SUBJECT AND OBJECT

BY

REV. JOHNSTON ESTEP WALTER

Author of "The Perception of Space and Matter,"
"The Principles of Knowledge,” and “Nature
and Cognition of Space and Time."

JOHNSTON AND PENNEY

WEST NEWTON PA.

1915

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE SUBJECT OR SOUL.

I. Theories of the Soul-Hume's theory of the mind as

the broken succession of our perceptions or thoughts without

subject or substance-His doctrine of the knowable relations

among the separately existing perceptions composing mind—

His explanation of the knowable relations by foisting in a

second mind of a peculiar nature-The theory self-contra-

dictory and baseless, and involves a return to the theory of

substance-The later form of the theory, in which mind is

regarded as, not a disconnected, but a connected, succession

of thoughts, a stream-Professor James' exposition-It is

chargeable with similar inconsistency and errors to those

of Hume's-Its grave faults especially as an account of

memory and the sense of personal identity-Making a mind

of the permanent and extended brain-II. The Soul maintained

as a permanent and identical reality-Relation of soul and

body-Mind as the producer of the conscious modes-Re-

lation of the conscious affections and the producing mind—

What do we really know of mind, and how?—Knowledge of the

Succession of mind-Of its Permanence-Memory as a mode of

mediate knowledge Knowledge of the mind superior to knowl-

edge of the brain and every other physical object-Knowledge

of personal identity-Knowledge of the mind our supreme

knowledge, as being the most direct and certain and the

basis of the knowledge of all else.

Subject and Object discriminated-The two sorts of objects,

Subject-Objects and Object-Objects (1) Relation of subject

and subject-object-Subject-objects constitute a distinct

internal procession and system-(2) Relation of object-

objects to subject and subject-objects-Possible cognition of

object-objects-The cognition is inferential-Comparison with

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the "window" theory of perception-Projection of sensations
and percepts-The immediate materials of both mental science
and physical science are the same-Mental science and phys-
ical science distinguished-The two worlds, the internal and
the external, and their correspondence Does the knowledge
of self require the knowledge of other selves?-Does the knowl-
edge of physical objects require the knowledge of other per-
sons? The view that "what science finds in Nature is the
mind's own latent wealth”-Dualistic realism since Locke.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND OUR PERCEPTION OF MATTER

Nature of Matter-Reality and nature of atoms-Perception
of matter to be treated with special reference to the Berkeleian
immaterialism—Relation of Berkeley to Locke-Berkeley's rea-
soning against the knowableness and the reality of external
matter-His doctrine of the relation of spatial extension to
the so called Secondary Qualities, as color-His doctrine of
causation within mind-In his teachings respecting subjective
extension and subjective causation, Berkeley states and ad-
vocates principles which constitute a substantial basis for
a true representative knowledge of matter; and which, there-
fore, turn about, so to speak, and serve as means of his
own refutation-Berkeley's place in the historical development
of the science of external perception.

CHAPTER IV

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TRUTH

Truth objective and subjective; or truth as fact or reality,
and as correspondence of thought to reality-In this essay
truth is taken as entirely subjective-The correspondence of
thought to its object or to reality-Four sorts of truth or
correspondence of thought: (1) Correspondence to the sub-
stantial mind; (2) to other thought; (3) to past events; (4)
to external objects-Truth and knowledge compared-Antago-
nism of idealists to truth defined as correspondence of thought
to objects external to mind-The same as Berkeley's main
opposition to the doctrine of the representative cognition of
external matter-Possibility of correspondence, and known
correspondence, of thought to external things-Truth a mat-
ter of progression-1. How far do we make truth?-The
"cognitive making" of reality-Reality as determined by our
wishes-The making of truth by our thinking and wishing-

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The intellect as conditioned in the making of truth by the
original and indispensable materials and forms given to it-
Nature of the sense-materials supplied to the intellect-De-
pendence of intellect also upon the action of external objects.-
2. Stability of truth-It results from the constancy of the in-
ternal and the external conditions of knowledge-3. Utility as
the criterion of truth-The real as the useful-All things use-
ful to us because of the systematic unity and uniformity of
nature-Neither reality nor truth, though inseparable from
utility, is identical with it; they are more, they have a
primacy-The conception of God considered as beneficial and as
a "working hypothesis"-The truth of our knowledge of God.

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