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is lost. The English Army, I hope, will do all which can be expected from their numbers; but the safety of Spain depends upon the union of its inhabitants, their enthusiasm in their cause, and in their firm and devoted determination to die, rather than submit to the French; nothing short of this will enable them to resist the formidable attack about to be made upon them. If they will adhere, our aid can be of the greatest use to them; but, if not, we shall soon be out-numbered, were our force quadrupled.

- my own

"I am, therefore, much more anxious to see exertion and energy in the Government, and enthusiasm in their Armies, than to have my force augmented. The moment is a critical one situation is particularly so I have never seen it otherwise; - but I have pushed into Spain at all hazards- this was the order of my Government-and it was the will of the people of England. I shall endeavour to do my best, hoping that all the bad that may happen, will not happen; but that with a share of bad, we shall also have a portion of good fortune."

With regard to Mr. Frere, it is observed by the Editor:

Mr. Frere arrived at Aranjuez at the beginning of November, as Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain. He of course superseded Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart; who, from having resided some time in Spain, and from personal qualifications, had got acquainted with many of the leading men, and had acquired a clear insight into the state of affairs.

Mr. Frere unfortunately had acquired his notions of Spanish politics in London; and his prepossessions were much too strong to be effaced by the observations of his predecessors, or even to be altered by the most opposing facts.'

Consistently with this representation, so early as Nov. 13, Mr. Frere writes in reply: The fixed spirit of resistance which, without calculation of danger or of means, seems to have rooted itself in the minds of the people, appears superior reverses.'

to any

Nov. 19, Sir J. Moore again addresses Mr. Frere, and his letter contains these paragraphs:

"The scenes which Colonel Graham describes, in his letters, as passing at the Head Quarters of the Central Army, are deplorable. The imbecility of the Spanish Government exceeds belief. The good-will of the inhabitants, whatever it may be, is of little use whilst there exists no ability to bring it into action.

any

"I am in communication with no one Spanish army; nor am I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish Government, or of of its Generals. Castanos, with whom I was put in correspon dence, is deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear from him; and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond (for it has not been officially communicated to me) is absent God knows where. In the mean time the French are within four marches of me, whilst my army is only as

sembling

sembling in what numbers they are, I cannot learn. No channels of intelligence have been opened to me; and I have not been long enough in the country to procure them myself. 1 state these particulars to you. I wish it were in my power to go myself to Aranjuez, or Madrid, to represent them; for really if things are to continue in this state, the ruin of the Spanish cause, and the defeat of their armies, is inevitable; and it will become my duty to consider alone the safety of the British army, and to take steps to withdraw it from a situation, where, without the possibility of doing good, it is exposed to certain defeat.”

Similar representations were made to Lord Castlereagh in a dispatch of the 24th; and it is remarked:

"Your Lordship must be prepared to hear that we have failed: for situated as we are, success cannot be commanded by any efforts we can make, if the Enemy are prepared to oppose us. I am without a shilling of money to pay the army their subsistence, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it, our supplies will be stopped. The 500,000 dollars your Lordship mentions, Sir David Baird considered as sent to him; he detained them, and has nearly expended them. The money which it is possible to procure at Madrid and in other towns of Spain is quite trifling, and it is impossible to describe the embarrassment we are thrown into from the want of this essential article; nothing but abundance of money, and prompt payments, will compensate, when we begin to move, for the want of experience and ability of our Commissariat."

In a private letter to one of his brothers, dated the 26th, the state of his mind is thus expressed :

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Upon entering Spain I have found affairs in a very different state from what I expected, or from what they are thought to be in England.

"I am in a scrape from which God knows how I am to extricate myself. But, instead of Salamanca, this army should have been assembled at Seville. The poor Spaniards deserve a better fate, for they seem a fine people; but have fallen into hands who have lost them by their apathy and ****** ? —

Pray for me that I may make right decisions: if I make bad ones, it will not be for want of consideration.

"I sleep little, it is now only five in the morning; and I have concluded, since I got up, this long letter.'

Sir David Baird's sentiments thus appear in a letter to the General in Chief, dated Astorga, Nov. 23:

"As it could never be intended by the British Government that our army should engage in the defence of this Country unaided and unsupported by any Spanish force, I confess, my dear Sir John, I begin to be at a loss to discover an object at this moment in Spain : it being very evident that the Spaniards are not at this moment in a situation to be capable of assembling a force competent to offer any serious resistance to the progress of the French arms."

At

At this period, Sir John also writes in his Journal:

"I see my situation as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse; for I have no Spanish army to give me the least assistance, only the Marquis Romana is endeavouring to assemble the fugitives from Blake's army at Leon.

"Yet I am determined to form the junction of this army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here as things are; but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle."

A want of necessary and accurate information was severely felt by all the British officers, civil and military; and Mr. Frere (from Aranjuez, Nov. 25.) explicitly states this griev ance, which he ascribes in part to mistaken notions of secrecy and mystery,' in part to a jealousy of Great Britain,' and most of all to the confusion of their own system of intelligence, or more properly speaking, want of system.'-Blake's army had now been dispersed, and the French were threatening Madrid.

The several columns of British troops not having yet assem bled together, Sir John writes again on the 27th Nov. to Mr. Frere; repeating his sentiments on the cheerless prospect of affairs, and observing: "This is a state of things quite different from that conceived by the British Government, when they determined to send troops to the assistance of Spain."

"It becomes, therefore, a question, whether the British Army should remain to be attacked in its turn, or retire from a country where the contest, from whatever circumstances, has become unequal.

I wish to throw no responsibility off myself, which properly belongs to me.

The question is not purely a military one. It belongs at least as much to you, as to me, to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish Government, and the opportunities you have had of judging of the general state of the Country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered.

"You are, perhaps, better acquainted with the views of the British Cabinet; and the question is, What would that Cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered; it is comparatively of very little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am willing to take the whole, or a part; but I am very anxious to know your opinion.

"The movements of the French give us little time for discussion." On the 28th, the General received accounts of the defeat of the Spanish army under Castanos, and consequently decided on retreating to the banks of the Tagus. He sent orders to Sir D. Baird to retire on Corunna, and to Gen. Hope to join

him (Sir J. M.) by forced marches, at Salamanca or at Ciudad Rodrigo; remarking,

"After due consideration, I have determined to give the thing up, and to retire. It was my wish to have run great risks to fulfil what I conceive to be the wishes of the people of England, and to give every aid to the Spanish cause; but they have shown themselves equal to do so little for themselves-their two principal armies having allowed themselves to be thus beaten and dispersed without almost an effort it would only be sacrificing the Army without doing any good to Spain, to oppose it to such numbers as must now be brought against us: besides, I take for granted, a junction with Baird is out of the question; and, perhaps, with you, pro. blematical; as there must be troops at Burgos, which must now push on to intercept us.'

Here the Editor observes:

It thus appears that Sir John More took the resolution of retreating, without waiting for Mr. Frere's answer to his letter of the 27th. The defeat of Castanos totally altered the question; and the situation of the Army admitted of no delay. For, if Buonaparte should detach his most advanced corps against the British, General Hope might possibly be intercepted, and Sir David Baird might be hotly pursued, and suffer loss in the embarkation.

He then assembled the General Officers, and shewed them the intelligence he had received, and the plan he had adopted. He told the Generals, "that he had not called them together to request their counsel, or to induce them to commit themselves by giving any opinion upon the subject. He took the responsibility entirely upon himself; and he only required that they would immediately prepare for carrying it into effect."

It ought to be mentioned, that the idea of retreating was very generally disapproved of at Salamanca by the Army. The murmurs against it from Officers of rank were heard in every quarter. Even the Staff Officers of Sir John Moore's family lamented it; and, for the first time, doubted the wisdom of his decision. He, however, afterwards learnt, that General Hope agreed with him completely on this, as on all other points.'

Other

December 2, Sir J. Moore was supplied with various information, all tending to represent affairs in a better light, chiefly on the authority of Don Tomas Morla, whose treachery was afterward manifested; together with letters from Mr. Frere, strongly expressing his dissent from the opinion of the General, and urging farther efforts in favour of the common cause. encouraging accounts were shortly transmitted; Madrid was stated to be firm in its determination and active in its preparations to resist the enemy;, the Junta sent, through the Prince of Castelfranco and Don T. Morla, pressing solicitations to Sir John Moore for his aid; and Mr. Frere again wrote, reiterating

his persuasions, and renewing his request for a change in Sir John's measures:

"I have no hesitation (he says) in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach itself to this advice As I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely for the present upon the decision which you may adopt. I say for the present, for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success."

Duly considering all these statements, (which appeared to come from the best authority, but which have since proved to be entirely deceptive*,) and reflecting that his instructions from the British Government commanded him to receive the requisitions and representations of the Spanish Junta and the British Minister at Madrid "with the utmost deference and attention," Sir John Moore rescinded his former determination, and wrote to Sir David Baird to stop his retreat, and return to Astorga.

In the mean time, Mr. Frere sent to Sir John the memorable letter of which Colonel de Charmilly was the bearer, requiring that this gentleman should be examined by a Council of War, to give (in fact) evidence in opposition to the views and resolves of the Commander in Chief. The General's answer is inserted in the present volume, and deserves the Editor's epithets of • calm and dignified :'--but we must hasten onward.

On the 4th Inst. General Hope's division effected a junction with the main army. Sir John now took measures for making a movement on Zamora and Toro, that he might approximate himself to the corps of Sir David Baird and the Marquis de la Romana, and that he might threaten the communication between Madrid and France. Madrid had capitulated on the 3d December, but the British General was uninformed of its entire submission.

Dec. 12. a private dispatch to Lord Castlereagh was written, in which we find this paragraph:

"I fear that Mr. Frere is infinitely more sanguine upon the subject of Spain than I am. This is to be regretted, as it renders it more embarrassing for you to come to a decision upon the measure to be pursued I have seen no ability with the Spanish Government, but much the reverse: none has been displayed by their officers in the command of the armies; no one officer has yet a chief direction of the military branch; the armies have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm, nor no daring spirit; and that which has not been shewn

Morla and his associates were actually negociating for the surrender of Madrid, when they wrote in the name of the Junta to the British General, urging his continued co-operation.

hitherto,

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