we have of Truth and Falfhood, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, which nothing that comes into our Minds by the Senfes can represent to us.

Q. But cannot the infinite Power of God endow Matter with a Capacity of Thinking?

A. The Extent of infinite Power and of the Capacities of material Nature, are fuch Secrets to us, that it is hard to pretend to ftrict Demonftration against either of them. But this is not fairly urged by the Men of Reason and Philofophy, which shews their Cause very indefenfible; because if Men will reafon about fuch Matters, all fuch Appeals fhould be laid afide, and they should only argue from their own Senfations, and from the known Appearances of Nature; for though it is difficult to pretend to fay what infinite Power can or cannot do, yet, according to the known Principles of Philosophy, there is no Relation between Matter and Thought; nay, as far as we can judge, an utter Incapacity in Matter to think; and it feems not intelligible, how God fhould fuperadd to Matter this Faculty of Thinking, unlefs he changed the Nature of Matter. And it may as well be maintained, that God by his Omnipotence may fuperadd to immaterial Beings the Faculty of Extenfion and Divifibility, which would be to make them quite other Things than they are. When we feek for natural Evidence, we must be content with fuch Evidence as Senfe and Reason, and the Philosophy of Nature afford; and at the fame Time there is not any Pretence of Reafon against the Poffibility of an immaterial Principle in Man diftinct from Body.

Q. What do feveral of the ancient Fathers of the Church mean, when they affert that the Soul is not properly immortal?

A. Their Expreffions are not to be taken in a rigorous Senfe; for they spake not in Opposition to the Chriftian Opinion of the Soul's Immortality,

but

al. cum

but in Oppofition to the extravagant Notions of fome pretended Platonifts, who taught fuch an Immortality of the Soul as implied Neceffity of Exiftence: for the Reafon they give why Souls ought not to be called immortal, is, because they bad a Beginning, and depend continually upon God for Juft. the Prefervation of their Being; in which Senfe nei- Mart.Dither are the Angels themselves immortal, but God Tryph. himself, who, as St. Paul expreffes it, only bath 1 Tim. vi. Immortality. And the Paffages wherein they affirm, 16. that Immortality is not the neceffary Condition of our Nature, but the Reward of our Virtue, are all plainly meant not of Perpetuity of Duration, but of the eternal indefectible Happiness of Heaven, in which Senfe the Word Immortality is used by them, as alone deferving that glorious Title, notwithstanding that they affirm the oppofite State to be of equal Duration and Perpetuity.

Q. But if whatever bath a Principle of fenfitive Perception is immaterial, and confequently immortal; will it not follow that the Souls of Brutes must be immortal?

La&t. li.

7.97.

21.

A. That there is a Spirit in a Beast distinct from its Body, and separated from it by Death, we learn from Solomon; and that they are not mere Machines Ecel. iii. and Engines, without real Senfation, is as evident to us, as that other Men have Senfations; for the brute Beasts appear to have all the five Senfes as truly and exactly as any Man in the World. But yet it will not follow, that their Souls are immortal in the Sense we attribute Immortality to the Souls of Men, because they are not capable of the Exercife of Reason and Religion. For the Immortality of Men's Souls confifts not only in a Capacity of living in a separate State, but living fo in that State as to be fenfible of Happiness and Mifery; for they are not only endowed with a Faculty of Sense, but with other Faculties that do not depend upon, or

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have

have any Connexion with Matter. Though therefore it fhould be allowed, that the Souls of Brutes remain when separated from their Bodies; yet, being only endowed with a fenfitive Principle, the Operations of which depend upon an organical Difpofition of the Body, when that is diffolved, it is probable they lapfe into an infenfible and inactive State; and when the Scene of fenfible Things at the End of the World shall pafs away, it is not improbable, but that they may return to their first Nothing, as not farther neceffary.

Q. What is the fecond Argument from Reason to perfuade us that the Soul is immortal?

A. The universal Consent of Mankind, which fheweth it to be a natural Notion and Dictate of our Minds. Now when all Men, though diftant and remote from one another, and different in their Tempers and Manners, and Ways of Education; when the most barbarous Nations, as well as the moft polite, agree in a Thing, we may well call it the Voice of Nature. And that they did thus agree in the Belief of the Soul's Immortality, is evident from the Teftimony of many ancient Heathen Writers, and the Confent of feveral credible Hiftories; nay, the very Idolatries of the Pagans themselves confirm this Truth; for their Gods were no other than dead Men and Women, confecrated by the Superftition of the People, and worshipped with divine Honours and religious Ceremonies. Now the leaft that can be inferred from this is, that they believed that these Men and Women they worshipped, lived after Death, and had an Existence when feparated from their Bodies.

Q. But is it not a great Prejudice to this Argument, that the Epicureans among the Philofophers, and the Sadducees among the Jews, denied the Immortality of the Soul?

A. That

A. That fome few Inftances may be brought to the contrary, is no Proof that this Notion is not natural; and fome few Exceptions are no better Arguments against an universal Confent, than fome few Monsters and Prodigies are against the regular Courfe of Nature; for Men may offer Violence to Nature, and debauch their Understandings by Luft, Intereft, or Pride, and an Affectation of Singularity; which was the Cafe of Epicurus. And the Sadducees, from a Heat of Oppofition to the Pharifees, fell into this Error, miftaking the Doctrine. their Mafter Sadoc had fo often inculcated, viz. That though there were no Rewards and Punishments after this Life, yet Men ought to live virtuously. This we are sure of, the more Men excelled in Piety and Virtue, the more firmly they believed a future State; and it is reasonable to learn what Nature is from the most perfect Patterns. And that the Senfe of Nature in this Cafe is very ftrong, is evident from the great Number of wicked Men in the World; who, notwithstanding it is their Intereft there should be no Life after this, yet cannot overcome the Fears of it.

Q. What is the third Argument from Reafon, for the Immorality of the Soul?

A. Those natural Notions we have of God, and of the effential Difference between Good and Evil, bear great Evidence to this Truth: For the Belief of a God implies the Belief of his infinite Goodnefs and Justice: From the first we may conclude him inclinable to make fome Creatures more perfect than others, and capable of greater Degrees of Happiness, and of longer Duration: becaufe Goodnefs is communicative and diffufive, and delights in being fo; and fince in Man are found the Perfections of an immortal Nature, which are Knowledge and Liberty, we may infer, that he is endowed with fuch a Principle as in its own Nature is capable

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capable of an immortal Duration. From the latter, his infinite Juftice, we may conclude he loves Righteousness and hates Iniquity; but the Difpenfations of his Providence in this World being very promifcuous, that good Men often fuffer, and that for the Sake of Righteousness; that wicked Men as frequently profper, and that by Means of their Wickedness, it is reasonable to believe a future immortal State for the fuitable Diftribution of Rewards and Punishments. And there being a Difference between Good and Evil founded in the Nature of Things, it is reasonable to imagine they will be diftinguished by Rewards and Punishments: But fince we find that in this World this Difcrimination is not always made, we may conclude there is a future State, where all Things fhall be fet right, and the Juftice of God's Providence vindicated; which is the very Thing meant by the Soul's Immortality. Q. What is the fourth Argument from Reason for the Soul's Immortality?

A. The natural Hopes and Fears of Men, which cannot be well accounted for without the Belief of an immortal State after Death. Now common Experience proves the Reality of fuch Hopes and Fears. Some have been defirous to perpetuate their. Names to Pofterity, and by brave Actions have endeavoured to purchafe Fame, which would fignify nothing, if they had not believed they should have exifted in another World to have enjoyed it. There have been many more, who by the Virtue and Piety of their Lives, by the Juftice and Honefty of their Actions, have been raised to an Expectation of Rewards after Death; and all the Arts of wickedMen have not been able to deliver them from Shame and Horror upon the Commiffion ofany wicked Action, though covered with the greatest Privacy, and unknown to any one but themfelves. Now what can fill the one fo full of Hopes, and deject the other