might as readily dispense with the one as the other. Both are known alike, merely by their properties; their properties are equally discernible; and they seem to be perfectly distinct and indeed incompatible with each other. That the thinking principle should be material is, I confess, a dogma in philosophy, which surpasses my comprehension. That thought, and will, and consciousness should be properties of matter, which is an inert, inactive and divisible mass, itself incapable of be ginning, continuing, or changing motion; and that any modification or refinement of matter should produce mental powers and exercises, are propositions, which, however allowed by others, cannot command my assent. Of the existence of one spirit, the source of all being, spiritual or material, and of his action on matter, without any com. mon properties, we are all convinced; and whilst we allow the Deity to be immaterial, many of the difficulties that attend the doctrine of a separate spirit in man are capable of being satisfactorily resolved. But without enlarging in this way, we may observe,

REV. OCT. 1809.

way

K

• That

That the intellectual faculties of man, from whatever source they are derived, constitute the chief dignity of his nature. It is by the powers of his understanding that he claims superiority, and exercises dominion in this lower world. His judgment and imagination and memory and will extend the sphere of his knowlege and intercourse, of his activity and enjoyment, far beyond that of any other creatures on earth. It is by the exercise of the understanding, that man directs, and controuls, and subdues to his own service and use all other inferior animals, however subtle or however strong; and the knowledge he thus acquires is so much actual power augmented by the concurrence and combination of the powers of other creatures, much more mighty than himself. It is by the exercise of the understand. ing, that man converts the elements of nature, fire, air, and water, and all the productions of the earth, to his own accommodation and enjoyment. This enables him to multiply these means of supply and comfort, by the labour of tillage, by the skill and industry of the artisan and manufacturer, and by the active spirit of commercial intercourse; and when they are acquired and possessed, to provide for their security and defence against the efforts of lawless power, the artifices of fraud, or the more ordinary and more signal vicissitudes and calamities of human life. It is by the exercise of the understanding, that useful arts and sciences are cultivated and promoted :—those sciences and arts that contribute to meliorate the world, to improve the condition of mankind, and to furnish various sources of agreeable amusement, and of refined and rational enjoyment. It is by the exercise of the understanding, that man discovers truth and duty; the principles and obligations of religion; the sanctions and motives of a virtuous conduct; and the means of pursuing and attaining substantial and permanent felicity. In a word, man, by his intellectual faculties, is superior to the brutes: and by the culture and improve ment of them, one man is as much superior to another, as the uninstructed barbarian is to Iris associate of the field or the stall.-It is by the power of the imagination, that we are enabled to admire and enjoy whatever is sublime or beautiful in the works of nature or in the productions of art.It is by the faculty of memory, that we deduce instruction and entertainment from the records of history and from the review of past events; and that we are enabled to derive useful lessons for the conduct of life, and for the attainment of happiness, from our own observation and experience, or from the experience and observation of others in past ages, and in circumstances similar to our own. It is by that power which we possess of anticipating futurity, that we can, in many cases, avoid evil and secure good; and that we are able to increase the amount of our present felicity by the hope and prospect of future enjoyment.-It is by that direction and controul, with respect to our own volitions and actions, with which the creator has endowed us, that we become moral and accountable beings; capable of religion and virtue; fit subjects of the moral go vernment of God; responsible for our conduct; self approved in a course of integrity and holy obedience; and meet for obtaining the approbation and applause of our supreme judge in a state of retribu

tion..

• Such

Such, then, is the dignity attached to our intellectual nature. Such are the honours and prerogatives connected with the mental faculties which God has given us. Such are the benefits and pleasures, which we derive from the cultivation and exercise of which they are capable. It behoves us, therefore in the contemplation of our intelligent nature, to acknowledge with devout gratitude: thou, O Lord, bast crowned us with glory and honour.

In the survey of our frame, the moral principles, with which we are endowed, merit a distinct consideration. Some portion of intellect has been conceded to brutes; but they possess it in a very low degree and without a corresponding capacity of cultivation and improvement. The grand and discriminating difference, which some have established between brutes and human beings, is that which consists in those moral and religious principles, that pertain, not only by way of eminence, but solely and exclusively to the latter. Man alone possesses that degree of understanding and that portion of knowledge which render him capable of religion; and which make him accountable for his conduct. Accordingly his creator has endowed him with those powers and principles, with that sense of good and evil, of honour and shame, of praise and reproach; and with those affections of hope and fear, in the review of his conduct and in the anticipation of its consequences, which evince him to be moral and accountable; and which lay the foundation for those expectations and prospects which divine revelation and the doctrine of the gospel in particular lead him to entertain. The knowledge of the attributes, character, and government of God; of the duties we owe him, and a capacity of performing those duties; a regard to his authority and law, and to his right of prescribing to our conduct; the hope of his approbation and favour, and the dread of his displeasure; and a view to future judgment and retribution, are principles which pertain to man; and they advance him to that rank of intelligence, which is but a little lower than that of angels.'

In such a view of the nature of the human constitution, as being crowned with glory and honour, exhortations to piety and virtue have a peculiar fitness. Man thus endowed is a Being formed for the duties of religion, and for the fruition of the bliss which religion promises hereafter.

It is a defect in the printing of these volumes, that in the contents we are not referred to the page in which each sermon commences, and that no marginal numeration occurs.

ART. III. An Essay on Hydrocephalus Acutus, or Dropsy in the Brain. By John Cheyne, M.D. 8vo. pp. 218. 8s. Boards. Murray.

THE

HE disease of which this volume treats is so rapid in its progress, so fatal in its tendency, and so liable to be mistaken for other affections, which, though resembling it in many leading symptoms, possess a totally different origin,

K 2

that

that we cannot but peruse with great satisfaction any attempt to render us more familiar with its phænomena, and parti cularly with those of its early stages. Dr. Cheyne professes to write from experience, and his work contains within itself strong evidence of the fact. He informs us that the cases which he details are not recollections; nor were they ever in danger of being altered, or even coloured by any prevailing or favourite doctrine. They were invariably drawn up in the bed-chamber of the patient, and present a faithful account of every symptom and circumstance that attended the disease. They may, perhaps, appear to others to authorize conclusions different from what I have drawn: my reasoning may be wrong, but my facts may be implicitly relied on.'

After some remarks on the name of the disease, and on the difficulty which has always subsisted in composing a distinct account of it, the author endeavours to remove or to diminish this difficulty, by proposing a new arrangement of its several forms, concerning the value of which he expresses himself with much confidence, as being neither artificial nor arbitrary. According to this new arrangement the malady is divided into three species, each of which he then attempts to delineate. The first supplies an accurate representation of the disease in the form in which it usually occurs; the 2d. seems to differ from the first only in being more rapid in its progress, and more violent in some of its symptoms; and the 3d. consists of those cases which have been immediately preceded by some other complaint, and which Dr. Cheyne considers as an instance of that conversion of diseases, which arises either from the excess or combination of the symptoms of the original complaint, operating upon a habit favourable to the new disorder, or perhaps from the state of the habit produced by the primary giving rise to the consequential disease.' We must confess our doubts respecting both the grounds of this new arrangement and its utility. The first two species, as far as we can perceive, have no diagnostic symptoms, and differ only in degree; so that it must depend entirely on the individual fancy or feelings of every practitioner to determine, whether each case should be placed in the Ist. or the 2d. class, and should be regarded as a mild or a severe instance of the disease. The third species indeed exhibits more variety, at least as far as the previous history is concerned; and this, as throwing light on the constitution of the patient, and as enabling us to judge what may be the effect of particular remedies, is a matter to which we ought always to attend. Beyond it, however, we should not be disposed to follow the author: but, as it is a point to which

he seems to attach considerable importance, we shall let him speak for himself:

When hydrocephalus arises after an imperfect state of health, as where there had been a scrophulous action which has abate or where, from predisposition and the anomalism of the symptoms, such action is looked for; or where the child has had some epidemic disease formerly (perhaps many months before,) from which he has not perfectly recovered, or regained sound health; the attack is sometimes made with all the violence which I have described as dis. tinguishing the second form. When, again, the attack comes as the sequel of an acute disease, as fever, hooping-cough, perhaps deatition, or during some actually existing scrophulous disease, then the child almost imperceptibly slips into Hydrocephalus ; there are scarcely any of the acute symptoms; and the palsies or convulsions are the first indications of the new disorder.'

Besides this new arrangement of the species of hydroce phalus, Dr. Cheyne adopts an opinion that is to a certain extent novel, respecting the three stages into which the disease was divided by Dr. Whytt, as depending on the changes that are observable in the state of the pulse. These successive changes, first from increased quickness to an unusual degree of slowness, and lastly the return to an increased velocity, may be considered as the regular course of the disease, when it exists in its most exquisite form: but, as the author remarks, the student will be disappointed if he expects them to follow each other in a regular progress. However, admitting that they are present when the disease assumes its complete character, Dr. Cheyne thinks that it is useful to attend to them, as indicating the alterations which are produced in the nervous system; and, attributing them entirely to this source, he designates them under the following titles; 1st. the stage of increased sensibility, 2d. the stage of decreased sensibility, and 3d. the paralytic or convulsed stage. To this new nomenclature, objections may be made, both as to its accuracy and as to its practical utility. We are not prepared to assent to the supposition that the nervous system is the primary or chief seat of disease, at least in the first stage; and consequently we must object to the malady being ascribed to an increase of sensibility. We likewise demur to the title of convulsive stage, as applied to the termination of the complaint, since it would intimate that convulsions occur only at the

termination.

We have dwelt thus long on Dr. C.'s preliminary matter, not that we deem it the most important part of his work, but because it contains some new views of the disease; and because, how much soever he may profess to diregard hypo

K 3

thesis,