produce good, to one rather than another, without considering the general consequences. 5. There is therefore another principle of action, by which good is to be distributed, beside a regard to the greatest good. This principle we call rectitude, or, in a broad sense, justice. 6. Those actions are right, which on the whole tend to produce good or prevent harm, under the control of the principle just stated. Or, in other words, we should have a general regard to the greatest good, modified by a regard to the rights of individuals, and the relations in which we stand. And absolute right is acting conformably to this rule. 7. Of this absolute right, our idea is simple and intuitive. MORAL OBLIGATION. Ail the theories on this subject may be resolved into two: that which refers it to Prudence, and that which refers it to Conscience, or a perception of Right. For when I ask, why I am obliged to perform a particular act of benevolence; if it be answered, because it will promote the general good; the question returns, why I am obliged to promote the general good; there are then three answers which may be given; either 1. to promote indirectly my own good; or, 2. because it is the command of God; or 3. because it is right. If again I ask, why I am obliged to obey the command of God; only two answers can be given. 1. Because he will reward me, if I do, and punish me, if I do not; or 2. because it is right. Thus we come at last to Prudence and Pight. Is moral obligation, then, a motive arising from self-interest? We may use the word motive in one of two senses. 1. That which affects the will. 2. That which has a general adaptation to affect the will of that kind of beings, to whom it is presented. All men have a desire of happiness; but no. object or course of conduct can act on this desire, or become a motive in the first sense, till the agent is convinced that it will promote his happiness. Now if an agent do not believe in a future retribution, and is not convinced that virtue will promote his happiness in this life, he can have no motive to virtue, and of course no obligation. If motive be used in the second sense, then it must mean, either that the object or action is such, as will affect the will of many, perhaps of most beings of the kind to whom it is addressed; which is only saying, that it is to these many or most, a motive of the first kind, and to the remainder no motive at all; or we may mean that the motive is such, that it would be better for the agent to be influenced by it. This is our opinion; but who is to be the judge, we or the agent? Prove it to be so to him, and it becomes a motive of the first kind. Otherwise, it is no motive at all. For how can one be worthy of praise or blame, for not being affected by what he does not perceive? Or, lastly, we may mean by motive that by which the will of the agent ought to be affected. And this I am ready to think is precisely what we intend by moral obligation. If it be said, as in the last case, that this cannot affect the will where it is not perceived, it is admitted. But we say, it is of the very nature of right; and the faculty of perceiving it, is what constitutes a moral agent. If obligation might be resolved into prudence, or a regard to our own gratification, there would be no distinction between moral pleasures and other pleasures, except in degree. A regard to the former could be urged on no other grounds, than a regard to the latter. Nor would there be any proper moral distinction in motives; since selfinterest is supposed by this theory to be the motive of every act. The very notions of reward and punishment presuppose obligation;* and that which renders us obnoxious to punishment, is not the foreknowledge of it; but the violation of some known obligation.† Sanctions are distant, in order that an opportunity may be given to moral principle to act. Our idea of moral obligation then is this: we judge certain actions to be right, others, wrong; and this judgment is accompanied with the belief; or rather in this judgment is implied the belief, that the former should be performed, and the latter avoided. Let any man analyze his principles of conduct, and he will find after enumerating all the motives of interest to virtuous conduct, a sense of duty still left. [I am again compelled to omit what I find on the subject of Approbation and Merit, as too imperfectly expressed in the very brief notes which are before me. I subjoin one detached remark upon a passage in Brown's lectures, which, as I have formerly stated, were read by Professor Frisbie a short time before his death.] "To feel," says Brown, "the character of approvableness, in an action, which we have not yet performed, and are only meditating on it as future, is to feel the moral obligation, or moral inducement to perform it ;—when we think of the action, in the moment of volition, we term the voluntary performance of it virtue,-when we think of the action as already performed, we denominate it merit;—in all which cases, if we analyze our moral sentiment, we cannot fail to discern, that it is one constant feeling of moral approval, with which we have been impressed, that is, varied only by the difference of the time, at which we regard the action, as future, immediate, or past. There is some question, says Professor Frisbie, of the truth of this as to obligation. Are there not many actions, which seem to us to have very little * Brown iv. 149. |
