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16 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

former, and the more readily, be-
caufe it will be impoffible to dif
cover who was his informer; there-
fore, it is a miftake to fay, that no
man can give such information with-
out incurring the character of an in-
former, as well as a perjured wretch. A
For this reafon, Sir, I must say, that
the first projector of this oath had,
in my opinion, a fixed defign to give
to every commander in chief, a com-
manding influence over every court-
martial that might be held in the
army under his command; and this B
can never be necessary for ferving any
good purpose, but may be neceffary
for ferving a bad one.

C

Jan.

injuftice, or been provoked by his infolence. Any fcheme, therefore, for concealing any part of the behaviour of fuch men, I muft look on as a scheme for protecting and propagating infolence and injuftice in our army; and as this would drive every man of honour and fpirit out of it, I fhall always, to the utmost of my power, oppofe every such fcheme.

The prefent, I admit, Sir, reaches no farther than that of voting in a court-martial; but one bad precedent generally makes way for another: It will be eafy to flip from voting to proceeding; and though there is at present a very great difference between the methods of proceeding in courts-martial and courts at common law, if fecrecy be once introduced into every part of the former, it will be found so suitable to arbitrary power, that no flone will be left unturned for introducing it into the latter, and our army, in mere revenge, will contribute all in their power towards that fatal change in our conftitution. Therefore, even thofe gentlemen who are not of our army, nor ever defign to engage in it, ought to be cautious of fubjecting it to a court of inquifition, under the en_fnaring pretence of rendering courtsEmartial more independent and impartial.

D

Now, Sir, as to thofe dangerous animofities and heart-burnings, which are said to be raised among officers, by its being known how they voted at courts-martial, it is ftrange that no fuch animofities or heart-burnings were ever heard of in our army, till within these three or four years. I have converfed with many old officers in our army, and they have informed me, that when gentlemen, upon a court-martial, behave not only with juftice, but with good-nature and candour, they never incur the ill-will, even of those who fuffer by the fentence they concurred in ; and that a fellow would be houted out of the army, fhould he ever teftify any refentment against fuch an officer. I am, therefore, apt to fufpect, that fome of our courts-martial have not of late behaved as they ought to do; for when a man behaves with infolence in power or office, and adds injuftice to his info- F lence, I do not wonder at his meeting with refentment, or fuffering by that refentment; but this is fo far from being an argument with me for having his behaviour concealed, that I fhould be for having it printed and published, on purpose, that if he did not meet with a juft reward from his fuperiors in command, which he ought to do, he might meet with it from those who had fuffered by his

But I hope, Sir, I have already laid this fnare fo open, that no gentleman can be caught in it. I fhall grant, that from the nature of military fervice it is impoffible to render the judges upon a court-martial quite independent of their general in chief; and therefore there are but two ways for preventing their being too much influenced by him in their judgments One is, by their voting as well as proceeding in the most pubGlick manner; for then fome of them at leaft, I hope, most of them, will be ashamed to concur in any act of manifeft injuftice or oppreffion; and the general will be afraid of having

1751. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

it publickly known, that fuch an act was the effect of his influence, The other is, by rendering it impoffible that a man's way of voting fhould be known to any one but himself ; and as this is fo often practifed in

17

comprehended both house of parliament, if the Hon. gentleman who fpoke laft intends that they fhould be fo understood, why does he oppołe adding the words propofed? Does abundance of the law break the

this house, I cannot comprehend A law? Is it not neceffary to add those

how the Hon. gentleman came not to think of it. When I fay this, every gentleman muft fuppofe I mean, that all voting in courts-martial should be by balloting. This would effectually conceal a man's way of voting from the general as well B as the publick: But by the method propofed you will conceal it from the publick, to whom it ought to be known, and you will at the fame time reveal it to the general, to whom it ought never to be known.

words, in order to prevent a doubt which might arife in the mind of an officer, who is brought to be examined before us? I fhall not talk of an officer's tenderness of confcience; but, I hope, I may talk of his tendernefs of honour; and a man who is tender of his honour, will put his own fenfe on the words of every oath he takes, and will die rather than do or fay any thing he in his own mind thinks contrary to that fenfe. Suppofe then, that an officer C fhould tell us, that as he never fuppofed this houfe to be a court of juftice, he thought himself bound by his oath not to disclose to us how any man voted at a court-martial of which he was a member. Could we with any juftice punish fuch an offiD cer for contumacy? And if all the officers of that court martial were of the fame opinion, which they would probably be, could we proceed in any fuch inquiry? At least we could not diftinguish who had voted for or against that unjust sentence; and an inflamed house of commons might thus, very probably, be provoked to pafs a bill of pains and penalties, against every officer who had the misfortune of being a member of that court-martial. Therefore, to prevent any future inquiries being interrupted by fuch a scruple, or to prevent our being provoked, and I may fay, compelled to punish the innocent equally with the guilty, it is abfolutely neceflary to add the words now moved for.

F

Thefe, I fay, Sir, are the only two poffible methods for preventing the too great influence of a general upon the judgment of a court-martial. Which of these two is the beft, I confefs, I am at a lofs to determine; for with Pliny I may ask,, Quotocuique eadem honeftatis cura Jecretò, quæ palam? And I am pretty apt to join in opinion with him, that Multi famam, confcientiam pauci verentur. By the method we have chofen, we diveft men of all concern for their reputation, and we put it in the power of a tyrannical general, or minifter, to divest them of conscience. What in this cafe can be expected from any court-martial, but fuch a sentence as they may privately be directed to give by their commanding officer ? And what is ftill worse, we are go- E ing to put it out of our power, when a fentence flagrantly unjuft and oppreffive is paffed, to difcriminate the innocent from the guilty; for tho' the parliament may, and, I hope, always will act juftly, yet in the common way of speaking, nei-G ther house is ever called a court of justice.

But fuppofe, Sir, that in a law fenfe the words, court of justice, January, 175***

For our own fakes, Sir, and forthe preservation of our privileges, we ought to add these words. I was indeed furprifed to find the imagination of the honourable gentleman who spoke last to unfruitful,

C

that

16 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

A

former, and the more readily, be-
caufe it will be impoffible to dif-
cover who was his informer; there-
fore, it is a miftake to fay, that no
man can give fuch information with-
out incurring the character of an in-
former, as well as a perjured wretch.
For this reafon, Sir, I must say, that
the first projector of this oath had,
in my opinion, a fixed design to give
to every commander in chief, a com-
manding influence over every court-
martial that might be held in the
army under his command; and this B
can never be neceffary for ferving any
good purpose, but may be neceffary
for ferving a bad one.

Now, Sir, as to thofe dangerous animofities and heart-burnings, which are faid to be raised among officers, by its being known how they voted at courts martial, it is ftrange that no fuch animofities or heart burnings were ever heard of in our army, till within these three or four years. I have converfed with many old officers in our army, and they have informed me, that when gentlemen, upon a court-martial, behave not only with justice, but with good-nature and candour, they never incur the ill-will, even of those who fuffer by the sentence they concurred in ; and that a fellow would be houted out of the army, fhould he ever testify any refentment against such an officer. I am, therefore, apt to fufpect, that fome of our courts-martial have not of late behaved as they ought to do; for when a man behaves with infolence in power or office, and adds injuftice to his infolence, I do not wonder at his meeting with refentment, or fuffering by that refentment; but this is fo far from being an argument with me for having his behaviour concealed, that I fhould be for having it printed and published, on purpose, that if he did not meet with a juft reward from his fuperiors in command, which he ought to do, he might meet with it from thofe who had fuffered by his

C

Jan.

injuftice, or been provoked by his
infolence. Any fcheme, therefore,
for concealing any part of the beha-
viour of fuch men, I muft look on
as a scheme for protecting and pro-
pagating infolence and injuftice in
our army; and as this would drive
every man of honour and spirit out
of it, I fhall always, to the utmoft
of my power, oppofe every fuch
scheme.

The prefent, I admit, Sir, reaches
no farther than that of voting in a
court-martial; but one bad precedent
generally makes way for another :
It will be easy to flip from voting
to proceeding; and though there is
at present a very great difference be-
tween the methods of proceeding in
courts martial and courts at common
law, if fecrecy be once introduced
into every part of the former, it
will be found fo fuitable to arbitrary
power, that no flone will be left
unturned for introducing it into the
latter, and our army, in mere revenge,
will contribute all in their power to-
wards that fatal change in our con-
ftitution. Therefore, even thofe
gentlemen who are not of our army,
nor ever defign to engage in it,
ought to be cautious of iubjecting it
to a court of inquifition, under the en-
fnaring pretence of rendering courts-
Emartial more independent and im-
partial.

D

F

But I hope, Sir, I have already laid this fnare fo open, that no gentleman can be caught in it. I fhall grant, that from the nature of military fervice it is impoffible to render the judges upon a court-martial quite independent of their general in chief; and therefore there are but two ways for preventing their being too much influenced by him in their judgments One is, by their voting as well as proceeding in the most pubGlick manner; for then fome of them at leaft, I hope, most of them, will be afhamed to concur in any act of manifeft injuftice or oppreffion; and the general will be afraid of having

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POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

1751. PROCEEDINGS of the it publickly known, that such an act was the effect of his influence. The other is, by rendering it impoffible 'that a man's way of voting fhould be known to any one but himself; and as this is fo often practifed in this houfe, I cannot comprehend A how the Hon. gentleman came not to think of it. When I fay this, every gentleman muft fuppofe I mean, that all voting in courts-martial fhould be by balloting. This would effectually conceal a man's way of voting from the general as well B as the publick: But by the method propofed you will conceal it from the publick, to whom it ought to be known, and you will at the fame time reveal it to the general, to whom it ought never to be known.

Thefe, I fay, Sir, are the only C two poffible inethods for preventing the too great influence of a general upon the judgment of a court-martial.

17

comprehended both houfe of parliament, if the Hon. gentleman who spoke laft intends that they fhould be fo understood, why does he oppole adding the words propofed? Does abundance of the law break the law? Is it not neceffary to add those words, in order to prevent a doubt which might arife in the mind of an officer, who is brought to be examined before us? I fhall not talk of an officer's tenderness of confcience; but, I hope, I may talk of his tendernefs of honour; and a man who is tender of his honour, will put his own fenfe on the words of every oath he takes, and will die rather than do or fay any thing he in his own mind thinks contrary to that fenfe. Suppofe then, that an officer fhould tell us, that as he never fuppofed this houfe to be a court of juftice, he thought himself bound by his oath not to difclofe to us how any man voted at a court-martial of which he was a member. Could we with any juftice punish such an offD cer for contumacy? And if all the officers of that court martial were of the fame opinion, which they would probably be, could we proceed in any fuch inquiry? At least we could not distinguish who had voted for or against that unjust sentence; and an inflamed house of commons might thus, very probably, be provoked to pafs a bill of pains and penalties, against every officer who had the misfortune of being a member of that court-martial. Therefore, to prevent any future inquiries being interrupted by fuch a fcruple, or to prevent our being provoked, and I may fay, compelled to punish the innocent equally with the guilty, it is abfolutely neceffary to add the words now moved for.

Which of these two is the beft, I confefs, I am at a lofs to determine; for with Pliny I may ask, Quotocuique eadem honeftatis cura fecretò, quæ palam? And I am pretty apt to join in opinion with him, that Multi famam, confcientiam pauci verentur. By the method we have chofen, we diveft men of all concern for their reputation, and we put it in the power of a tyranni- F cal general, or minifter, to divest them of confcience. What in this cafe can be expected from any court-martial, but fuch a sentence as they may privately be directed to give by their commanding officer ? And what is still worse, we are go- E ing to put it out of our power, when a fentence flagrantly unjuft and oppreffive is paffed, to difcriminate the innocent from the guilty; for tho' the parliament may, and, I hope, always will act juftly, yet in the common way of speaking, nei-G ther house is ever called a court of justice.

But fuppofe, Sir, that in a law fenfe the words, court of justice, January, 175

For our own fakes, Sir, and forthe prefervation of our privileges, we ought to add thefe words. I was indeed furprifed to find the imagination of the honourable gentleman who spoke laft to unfruitful,

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that

18

PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c.

Jan.

ing him out of the houfe, when
their general was in danger of hav-
ing a vote paffed against him; and
fuppofe the queftion for this purpose
fhould be carried in the court-mar-
tial by a majority but of one, how
could we punish the guilty, how
could the innocent clear themselves?
We may talk of our being a court
of juftice in matters of privilege.
and election: I doubt if the world
thinks fo: I am fure, we do not act
as fuch, because we never pretend
to adhibit an oath to any witness
examined upon fuch occafions; and
this alone is fufficient for raifing a
fcruple in an officer's breaft, whe-
ther he be at liberty to disclose to
us, how any man voted in a court-
martial, which had committed fuch
heinous breach of privilege.

Ca

that he could not fuggeft to himself
any one cafe, wherein a court-martial
might be guilty of a breach of the
privileges of this houfe. I have
known his imagination much more
fruitful upon other occafions. Do
not we all remember, that a famous A
court-martial, but a few years ago,
put a very high indignity upon one
of the courts in Weftminster-hall,
for which they were glad to make a
most humble fubmiffion? And may
not an ignorant and wrong-headed
court-martial put fuch another in- B
dignity upon this houfe, or perhaps
on you, Sir, who fo worthily and fo
honourably fills the chair? I wish
gentlemen would be a little more
cautious, when they talk of the
power of judges, juftices of the
peace, or commanding officers, over
the members of this houfe, in the
cafe of crimes. The king himself,
when he orders any of our members
to be taken into cuftody for the
highest of all crimes, treafon, al-
ways takes the first opportunity to
acquaint us with it, and to defire D
our leave to detain him in cuftody.
This, 'tis true, is never refused,
when there is no fufpicion of a fi-
nifter defign; but if we had any
fuch fufpicion, we have a power to
fend our ferjeant for our member,
to examine into the cause of his E
commitment, and to declare it a
breach of privilege, if no fuffi-
cient caufe fhould be made appear;
and I would advife the higheft gene-
ral that ever can be in our army, or
any court-martial we can ever have,
to be cautious of confining an offi. F
cer who is a member of this houfe,
unless there be fome very juft and
very urgent caufe; for without fuch
a caufe we should deem it a breach
of privilege, and would punish it
accordingly.

But, Sir, fuppofe a court-martial, G
without any juft caufe, fhould order
one of our members to be confined
in the dungeon of the Savoy, mere-
ly, perhaps, for the fake of keep-

I fhall therefore conclude, Sir,
with obferving, that those who are
of opinion, that the two houfes of
parliament are not comprehended
under the words, court of juftice,
must find themselves under a neceffi-
ty of agreeing to the amendment
propofed; and those who think that
they are, can have no reason for op-
pofing it; for which reason, I hope,
it will be unanimously agreed to.

The next Speech I shall give you in
this Debate, was that of Afranius
Burrhus, the Purport of which was
as follows:
Mr. Prefident,
SIR,

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