EXAMINATION

OF

DR. ADAM SMITH'S THEORY

OF

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE NORTH-AMERICAN REVIEW FOR MARCH 1819.

WHAT is that quality in actions, which is the object of moral approbation, and by what faculty of our minds do we become acquainted with this quality, are questions, which have long exercised the ingenuity of speculative men. One class of theorists informs us, that there is in certain actions a fitness, congruity, or intrinsic excellence, which, like truth, is discovered by the understanding, and of which the idea is simple, and of course not to be defined. Another tells us, that virtue is the tendency of actions to a certain end, and that this end is either directly or more remotely the happiness of the agent himself. By a third we are taught, that approbation is an agreeable feeling, and virtue the cause that excites it. Among the advocates of this last system are Dr. Hutchinson, Mr. Hume, and Dr. Smith. Dr. Hutchinson believed this feeling to be

specific, and assigned for its perception a distinct faculty, which he denominated the moral sense. Mr. Hume and Dr. Smith, while they agreed with Hutchinson in considering approbation as a feeling, denied the necessity of supposing an appropriate faculty for its perception ;-the former of these philosophers referring the phenomena of approbation to the more general law, by which the perception of utility is agreeable to us, and the latter to sympathy. It is the theory of Dr. Smith, upon which we propose to offer some remarks to our readers.

Notwithstanding the intrinsic difficulties of the subject, and the uncommon ingenuity with which it is treated by Dr. Smith, his theory of moral sentiments has not, so far as we know, been formally examined by any writer; though it seems to have been adopted by none. Before, however, we enter upon this discussion, it may be useful to that portion of our readers, who are not much accustomed to speculations of this sort, to state, as clearly as we can, what the problem is, which is to be solved, and in what its difficulty consists.

In the contemplation of particular actions, the spectator is conscious of the sentiment of approbation; and the quality, which is the object or occasion of this sentiment, we denominate rectitude. But what is approbation, and what is rectitude?

When I taste a peach, I have an agreeable sensation; when I understand a mathematical proposition, I perceive a truth. To which of these facts is approbation analogous? I observe, for instance, the conduct of a just and benevolent man; I find feelings of approbation, love, esteem, springing up in my breast, and I affirm his actions to be right. Now do I exercise these feelings because I perceive the rectitude of his conduct, or do I judge his conduct to be right, because it gives me these feelings? But if it be said, that the object of approbation is the beneficial tendency of actions, or their conformity to the divine will, rather than their intrinsic nature; —this tendency or conformity to a rule is, indeed, discerned by the understanding; but the question still returns, why are they approved? Is it because the spectator perceives in them somewhat excellent in itself, or because they are directly agreeable to him; or has he learned to approve of the happiness of another by associating it in some way with his own, and of conformity to the divine will, by a reference to those sanctions of reward and punishment, which may affect himself? Thus, when we examine the foundation of our approbation of benevolence, the inquiry seems to result in one of these three principles: that benevolence is, by the constitution of our being, the ultimate cause of a

pleasing emotion; or that the understanding directly perceives in it somewhat excellent and right, which, like truth, recommends itself at once to an intelligent nature; or that all approbation is at last to be referred to the phenomena of self-love. To answer the inquiries which have been stated, is the design of a theory of morals.

Could we recollect every incident of our lives, from our birth to the present moment, so that we could exactly trace the formation or development of all the principles of our moral and intellectual being, the questions we have stated would involve no great difficulty. But we approve, long before we consider the nature or object of approbation. When we first turn our thoughts to the examination of these principles, they are in their maturity; they have grown up, mixed and modified and changed by a thousand impressions and associations; so that we can no longer, without great labor, distinguish what is native and original from what is formed and adventitious. It is the province of the theorist then, to resolve this compound into its elements. To do this, he must bring together a large variety of cases, which are known to involve the principle he seeks, and proceed, in a sort of algebraic process, by repeated comparisons and separations of what is unessential, till at last the truth required stands