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direct violation of a treaty entered into with them only a few years earlier, who styles that demand "an expression of calm contempt, on the part of the British, for subsisting engagements, yet afterwards "ventures to think, that, after all, these deceitful rulers were dealt with too leniently," and speaks of the anticipated storm and plunder of Hyderabad, and the "blasted hopes" of the army, in consequence of a peaceful arrangement, in the spirit of a disappointed Mahratta plunderer. We solemnly assure our readers that the page in Captain Havelock's work, which anticipates the storm of Hyderabad, is headed "Golden Prospects," that the page which records how Hyderabad came not to be stormed, is headed "Prospects Blighted;" that each page is like to its heading, and that we have been able to discover no trace of irony. Is this the natural tone of a British officer? or is it the case that injustice on the part of rulers leavens the whole mass of those whom they employ with a corresponding leaven of iniquity?

After passing through Scinde, the route followed by our army led them through the parts of Eastern Beloochistan, subject to Mehrab Khan of Khelût-a name of deep significance to the student of the Affghan war. That chieftain, or his predecessors, had been, like the Ameers of Scinde, feudatory to the crown of Cabool, but for the last many years they had possessed both virtual and nominal independence. In 1834, Shah Soojah, flying from the consequences of a defeated attempt to recover his dominions, took refuge in the territories of Mehrab Khan, of whom he was demanded by his pursuer, one of the Barukzye chieftains of Candahar. Mehrab Khan had the generosity to refuse to give up the fugitive, and the Barukzye the generosity to applaud the refusal, saying, that "Mehrab Khan acted like a good man." Shah Soojah had now an opportunity of showing his gratitude to the man to whom he was perhaps indebted for liberty and life, and he did so characteristically. On understanding that Mehrab Khan demurred to the passage of the army, he wrote to him, reminding him that Shah Nawaz Khan was now in his camp; this Shah Nawaz Khan being a shoot of the ruling family of Khelât, and a legitimate pretender, with pretensions about one hundred years old, to the throne; whom the English afterwards actually set up on the death of Mehrab Khan, and maintained for a few months. In any estimate of the character of our protegé, Shah Soojah, this incident ought not to be forgotten.

Sir Alexander Burnes, who was more than once at Khelât for the purpose of conducting the negotiation for the supply of provisions and carriage with Mehrab Khan, has recorded some of his conversations with the chieftain. The Khan's remarks upon the dangerous impolicy of our conduct, by which, though we might set up Shah Soojah, "we could never win over the

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Affghan nation," indicate far more judgment and shrewdness than he receives credit for from Mr. Masson, who considers him an imprudent, though by no means treacherous, character. Once he is said to have used words of ominous prophecy: "You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it out again?" Ultimately, after showing much reluctance, Mehrab, as the historian of the Bombay Times says, promised plentifully, as most Oriental, and many European, princes, under these circumstances, would have done; trusting that the chapter of accidents would enable him to evade, or release him from a treaty which was acceded to under fear or constraint."

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As might have been expected, these promises were little regarded; probably it would not have been in Mehrab Khan's power to perform them, whatever had been his intention. But the distress of the army, in consequence of their non-performance, seems to have been fearful; even before the main division of Bengal, estimated, with the camp followers, at little short of one hundred thousand men, entered the tremendous pass of the Bolan, the non-combatants were reduced to half rations. A vivid idea of the nature of the march may be gained from Dr. Atkinson's sketches of the scenery of this pass; the deep and narrow split in the hills, where the precipitous cliffs, inclining towards each other as they run up, and, nearly meeting at top,

"Forehead to forehead hold their monstrous horns."

Half-way up, a wild group of Beloochees are perched in a cleft peering and pointing their matchlocks over the ledge at the invading column; some adventurous Sepoys are scrambling up the rocks to some "coin of vantage" from which to assail the plunderers; while the long line of march, men, horses, and laden camels, is toiling on painfully below. During the advance of seventy miles along that terrible chasm, their losses in baggage and provisions were great, owing to the difficulties of the route even more than to such predatory attacks; and the Bombay column, when following some weeks later, found the track marked by the dead bodies of horses, camels, and marauding Beloochees, who were invariably dealt with according to the order that " no prisoners were to be taken." Yet they were never attacked in force. An intercepted letter to a hill chief, written, whether by Mehrab Khan, or, as Mr. Masson thinks, by his treacherous minister without his knowledge, contains the following expressions:-"What is the use of your treaties and your arrangements? all child's play. There is no relief but in death: no cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, goods, and bodies must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy." Had this fierce but not unwise counsel been heartily followed; had

Mehrab Khan combined with the chiefs of Candahar for the purpose of resolutely opposing the advance of the English, there seems no slight probability that the invasion of Affghanistan might have terminated short of the frontier of that country. But the retribution which, perhaps, but for the disunion of our enemies, might have signalized the Pass of the Bolan, was deferred until it should be better merited;

"Until a day more dark and drear,

And a more memorable year'

should give to Khoord Cabool and Tezeen the fame of the slaughter of an English army.

Between Quettah and Candahar, shortly before entering the Kojuk Pass, the danger-not from the sword, but from starvation-was great. The camp followers were in a state bordering on famine; the men were dispirited, and desponding; speculations upon the necessity of a retreat were prevalent in the camp; but were put an end to by the spirited and judicious order of the Commander-in-chief, directing an immediate advance. Still beset by attacks, rather on their baggage and stores than themselves, losing very few men by the sword, but many by sickness and exhaustion, having had many horses shot to preserve them from dying by starvation, and almost all the rest unfit for duty, the harassed, half-famished, and diminished column struggled on to Candahar. The Barukzye chiefs of Candahar, deterred from resistance by the treacherous desertion of one of their most influential adherents, fled at the approach of the British army, and Shah Soojah entered unopposed into the second city of his dominions, where he was apparently well received-flowers and loaves of bread being strewed before him by his loving subjects; the latter of which demonstrations of respect would have been more to the purpose in the course of the march through the passes. He proceeded to constitute a court, hold levees, and perform other similarly important functions of sovereignty. For all such formalities he seems to have had a strong taste, diametrically opposed to the prejudices and principles of his Affghan subjects, accustomed to feel pride in the rude freedom and social equality which existed under the half-patriarchal, halffeudal, government of their chieftains. On the plain outside the city, surrounded by English officers, and the roar of English cannon, he was solemnly recognised as sovereign of Affghanistan. The whole ceremony was conducted according to theatric programme, assigning to every one his place; and, among others, a place to the populace," whose exuberant loyalty was to be "restrained" by the Shah's troops. The performance went off well; but the part of Hamlet was omitted-the people were not there.

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Advancing, after two months' delay, from Candahar, and still exposed to similar privations, the army arrived at length before

the fortified city of Ghuznee in a state in which failure would have been most dangerous, and success was almost necessary. Such situations are not unfrequent in war; and as the die falls, there is blame for the imprudence which risked and lost-or all praise for the courage which risked and won. "I know," said Napoleon, after hearing and answering the objections of some of his generals to his proposed scheme for the world-dividing campaign of 1813, "I know, after all, I shall be judged by the event." But the swift decision to try, and the resolution to win, which have never a small share in determining the event, determined that of the Ghuznee campaign of 1839. The battering train had been left at Candahar; the defences of the town were strong; but one gate, out of twenty-four, had not been walled up; and the scheme suggested by an engineer officer was instantly adopted by the general-to blow in this gate with powder, and carry the town by storm. All was done as it was arranged. On the 21st of July the garrison of Ghuznee first saw from their walls the colours of an English regiment; by five o'clock A. M. on the 23d, those colours were floating from the citadel.

Nothing can be more picturesque, nothing, as an exhibition of determined valour, apart from all considerations of the cause in which it was shown, more brilliant, than that assault, as told in the official despatches, and the accounts of those who were present. The stormy night, the violent gusts of wind preventing the garrison from hearing the approach of our columns; the enemy, seen through the chinks of the gate, quietly smoking, immediately before the explosion in which they were buried; the storming party, under Colonel Dennie, struggling through the half-ruined gateway, at once feeling and fighting their way forward through the covered passage in the dark, until their leader saw the blue sky and stars above the heads of their retiring opponents;-all these circumstances belong to the romance of war. According to the account of Colonel Dennie, confirmed from other quarters, an unavoidable mistake prevented the storming party from being immediately followed by the supporting column, of which the advance was delayed for some minutes; and Dennie and his small band forced their way into the town, and held their position there on the ramparts within, for some time, unsupported and alone.

"Alone I did it." He was the Coriolanus of Ghuznee.

This exploit, in fact, decided the struggle, and Shah Soojah might now consider himself, by the grace of the English, king of Affghanistan. We find him "every inch a king," taking, and, which is much stranger, receiving in Lord Keane's despatch, ostentatious credit for sparing the life of the "rebel" governor of Ghuznee, Prince Hyder Khan, son of Dost Mahomed; "as if," says Dr. Kennedy, with just indignation, "the bare possi

bility of the contrary could have been contemplated." The day previous he had begun to exercise in a yet more decided manner the rights of sovereignty. Fifty or sixty Affghan prisoners, (prisoners of war) had been taken and brought before him. His Majesty, who appears to have been fond of using strong language, began to storm at the rebels. One of them, a chief, irritated by the language addressed to him by the Shah, rushed towards him, and wounded an attendant with his dagger. The king, in the rage, it would seem, of a coward, instantly ordered the execution of the whole; and, in a few minutes, these fifty or sixty prisoners-again we say, prisoners of war—were massacred to a man.

This butchery was said at the time to have been perpetrated in the presence of the British Envoy, and by authority of the British Commander-in-Chief. We are sincerely glad to find that this was not the case; but that Shah Soojah was at once warned by the Commander-in-Chief that, while within the limits of a British camp, he must measure out his mercy and justice, even towards his rebellious subjects, in a different proportion. One can conceive the unmitigated disgust and scorn with which every English gentleman-every English man in the camp, must have heard of the performance of this, the first Bed of Justice, held by the imbecile old man whom they were supporting in leading-strings, over the bodies of his subjects, to a throne. This was the first occasion on which he acted for himself, and appears fair to presume that it was in character.

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While the army staid at Ghuznee, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, brother of Dost Mahomed, (mentioned in our former article,) appeared once more in the character of a peace-maker, asking for himself, nothing; for Dost Mahomed, his hereditary office of Grand Vizier, as the condition of submitting to the Shah. This, of course, could not be granted. When presented to the Shah, we find his deportment was not uncourteous, but his courtesy did not prevent him from addressing to the king a rather awkward question. "If you are to be king, of what use is the British army here? If the English are to rule over the country, of what use are you here?" By the ancient laws of Menu, a severe penalty is attached to the offence of overcoming a Brahmin in argument; we do not know whether Affghan law attaches any penalty to bringing a king into an inextricable dilemma; but, if there is any such, we think it is pretty clear that the good Nawab had incurred it. He was offered maintenance in his property and honours, which he declined, and departed to share his brother's fortune; having first solemnly laid the responsibility of the blood which would be shed upon the King and the Envoy. At this, "one could not but smile."

* History in the Bombay Monthly Times.

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